GMD and Spare Equipment Database: Perspectives and Status

1. GMD and Spare Equipment Database:Perspectives and Status Eric Rollison Engineer of Reliability Assessments

2. About NERC: Mission • Develop and enforce reliability standards • Assess current and future reliability • Analyze system events and recommend improved practices • Encourage active participation by all stakeholders • Pursue mandatory standards in all areas of the interconnection To ensure the reliability of the North American bulk power system

3. NERC Reliability Assessments • Peak Demand Forecasts • Resource Adequacy • Transmission Adequacy • Key Issues & Emerging Trends Impacting Reliability • Regional Self-Assessment • Ad-hoc Special Assessments

4. High-Impact, Low-Frequency (HILF) Risks • “Black Swan” events • Occur very infrequently, or, in some cases, have never occurred • Little real-world operational experience with addressing these risks • Generally have the potential to impact many assets at once • Catastrophic impacts on the bulk power system and society-at-large

5. HILF Report • Created a common understanding of three HILF risks • Coordinated Cyber/Physical Attacks • EMP/GMD • Pandemics • Lays the groundwork for the development of an action plan • 19 Proposals for Action suggested by workshop participants

6. Critical Infrastructure StrategicCoordinated Action Plan NERC Technical Committee Leadership Planning Operating Critical Infrastructure Protection Resources and Expertise Electricity entities Vendors Suppliers Government partners Scope Approved Dec 2010 Scope Approved Sep 2010

7. GMD Background • Geomagnetic Disturbances is on the NERC President’s Top Priority issues for Bulk Power System Reliability – MRC, January 2011 • Geomagnetic storms emanating from the sun can produce an impulsive disturbance to earth’s geomagnetic field over wide geographic regions. • This field disturbance causes induced ground currents (geomagnetically induced currents or GIC) • These GIC can saturate and severely damage bulk power system equipment that may be difficult to replace, such as high voltage transformers.

8. SWPC product distribution WECC Reliability Coordinator, Vancouver Midwest ISO, St. Paul NYISO WECC Loveland, CO SWPC G2 Alerts and Warning dissemination

9. GMD Task Force Scope - Deliverables • Purpose of GMD TF: …will investigate bulk power system reliability implications and develop solutions to help mitigate this risk. • Deliverables:…consider changes to current planning and operating criteria; evaluate and prioritize mitigation and restoration options; improve sector-wide spare equipment sharing programs; develop industry guidance, and provide input into NERC’s reliability Standards process.

10. GMDTF Status • Chair and Vice Chair have been appointed: • Chair: Donald Watkins – Bonneville Power Administration • Vice Chair: Frank Koza – PJM Interconnection • Task Group Membership spans Electric Industry, US and Canadian Government Agencies, and Transformer and Relay Manufacturers • Manufacturers: ABB, Siemens, GE Prolec, Efacec, Schweitzer Relays • Governmental: US (DOE, DHS, State, and NOAA) and Canada (NR Can, DPS)

11. GMDTF Deliverables

12. Critical Priorities • Transformer Vulnerability • ID vulnerability, prioritize, establish characteristics (GIC vs Time) • This is the primary reason for concern with GMD • What is your “Live to fight the next day.” plan in an extreme storm? • “Reference Event” – given a locational 1:100y: How should we establish performance requirements? : • Each system should be able to withstand the reference storm, or • Should each do what is prudent in their own estimation • Should it be a reference worse credible case with each entity deciding how to protect their system? (This is where we are headed)

13. NERC Advisory • NERC released an advisory to industry that covered immediate operational planning, operating and long-term planning recommendations to address GMD. • The Advisory was developed in partnership with NERC management, NERC’s technical committees (OC/PC/CIPC), North American Transmission Forum, and U.S. government (FERC) • Released to industry on May 10, 2011.

14. SEDTF Members • Chair and Vice Chair have been appointed: • Chair: Dale Burmester – American Transmission Company • Vice Chair: Mark Westendorf – Midwest ISO • Task Group Membership (43) includes experts from across the North American Electric Industry, US Government Agencies, and Transformer Manufacturers • Content and Function Subgroups initiated to focus on SED efforts and scope milestones/activities.

15. Question & Answer

16. Background Slides

17. Reliability Risk Management Concepts

18. Monitoring Progress – The Big Picture

19. Advisory Actions to Consider • Increase attention to Situation Awareness and coordinate all actions with Reliability Coordinator. • Discontinue maintenance work and restore out-of-service transmission lines, wherever possible. • Increase real and reactive reserves to preserve system integrity during a strong GMD event Real-Time Operations • Consider bringing equipment online to provide additional reactive power reserves. • Decrease loading on susceptible transformers through transmission reconfiguration and generation redispatch

20. Defined Scope for Each Task Force

21. Inter-Task Force Coordination

23. Sunspot History • Large geomagnetic storms can occur with smaller cycles • The largest geomagnetic storms on record occurred during smaller than average cycles 1859 Storm 1921 Storm

24. Status of Current Solar Cycle • Solar minimum in December 2008 • Solar Cycle 24 now well underway • Cycle 24 maximum forecast - May 2013

25. Impacts on Electric Power Grid • CME impacts Earth’s magnetic field • Fluctuations generate electric fields on • Earth. These geomagnetically induced • currents (GIC) can flow into power lines and • transformers • Leads to transformer saturation and • over-heating, voltage drops, harmonic generation, transformer • damage, grid collapse Information Notice No. 90-42: FAILURE OF ELECTRICAL POWER EQUIPMENT DUE TO SOLAR MAGNETIC DISTURBANCES Specific events occurred at the Three Mile Island, Unit 1, Hope Creek Unit 1, and Salem Unit 1 nuclear power plants. …inspection of the generator step-up transformer… severe overheating, melted low -voltage service connections in phases A and C, and insulation discoloration in phase B. On September 19, at Salem Unit 2 nuclear power plant, a second solar storm damaged the generator step-up transformer. Sep 1990 (Credit: K. Turnbull / J. Wild / ESA)

26. Areas vulnerable to GMD Impacts Power systems in areas of igneous rock (gray) are the most vulnerable to the effects of intense geomagnetic activity because the high resistance of the igneous rock encourages geomagnetically induced currents (GICs) to flow in the power transmission lines situated above the rock. Shown in cross-hatching are the auroral zone and the extremes that the aurora can reach during severe disturbances such as March 13, 1989. Credit: American Geophysical Union

27. Impacts in the SERC RegionStorm Centered 50° Latitude From FERC – ORNL Meta-R-319 report – Page 3-26 http://www.ornl.gov/sci/ees/etsd/pes/pubs/ferc_Meta-R-319.pdf Greater than a 10x 1989 Storm (>5000 nT/Minute) will introduce significant GIC into the Southeastern US and may have BPS impacts

28. Impacts in the SERC RegionStorm Centered 45° Latitude From FERC – ORNL Meta-R-319 report – Page 3-26 http://www.ornl.gov/sci/ees/etsd/pes/pubs/ferc_Meta-R-319.pdf NOAA East Coast GIC Measurement Station is located at Fredericksburg, VA

29. Status – Coordinated Action PlanNERC Priority Initiatives 2010 2011 Q4 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 • Define objectives Spare Equipment Database • Streamlined processes • Performance requirements • Warning limitations, mitigation Geomagnetic Disturbance • Restoration abilities • GMD workshop • Prevention approaches Severe Impact Resilience • NLE New Madrid • Attack tree analysis • DOD case study Cyber Attack • Cyber security monitoring • NERC cyber exercise • Operator cyber certification • DHS bi-directional info sharing Other Initiatives • GridEx Summit • NERC crisis/communications plan • Policy-level severe • impact scenario Scope Approved Resources In-Place Work Underway • Milestone deliverables

30. SEDTF Scope - Deliverables • Purpose of SEDTF: …provide recommendations for enhancing resilience to High Impact Low Frequency events through improved access to critical spares, and potentially other long-lead time electric transmission system equipment. • Deliverables: …recommend a uniform approach to collecting, storing, and distributing information on CONFIDENTIAL long-lead time spare equipment.

31. SEDTF Deliverables