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PS 142 War and Peace

Empirical Tests of Conventional Deterrence. Huth (1988) published major study testing

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PS 142 War and Peace

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    1. PS 142 War and Peace The Conventional Deterrence Debate

    2. Empirical Tests of Conventional Deterrence Huth (1988) published major study testing “extended immediate deterrence” Defending challenges against 3rd party protégé 58 cases of “extended immediate deterrence.”

    3. Empirical Findings from Huth Military capabilities matter “immediate” balance matters most “short term” matters too, not “long term” Reciprocating strategy Reputation for TFT Not bullying OR appeasement

    4. Empirical Non-Findings from Huth Links between defender and protégé NO impact Alliance ties Trade Arms Transfers Still, overall viewed as strong support for Deterrence Theory

    5. Critiques of Deterrence Theory Lebow and Stein, several problems with deterrence theory Psychological vs. Rational Actor approach Disliked US foreign policy Disliked statistical approach Critique focused on Huth’s data Debate over research design & measures

    6. Critiques of Huth and Russett Dataset “Cold War” sources – dataset “blames” China and USSR for crises No – “challenger” coding not pejorative L&S say Huth “challengers” never had a “serious” intention of attacking Demand direct evidence that challenger WOULD have attacked without deterrent threat

    7. Lebow and Stein Data on Extended Deterrence L&S use their own rules to code cases of “extended deterrence” Only 13 cases in past 100 years! Only three “successful” cases Munich 1938 Six Day War 1967 Greece and Turkey 1974

    8. L&S REAL critique These data allow L&S to say “deterrence does not work” Defenders should not make threats Defenders should focus on “reassurance” Increasing the value of capitulation Advocating a policy of appeasement

    9. Critiquing the L&S Data on Deterrence L&S codings implausible on their face Only “successes” are two of the most famous failures of deterrence Only ONE real success in 100 years??? Why are these data so skewed? L&S demand for “serious” intention to attack selects ONLY challengers who CANNOT be deterred

    10. Lessons from the Deterrence Debate Research design matters! Rules for selecting cases and measuring variables determine your result Are the cases representative of the phenomenon you want to study? This is the problem of Selection Bias Also explains some of Huth’s odd results Defender Ties to Protégé

    11. Lessons from the Deterrence Debate Theory and policy are linked, but they are not the same thing Evidence in support of deterrence theory is not necessarily evidence in support of US foreign policy Example: Schelling’s arguments come from deterrence theory, but they are not ALWAYS good policy

    12. Policy Applications of Conventional Deterrence Conventional Deterrence and the war in Iraq: Should the US have done things differently before the war? Should the US be doing things differently now?

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