This paper represents initial stage of my doctoral research.

1. Institutional Isomorphism: A Theoretical Model for Institutional Change in Post-Communist Ukraine & Belarus • This paper represents initial stage of my doctoral research. • Outlines part of my research and goes into first assessment on the basis of official documents • in this presentation, I will outline my whole research and its theoretical framework, so that this paper can be placed into context • secondly, I will also elaborate on my paper, in particular the cases of Belarus and Ukraine • PhD Research • background in Slavonic philology and Eastern European Studies, MA in International Relations & Conflict Management • PhD research started in 2003 (until 2006) • main aim: explaining institutional change and geopolitical pluralism in Slavic Core of CIS (R, U, B) by empirically testing the theory of institutional isomorphism (neo-inst perspective) • find out if inst isom.  a viable, adequate theoretical model for explaining instit change in eastern Europe? STATUS QUAESTIONIS - BACKGROUND • implosion of the Soviet Regime  turned post-communist area even more complex picture than before. • - Central Europe made unambiguous Western choice --> by striving to become part of the Euro-Atlantic security structures e.g. EU bid • - Eastern Europe more complicated. region with divergent domestic and FP choices. e.g.: CIS --> conjoins countries with diverse policy goals in 1 organis: e.g. Ukr: CIS = elegant solution (civilised divorce); e.g. Rus&Bel: co-ordinating econ & secur. policies among Soviet successor states, after 10 yrs : sub-regional initiatives: GUUAM, Eur Econ Comm, Union R& B, Common Econ Zone.

2. So since 1991:evolution : from unitary Soviet state to area with a variety of foreign policy goals ranging from EU membership to regional integration some academics (Zatulin & Migranian) identified this as geopolitical pluralism -observed in different levels of state and society: • -divergent policy preferences of the former Soviet states • - in different political models on which the newly independent states based themselves during transition • - diversity in economic transition and trade links. • I want to focus on how this geopolitical pluralism is reflected in the instit change of NIS, in particular Ukr & Bel. Bel & Ukr each developed own pol & instit transition. • The apparent divergence in FP preferences can lead to the question whether instit. in these countries have been adapted to the institutional structures of the EU or the CIS. • More specifically, I would like to identify the mechanisms within the political institutions of Ukraine and Belarus that generate ‘isomorphism’ toward the European Union and the Commonwealth of Independent States, and the rationale behind the divergent foreign policy orientations of these countries. • Theory • I depart from the school of new institutionalism.  instit I focus upon here are defined as formal organisations that determine behaviour, interests, and belief-systems and that structure relations between different groups in the national community and international order. • In order to systematically explain institutional change in Ukr & Bel, I chose to use a branch of sociol instit’s organis analysis as theoretical model to be developed, namely instit isomorphism • first put forward by W Powell & P DiMaggio in 1983 • P&D describe instit change as instit becoming increasingly similar (isomorph) in order to obtain legitimacy (without necessarily becoming more efficient). P&D stress actor’s belief that legitimacy stems from conforming to general rules & norms; isomorphism

3. Similar processes of isomorphism can be witnessed in the post-comm. transition of CEE  demise of Soviet instit created certain void that called for inst-l reinterpretation. Looking East and West for inspiration for reforms is inherent to the transition processes. (eg EU integration of Central Europe, adapting to acquis communautaire) • More specifically, I want to assess how isomorphism surfaces through different stages in the instit of the selected countries. Secondly I want to look deeper into the reasons of isomorphism. • I translated these 2 aims into 2 impt distinct stages that lead to institutional isomorphism. • 1st stage: comprises instit definition towards org field • 2nd stage: homogenisation or isomorphism of institutions  In my paper I mainly focused on the first stage Stage 1: Institutional Definition towards org field • Def. org field: consists of org that constitute recognised area of institutional life, e.g. regulatory agencies, a legal system, or a supranational org. • first step: examine instit definition of 2 cases towards org fields surrounding them. how do instit of U & B define themselves on level ofFP towards EU & CISI chose inst involved in drafting, reflecting on & implementing FP: pres admin, MFA, parl 2.) Secondly, also empirical analysis of inst definition through a systematic assessment of 4 org characteristics  char. contribute to deepening relations between the centre& periphery of the org. field  also via interviews (see later in presentation) SLIDE 4 org characteristics

4. Stage 2: Insititutional Isomorphism • 2nd stage of research will consist of a thorough evaluation of instit change / redesigning in Ukr&Bel.  e.g. in Ukr: interesting to see shifting responsibilities for EU policy between instit (from Min of economy to MFA),…. (here: indicators for isomorphism – hypotheses in interviews) • After this, the divergences in FP preferences that we might witness lead to issue of geopol pluralism. I will try to explain the reasons of geopol plur by a. Looking at origins & identifying patterns of inst change (based on hypotheses -indicators of isomorphism) b. seeking how to explain variations in institutional change. a. Origins and Patterns of Institutional Change • should uncover underlying motives for the instit in U & B becoming isomorphic - conform to EU or CIS org.fields • Comes down to identifying causal mechanisms of inst change b. Sources of Variation in Instit Change • how to explain variations in instit change of Ukr, Bel? • reason for variations lies partly in the fact that the creation, development & change of institutions are history-dependent processes (Powell 1991:195)  path dependent patterns of development, in which initial choices preclude future options. to better understand factors that promote heterogeneity need to trace sources of divergence by exploring path dependent processes. --> this is the main theoretical framework for the research. In this paper I mainly concentrated on stage one; the institutional definition. Analytical overview of instit. developments in Ukr&Bel; summarised by linking them to 4 organis. characteristics.

5. Stage 1: Instit Definition in Ukraine & Belarus UKRAINE • After 1991focus on nation building, not on state or institutions. •  complicating factors in Ukr: a.Legacy of Soviet institutions b. Chaos surrounding Ukr independence a. Ukr inherited quasi-state from SU.  mix of instit held over from comm. era with new ones  instit fragmentation & confusion  too vague demarcation of institution’s authority (legacy of Supreme Soviet)  therefore inst engaged in unnecessary daily business instead of focusing on legislative work b. Chaos after indep. Aug 1991; unexpected coup, process of disintegration was suddenly speeded up; yet ukr institutionally unprepared.  no structured plan for instit reform  Ukr resorted to Soviet instit for inspiration; hybrid of old Soviet & new elements: combination of instit continuity (soviet) and inst renewal (western examples) • No clear definition of responsibilities, tasks, powers  institutional confusion and fragmentation became stumbling block for formulation FP • 1994 Kuchma: FP initiatives stepped up. European ambitions; (associate) membership. 1998 Strategy for EU integration issued. Instit coop with EU: instit level: minister for EU integration, national agency for Eu integration, special parl committee & dept in MFA for Eur integration. Inter-instit coop: in framework of PCA. Coop council, coop committee, interparl coop council, subcommittees, etc. CIS coop. Limited participation in inter-inst coop structures (interparl assembly, executive committee, biannual summits) yet no partic in agreem that has supranation powers over ukr: unconstitutional.

6. BELARUS • similar development  also strong focus on national identity, yet BPF failed to reach whole Bel population (countryside) no mass popular mobilisation • Nomenklatura: remained in power, election supr sov 1990: 86% comm, 25 members BPF  intent on preserving status quo, so also instit continuity After 1991 putsch: had to denounce communism, yet still, changes remained superficial (eg didn’t vote to dissolve Supr Sov because of comm majority); csv elite still dominated pol instit and preserved status quo  1991-94: all gvt actions directed to reinforcing gvt autonomy and increasing competencies of exec body compared to legislat bodies • 1994 Lukashenka: instit reforms (to his advantage) 1995-96 referenda: new state symbols, new state language (rus), new parliament  sup sov = pal predstav & sov respubliki • Controversies of state building reflected in B’s FP  before Luka: rapprochement to West; PCA, CSCE, CoE, IMF, EBRD, WB, Start I, PfP NATO,...)  although former comm did not want too much econ rappr with West  cause marketisation would seriously disturb status quo. • Luka: pro-CIS  coop on inst & inter-inst level, Union with Russia as model for coop in framework of CIS • EU: unlike Ukr no specific inst structures for EU integration, no specif strategies, documents: negative remarks (Eu failed to complete PCA because of its unadequate interpretation of referenda). Sanctions: problematic relation, no more inst definition

7. Comparison of instit definition Looking at both countries for comparison: • bothcountries started transition with initial focus on nation building (nat identity)  in both countries, this took priority over instit change (overshadowed) • For bothc.: another obstacle for instit change was the absence of real revolution; more process of gradual disintegration, soci&pol breakdown & reconstruction.  institutionally: no radical breach with Soviet past. The unexpected coup in 1991 comes closest to p.p., but this was to preserve Soviet times!  rapid breakdown afterwards left countries inst-ly unprepared: continuity. • Divergence: 1. Change 1994 : both c. new leaders, but: divergence in instit development, in FP. * Belarus: Luka: elim of pro-W opposition, pulled throughinstit reforms through unconstit referenda * Ukraine: constit 1996  limited powers for presid compared to Bel or Ru; pres still had to account for decisions to parl • compared: in Ukraine, instit structures more proportional than Bel; better balance between exec & legisl inst (although troubled relations with VR) 2. Instit creation in relation to FP orientation: • Created new sections & depts in existing instit • Specific inter-inst coop structures  See table EU Ukraine: -active instit dynamism on inst/interinst level - increased information load: strategy etc - mutual awareness: new neighb Belarus: -after 1996; no specific inst or interinst interaction - inf load: no specific strategies, neg docum -no mut awareness CIS Belarus: - strong ins&interinst coop. - inf load: specific strategies CIS, union, EvrAzES,... - enthusiastic member of CIS & union state. Ukraine: - reluctant member, no specif inst definition - interinst coop str:; limited participation (if doesn’ t violate ukr constit - no specif docum or strategies - no mutal awareness, limited particip, only symbolic (econ) eg Russia

8. Stage 2: Isomorphism • Looking at this comparison, one could say Ukr bandwagons with EU and balances its relations with CIS (balancing by allying against dominant force; GUUAM) • Conversely, Bel bandwagons with CIS &Ru (aligning with dominant force in region) balances with EU? Doubtful • YET this does not exactly explain the motives for these countries’ FP orientations. Why Ukr-Eu and Bel-CIS? Why divergence especially since countries with very similar backgrounds & past --> isomorphism. • instit redesigning in ukr & bel to resemble instit in the org fields in order to obtain (more) legitimacy vis-à-vis EU or CIS. • Yet what are the incentives for choosing EU or CIS and how does one explain the variations in inst change? • Incentives: origins & patterns of inst change. I explained this by pointing out some causal mechanisms: coercive, mimetic, recomp org fields (tabel)  how to account for variations in inst change; why do these countries have divergent FP orientations? • Ukr and Bel can have different organis responses to a. certain defining events b.inst pressures or influence (conforming to EU programs)  here historical heritage of a country can play a role; path dependent patterns of development.  historical development of ukr&bel over last 300yrs almost parallel. YET brief periods of independence  might they be defining moments that proved to be critical junctures? Final remark: in phd research, Russia will be included. Special position as leading country of CIS and yet still having developed inter-instit relations with EU, but still i really want to include Russia in my comparison!