US Foreign Policy Between the Wars

1. US Foreign Policy Between the Wars Kevin J. Benoy

2. As the Great War Ended • Of all combatants, the USA emerged from the war in the strongest position. • Militarily and economically, she had strengthened her position enormously during the war. • At Paris, Wilson looked as if he would bring America into prominence in a new world order. • Yet within just a few short years, the USA would retreat into isolationism.

3. No League of Nations Membership • The USA didn’t even join the League of Nations – Wilson’s pet project. • It was a product of the post-war treaty process that America’s Congress ultimately rejected.

4. Isolationism? • This isolationism was not complete. • US economic penetration of Latin America, which took off during the wartime period, continued. • American diplomats still pressed for an “open door” trade policy, allowing free markets for US manufacturers – though America also put up tariff walls to inhibit imports.

5. Isolationism? • Americans were not above threatening strong action against those who stood in the way of US business interests – as when Mexico considered nationalizing American owned oil wells within the country. Like the UK in the 19th century, US rhetoric was Classical Liberal, but policies were strongly nationalist.

6. War Debts • America insisted on full repayment -- $12 billion at 5% interest. • Europeans hoped for cancellation – as Britain had cancelled its allies’ debts at the end of the Napoleonic Wars. The US was less generous. • Eventually a lower interest rate was allowed, but that was all. • It was not until the German financial crisis of 1923 that the US came to accept that war debts and reparation payments were linked. • High American tariffs also impeded European efforts to earn the dollars needed to pay their debts.

7. Washington Conference • Relations were strained in the immediate post-war years. • The large US navy was a potential threat to Britain – paralleling the Anglo German naval rivalry before WW1. • A Solution was arrived at in Washington, in 1921-1922. • Suspicious of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the US got a deal whereby the pre-war alliance was widened into a 4 Power Pact, joining Britain, the Japan, France and the USA in a deal to consult over Pacific problems. • They also agreed to limit naval sizes to specific ratios: 5:5:3:1.75:1.75 for Britain, the US: Japan, France and Italy respectively. • The agreement ended Anglo-American hostility, but wrecked Britain’s special relationship with Japan. France too was suspicious of Britain and America.

8. Isolationism • America’s lack of involvement in most the bigger international discussions was oddly out of step with her financial involvement. • Her industrial strength dwarfed that of other nations – equivalent to the next 6 countries combined. • The size of her domestic economy gave Americans a sense of self-sufficiency and they saw little reason to concern themselves with many global issues. • Besides, what direct threats existed to America anyway?

9. Isolationism • A strong US navy was maintained after the Great War and a modern air force was created. The army was largely wound down • This allowed sufficient power to intervene in the so-called “banana republics” on behalf of US business interests, but military expenditures were minimized. • Even the US code-breaking service was eliminated when Secretary Stimson ended funding to it, feeling it was no longer of value.

10. The Kellogg-Briand Pact • In 1928 the US made a small foray into world affairs. • American and French diplomats suggested a treaty renouncing war as a means of settling disputes between the two powers. • The idea was wildly popular and had great traction in an election year. • Amid great fanfare, the treaty was enlarged to include other nations. • Signed in Paris on August 27, 1928, the Kellogg-Briand Pact outlawed war except in cases of self defense. • Then America again withdrew into self-satisfied isolation.

11. Threats to Peace - Asia • In the 1930s. America’s old Pacific nemesis, Japan, flagrantly violated international law when it invaded Manchuria. • President Roosevelt condemned the action, but refused to join in economic sanctions or to do anything that might lead to military confrontation with Japan. • Domestic trouble strengthened isolationism.

12. America First • Isolationism was enshrined in legislation: • In 1934 Congress banned loans to any foreign government defaulting on war debts. • In 1935 the US resolved not to sell arms to any nation involved in a war. • Later legislation forbade loans to combatant nations. • Such neutralist legislation made matters worse. Britain and France were weakened in their resolve to stand up to fascist aggression

13. America First • When Italy invaded Ethiopia, Roosevelt condemned the action, but US oil shipments to Italy actually increased.

14. America First • It was not until 1937 that American policy makers began to shift positions – and only gradually, as Charles Lindbergh and his America First movements still had considerable traction.

15. Shifting Policy • Roosevelt and others came to understand that threats were evolving in Europe and Asia. • Secret naval talks began with Britain about the German and Japanese threats. • The cynical Japanese attack on an American patrol vessel, the Panay, in China, made the Japanese menace real to many.

16. Shifting Policy • Military aircraft production doubled. • By 1940 there was a further commitment to double naval strength and to increase the army from an insignificant force to over 1 million men.

17. On the Eve of War • US tardiness in preparing for war was noted in both Berlin and Tokyo. • Hitler calculated that growing American power would not prove a hinderance until the mid 1940s. • Japan was more precise in its estimation. They felt: • By 1941 Japanese navel strength would be 70% that of the US. • By 1942 it would be 65%. • By 1943 it would be 50%. • By 1944 it would be 30%. • Both Germany and Japan had a powerful incentive to act before the “sleeping giant,” as Admiral Yamamoto called it, awoke.

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