Rutgers University-Newark CIMIC Dr. Nabil Adam Director and Professor Newark, NJ

1. Second Workshop on Advanced Technologies in Real-Time Monitoring and Modeling for Drinking Water Safety and Security Rutgers University-Newark CIMIC Dr. Nabil Adam Director and Professor Newark, NJ December 11-12, 2002

2. Events of 9/11 Led to National Concern Over Critical Infrastructure • EPA created a Water Protection Task Force in October, 2001 to improve the security of the nation's drinking water and wastewater infrastructure • WPTF identified water distribution system vulnerability as a security threat of major concern • In June 2002, Pres. Bush established Bio-terrorism Act requiring vulnerability assessments and threat response plans from water utilities

3. EPA’s Office of Research and Development • In spring of 2002 ORD Prepared Homeland Security Research Plan • Also identified distribution systems as a point of major vulnerability • Heavy emphasis on monitoring and sensor development • Both ORD and WPTF identified the need for advanced technologies and modeling to address water distribution system vulnerabilities

4. Nature of Threats – Community Water Supplies (CWS) • There are ~60,000 CWS in the US serving over 226 million people • Over 63% of these systems supply water to less then 2.4% of the population • About 5.4% supply water to 78.5% of the population • In addition there are 140,000 non-community water systems that serve schools, recreational areas, trailer parks, etc. • CWS are designed to deliver water under pressure -- generally supply most of the water for fire fighting purposes • Loss of water or a substantial loss of pressure could disable fire fighting capability -- interrupt service and disrupt public confidence • This loss might result from sabotaging pumps that maintain flow and pressure, or disabling electric power sources could cause long term disruption

5. Vulnerability of Water Systems • Water systems are spatially diverse and therefore, have an inherent potential to be vulnerable to a variety of threats • Physical, chemical, and biological • There are several areas of vulnerability including • the raw water source (surface or groundwater); • raw water channels and pipelines; • raw water reservoirs; • treatment facilities; • connections to the distribution system; • pump stations and valves; • finished water tanks and reservoirs. • Each of these system elements presents unique challenges to the water utility in safeguarding the water supply.

6. Physical Disruption • The ability of a water supply system to provide water to customers can be compromisedby destroying/disrupting key physical elements of the system, e.g., • raw water facilities (dams, reservoirs, pipes, channels) • treatment facilities • distribution system elements (transmission lines& pump stations) • Physical disruption may result in • significant economic cost, inconvenience and loss of confidence by customers, but have a limited direct threat to human health • Exceptions, include, e.g., explosive release of chlorine gas at a treatment plant • Water utilities should examine their physical assets, determine areas of vulnerability, and increase security accordingly • Redundant system components would provide backup capability in case of accidental or purposeful damage to facilities

7. Contamination (1) • The most serious potential terrorist threat to water systems. • Chemical or biological agents could spread throughout a distribution system and result in sickness or death • For some agents, the presence of the contaminant might not be known until it is too late • Even without serious health impacts, just the knowledge that a group had breached a water system could seriously undermine customers’ confidence in the system • Accidental contamination of water systems has resulted in many fatalities, e.g., • Cholera contamination in Peru, Cryptosporidium contamination in Milwaukee, Wisconsin (U.S.), and Salmonella contamination in Gideon, Missouri (U.S.)

8. Contamination (2) • CDC has defined three categories of potentially threatening organisms • Category A Agents/Water Threat, e.g., smallpox, anthrax • Category B Agents/Water Threat, e.g., brucellosis • Category C Agents/Water Threat, e.g., yellow fever, multidrug-resistant tuberculosis • The U.S. Army has conducted extensive testing and research on potential biological agents. • Though much is known about these agents, there is still research needed to fully characterize the impacts, stability and tolerance to chlorine of many of these agents

9. The Rutgers Initiative - Objective • Address the problem of drinking water resources and distribution network security in a fundamental manner and of a long-term nature: • Need to ensure the safety and security of drinking water at the source and in distribution networks within our region and within our nation for future generations • This effort would be consistent with the national goal of critical infrastructure protection

10. Road Map (1) • Convene (Rutgers CIMIC and EPA Region II) workshops of relevant organizations 2) Establish a Regional Drinking Water Safety and Security Consortium 3) Leverage existing systems and advanced technologies as elements of an end-to-end pilot systems 4) Design and develop an operational prototype system

11. Road Map (2) 5) Evaluate the technologies in an end-to-end prototype system (time span: approximately 3years) 6) Work with utilities to oversee and evaluate the implementation of an operational system 7) Develop the next generation prototype system by early acquisition and testing of new technologies and modeling systems

12. Rutgers and EPA Held Workshop in June 2002 • Workshop held on June 27th-28th, 2002 – Hilton Gateway Hotel, Newark, NJ • Attendees: about 115 representatives from: 20 industries, 16 water utilities, 13 government agencies, 14 academic institutions

13. The 1st Workshop, June 27-28 Objective • Provide a forum for scientists, water utility professionals, and leaders in the area of real time sensor and modeling technologies to share their expertise and ideas on how these evolving technologies may be used to monitor drinking water resources and distribution networks in order to protect public health • A follow-up workshop to take place in December 11-12 , 2002

14. Preliminary Workshop Findings (1) • Surface Source Water • Very large dilution factors are typical • Some biotoxins may be potent enough to cause negative health effects even at very low concentration • Natural treatment processes can remove or neutralize most contaminants • Contamination near the intake will minimize dilution and natural treatment • Off-stream storage is vulnerable to attack

15. Preliminary Workshop Findings (2) • Distribution System Vulnerabilities • More vulnerable than source waters • Large, complex, and accessible: Commercial & residential service connections; fire hydrants; finished water storage

16. Preliminary Workshop Findings (3) • Difficult to contaminate an entire city via the distribution system, but fairly easy to impact small sections or individual buildings • Impossible to eliminate all access, but the key is to • Harden system components, • Monitor, evaluate, respond and contain the threats in real-time fashion

17. The Regional Drinking Water Safety Security Consortium (RDWSSC)Goal • Provide a forum for state and local government agencies representatives, highly talented scientists, water utility professionals, and leaders in the area of real time sensor and modeling technologies • Provide a test bed for the rapid prototyping of advanced and still evolving technologies to monitor drinking water resources and distribution networks in order to better protect the public

18. RDWSSC - Membership A MoU among the following members • U. S. Environmental Protection Agency • State of New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection • U. S. Geological Survey • American Water Works Service Company, Inc. • North Jersey District Water Supply Commission • Passaic Valley Water Commission • Rutgers CIMIC The goal of the MOU is to implement the drinking water security recommendations of the 1st workshop

19. The Rutgers Laboratory for Water Security (LWS) • An independent research lab within the guidelines established by Rutgers University • Provides research forum and serve as research support to the Consortium • Attracts support from federal, state, non-profit funding agencies such as AWWARF, NSF, DARPA, EPA, etc.

20. RDWSSC - Immediate Objective • Development and implementation of an Early Warning System (EWS) that • Is real-time • Integrates sensors, monitoring and modeling into an end-to-end system • Is deployed in real-world environment • Utilizes in the source waters (reservoirs and streams) and the distribution network by municipal water systems • Document the Consortium’s experience into a • “Guide for Developing and implementing an EWS” • to share with others across the country

21. Approach • Three Phases • Phase I • Develop Prototype System and serve as test bed for integration of monitoring and modeling systems • Phase II • Investigate technologies close to commercial application • Phase III • Evaluate emerging technologies

22. The Consortium Unique Contributions • A collaboration among federal and state agencies together with water utilities and academic institutions • The Consortium will provide several unique test sites for evaluating existing and emerging sensors and monitors and modeling technology • Sites in selected portions of the distribution systems in the PVWC and AWWSC water utilities and in the reservoirs and source waters managed by the NJDWSC • This activities supports and complements the EPA in house testing program for water quality sensors and monitors.

23. Planned Research Studies by The Consortium (1) • Conduct research studies utilizing the field testing sites to • compare the specifications of the monitors as provided by the vendors against actual field scale performance • Studies on data handling and validation including • User requirements, • Data quality objectives • Real-time reporting and decision support • Compliance reporting

24. Planned Research Studies by The Consortium (2) • Determination of where in the distribution system, online monitoring would be most effective  • Development of real time decision support systems for the monitoring network •  Research on: • Predictive modeling • Data mining • SCADA systems • Optimal location of monitoring stations • Integration of water quality modeling with monitoring information to create an EWS

25. 2nd Workshop, Dec. 11/12 Objective • Provide a forum for scientists, water utility professionals, and leaders in the area of real time sensor and modeling technologies to share their expertise and ideas on how to • Further refine the needs for research and the specific research issues as related to Early Warning Systems for security in drinking water

26. RDWSSC – Long Term Objective • Serve as a model for other regions in the Country • Help incrementally establish similar regional consortium around the country • Establish a national federation made up of regional consortiums, that addresses the safety and security of our drinking water in the entire nation

27. Summary and Next Steps • WPTF was established as a result of 9/11 • Distribution Systems have been identified as the most vulnerable part of a water utility • Rutgers University held workshop from June 27-28 • Results from workshop emphasized the potential for advanced sensing and monitoring and modeling for protection of distribution systems

28. Summary and Conclusions • Established consortium • Rutgers will establish a water security research institute • Three Phased Program • Establish test bed in a water utility based on public sector model • Examine sensors and monitors close to commercialization • Conduct studies on new and emerging technology