Comparative politics of development
Download
1 / 88

Comparative Politics of Development - PowerPoint PPT Presentation


  • 129 Views
  • Updated On :

Comparative Politics of Development. Why are some states poor?. I. The Development Paradox: How can wealth become poverty and poverty become wealth?. Poor countries in 1000 become rich ones later. Why don’t China and India rule the world?. Rise of the West.

loader
I am the owner, or an agent authorized to act on behalf of the owner, of the copyrighted work described.
capcha
Download Presentation

PowerPoint Slideshow about 'Comparative Politics of Development' - dreama


An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation

Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author.While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server.


- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - E N D - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Presentation Transcript
Comparative politics of development l.jpg

Comparative Politics of Development

Why are some states poor?


I the development paradox how can wealth become poverty and poverty become wealth l.jpg
I. The Development Paradox: How can wealth become poverty and poverty become wealth?

  • Poor countries in 1000 become rich ones later. Why don’t China and India rule the world?


Rise of the west l.jpg
Rise of the West and poverty become wealth?

  • In 1750, China and India were the largest producers of manufactured goods (including crafts), accounting for more than half of global manufacturing.

  • The countries that would later constitute the Third World accounted for 73% of global manufacturing, including crafts.

  • But by 1913 the Third World accounted for only 7.5% of global manufacturing.


World wealth year 1 l.jpg
World Wealth, Year 1 and poverty become wealth?


World wealth year 1900 l.jpg
World Wealth, Year 1900 and poverty become wealth?


I the development paradox how can wealth become poverty and poverty become wealth6 l.jpg
I. The Development Paradox: How can wealth become poverty and poverty become wealth?

  • Poor countries in 1000 become rich ones later. Why don’t China and India rule the world?

  • Colonies (USA), fragmented states (German Confederation), resource-poor states (Japan) and late developers (NICs) all ended up more prosperous than many countries (Mexico, Brazil, African states) rich in natural resources and provided with aid from rich countries. Why?


Ii modernization theory l.jpg
II. Modernization Theory and poverty become wealth?

…aka Neoclassical or Development Economics

  • Western-centric “stages of development”


Ii modernization theory9 l.jpg
II. Modernization Theory and poverty become wealth?

…aka Neoclassical or Development Economics

  • Western-centric “stages of development”

  • Implications

    • S-Shaped Growth Curve


Predicted growth over time l.jpg
Predicted Growth Over Time and poverty become wealth?

Diminishing Returns to Capital

Capital-Fueled Growth

Lack of Capital

TIME

Per Capita GDP


I modernization theory l.jpg
I. Modernization Theory and poverty become wealth?

…aka Neoclassical or Development Economics

  • Western-centric “stages of development”

  • Implications

    • S-Shaped Growth Curve

    • Convergence – Size of national economies will eventually be determined only by population (more or less equal GDP per capita)

  • Recommendations: Agricultural surpluses, resource extraction, foreign investment, loans and aid, monetary stability, free capital markets, “modern” (Western) values, political stability (possibly authoritarianism)


D problems with modernization theory l.jpg
D. Problems with modernization theory and poverty become wealth?

  • Authoritarian regimes often renege on promises of development, become corrupt

  • West used state intervention to develop

    • Only the UK relied on free trade, because only the UK could be the first to industrialize

    • Germany and France needed industrial banks to direct investment to growth industries

    • Russia and Japan needed massive state involvement and protectionism

    • NICs used “developmental state” approach to target export sectors


3 modernization stalls l.jpg
3. Modernization stalls and poverty become wealth?

  • Capital wasn’t reinvested in industry


3 modernization stalls15 l.jpg
3. Modernization stalls and poverty become wealth?

  • Capital wasn’t reinvested in industry

  • Developed countries refused to lower barriers on textiles and other goods


3 modernization stalls17 l.jpg
3. Modernization stalls and poverty become wealth?

  • Capital wasn’t reinvested in industry

  • Developed countries refused to lower barriers on textiles and other goods

  • Debt crisis: burdens accumulated when commodity prices fell



3 modernization stalls20 l.jpg
3. Modernization stalls and poverty become wealth?

  • Capital wasn’t reinvested in industry

  • Developed countries refused to lower barriers on textiles and other goods

  • Debt crisis: burdens accumulated when commodity prices fell

  • Capitalist countries intervened against state involvement in economies (most common before 1960s)


E neoliberalism an update to modernization theory l.jpg
E. Neoliberalism: An update to modernization theory and poverty become wealth?

  • New Institutionalism: Institutions must create incentives for investment (transparency, prevent corruption, prevent rent-seeking)  embrace democracy and limited government


E neoliberalism an update to modernization theory23 l.jpg
E. Neoliberalism: An update to modernization theory and poverty become wealth?

  • New Institutionalism: Institutions must create incentives for investment (transparency, prevent corruption, prevent rent-seeking)  embrace democracy and limited government

  • Embrace export-led development: invest in infrastructure relevant to modern industries

  • Structural Adjustment: Austerity programs to reduce government spending and tax burden (increasing private investment, preventing debt spiral)

  • Focus on “micro” incentives to individuals/firms rather than “macro” national development projects (dams, power plants, railroads, etc.)


F evidence against neoliberalism l.jpg
F. Evidence against Neoliberalism and poverty become wealth?

  • Sill cannot explain NICs: autocracy “worked” in Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong

    • “Developmental State” – government picked winners and losers

    • Export-led industrialization did not emerge “naturally”

  • Difficult to sustain free market and democracy in poor states

  • Self-serving: All recommendations tend to help foreign investors, but many harm domestic poor


Iii dependency theory l.jpg
III. Dependency Theory and poverty become wealth?

  • Overview – Underdevelopment is perpetuated by the global economic order; prosperity will require empowerment of poor people in poor countries

  • History matters -- Past events influence present options (path dependence)

    • Europe: UK, France, Prussia, Russia all followed different paths, because only the UK could be first


2 colonialism l.jpg
2. Colonialism and poverty become wealth?

  • Economic effect: Colonial powers exploited colonies, siphoned wealth to home countries (slave labor, trade monopolies, head taxes, etc)

  • Social effects:

    • Development of pro-colonial local elites: (collaborators and administrators) sympathetic to ideology and culture of colonial power

    • Divide-and-Conquer: Colonial power makes itself “necessary” for stability

    • Metropole-satellite division: Within-country division between “developed” urban areas for elites and resource-producing rural areas for exploitation


Iv colonial predictors of present day economic inequality l.jpg
iv. Colonial predictors of present-day economic inequality and poverty become wealth?

  • Former slave society (esp. tropical colonies)

  • European settlement:

    • More Europeans = more inequality (if a minority)

    • “New Europes” (European colonists become majority) = less inequality

    • Conclusion: Privileged minority in colonial period = inequality in present day

  • These two variables account for more than half of the variation in inequality between nations today


Inequality and european settlement l.jpg
Inequality and European Settlement and poverty become wealth?


C institutional effects l.jpg
c. Institutional Effects and poverty become wealth?

i. Institutions selected for benefit of colonial powers or colonists

  • Densely populated areas (tropics): Native labor exploited through slavery and feudalism

  • Sparsely populated areas: Institutions set up to encourage further colonization by Europeans (representation, autonomy)



3 post colonial development l.jpg
3. Post-colonial development Population

  • Neo-colonialism: Local elites of colonial era installed as government

  • Dependent development: Former colonies have lost indigenous economic structures, possess infrastructure and economic systems geared to production of primary exports (mining, cash crops, etc.)

  • Key idea: Underdevelopment ≠ Undevelopment – Dependent countries don’t need to “catch up” by following the paths of rich countries


C how is dependency perpetuated l.jpg
C. How is dependency perpetuated? Population

  • Global economic system: Divided into core and periphery. Periphery’s function is to export cheap raw materials to core, then import expensive processed goods back











C how is dependency perpetuated42 l.jpg
C. How is dependency perpetuated? Population

  • Global economic system: Divided into core and periphery. Periphery’s function is to export cheap raw materials to core, then import expensive processed goods back

  • Unfair terms of trade: Primary commodities lose value relative to manufactures




3 why don t dependent countries just industrialize like the core states l.jpg
3. Why don’t dependent countries just industrialize like the core states?

  • Lacking capital, peripheral states require foreign investment and loans  strings attached


Slide47 l.jpg

FOREIGN AID, DEBT, AND INTEREST the core states? PAYMENTS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 1992 AND 1997 (IN $US BILLIONS)

$US Billions

Aid as percent

of interest: 55.7%

Aid as percent

of interest: 32.5%

Year


Total debt service 1990 l.jpg
Total Debt Service, 1990 the core states?


Total debt service 2002 l.jpg
Total Debt Service, 2002 the core states?


3 why don t dependent countries just industrialize like the core states50 l.jpg
3. Why don’t dependent countries just industrialize like the core states?

  • Lacking capital, peripheral states require foreign investment and loans  strings attached

  • Profits are used to buy imports rather than re-invest in the country

  • Local elites are part of the exploitive system – Expoited metropoles themselves exploit satellite areas


The triangle of dependence l.jpg
The Triangle of Dependence the core states?


D the role of mncs perpetuation of core dominance l.jpg
d. The Role of MNCs: perpetuation of “core” dominance the core states?

  • MNCs outcompete local firms through economies of scale or dumping

  • MNCs repatriate profits instead of investing them in-country

  • MNCs construct alliances with local elites (bribes, or simply offers of jobs and capital)

  • MNC mobility creates “race to the bottom” in labor standards

  • Threats to MNCs are international threats  more likely to trigger military intervention


Slide53 l.jpg
D. Policy Recommendations: It’s not about “catching up” – periphery must follow a different path to prosperity

  • Radical Variant: De-Linking (Autarky) and South-South Links. Example = Maoism

    • Emphasize industrialization at expense of agriculture (esp. Great Leap Forward)

    • Prevent foreign investment, capital transfers

    • Focus on domestic “market” instead of trade

    • Avoid dependence or vulnerability: Redundant autarkic development in regions


Performance maoism in china l.jpg
Performance: Maoism in China up” – periphery must follow a


2 moderate variant import substituting industrialization isi l.jpg
2. Moderate variant: Import-Substituting Industrialization (ISI)

  • Tariffs and Subsidies directed to replacing imports with domestically-produced goods

  • Shift from primary to manufactured products


C evidence for dependency theory l.jpg
C. Evidence for Dependency Theory (ISI)

  • Mild de-linking (devaluation and tariffs) protected some Latin American states from Great Depression

  • Explains different paths of Australia, Argentina from 1913 to present



Argentine capital dependence hobbles economy from 1913 on l.jpg
Argentine Capital Dependence Hobbles Economy From 1913 On 1987…

  • Capital scarcity during/after WW I and Great Depression undermines development



C evidence for dependency theory60 l.jpg
C. Evidence for Dependency Theory performed poorly

  • Mild de-linking (devaluation and tariffs) protected some Latin American states from Great Depression

  • Explains different paths of Australia, Argentina from 1913 to present

  • Recent neoliberal programs have had mixed results:

    • China – Apparently works (but still high state control)


C evidence for dependency theory63 l.jpg
C. Evidence for Dependency Theory performed poorly

  • Mild de-linking (devaluation and tariffs) protected some Latin American states from Great Depression

  • Explains different paths of Australia, Argentina from 1913 to present

  • Recent neoliberal programs have had mixed results:

    • China – Apparently works (but still high state control)

    • Mexico and Brazil – Structural adjustment has not produced growth


D shortcomings of dependency theory l.jpg
D. Shortcomings of Dependency Theory performed poorly

  • ISI = inefficiency. Worse products for the price (poor states’ markets are too small to support economies of scale)  subsidies are expensive and undermine incentives to expand size of domestic market

  • Consumers rejected protectionism -- Even dependency theorist Cardoso governed as a neoliberal!

  • Urban focus undermines farming: All those city workers need cheap food….  price controls and perverse incentives OR urban revolutions

  • The problem of the NICs… Investment increased growth!



Iv tackling the nic puzzle endogenous growth theory l.jpg
IV. Tackling the NIC Puzzle: Endogenous Growth Theory “take-off” period

Argument limited to small # of states:

  • Technology is “endogenous” (dependent variable explained by the model) instead of “exogenous” (independent variable taken as a given).

  • Economies of scale: Doubling capital more than doubles production

  • Policy advice: Give firms incentives to focus on long-term growth instead of short-term profits (invest in R&D)

  • Problem: Requires “take-off” first (and capital to invest in R&D)


Predicted growth over time69 l.jpg
Predicted Growth Over Time “take-off” period

Possible Economies of Scale

from R&D / Oligopoly

Capital-and-Technology

Fueled Growth

Lack of Capital

TIME

Per Capita GDP


Iv tackling the nic puzzle endogenous growth theory70 l.jpg
IV. Tackling the NIC Puzzle: Endogenous Growth Theory “take-off” period

Argument limited to small # of states:

  • Technology is “endogenous” (dependent variable explained by the model) instead of “exogenous” (independent variable taken as a given).

  • Economies of scale: Doubling capital more than doubles production


R d expenditures 2002 l.jpg
R&D Expenditures, 2002 “take-off” period


V selectorate theory institutions first l.jpg
V. Selectorate Theory: Institutions First “take-off” period

  • Division of society:

    • Leader: Decides public policy

    • Selectorate: set of people with legal right to participate in selection of the government

      • Democracies: Adult citizens

      • Monarchies: Royalty or nobles

      • Some autocracies have large selectorates (single-party states, rigged elections, etc.) Why…?

    • Winning Coalition: Number of selectorate actually needed to gain/retain power

      • Democracies: About half of S

      • Autocracies: Military leaders, governors, key nobles, election supervisors (to fix the vote), etc.

    • Disenfranchised: Powerless


Selectorate theory s division l.jpg
Selectorate Theory’s Division “take-off” period

Society’s Disenfranchised

Selectorate

Winning Coalition

Leader


B regime types three combinations l.jpg
B. Regime Types: Three combinations “take-off” period

W = Size of winning coalition

S = Size of selectorate

W/S = Regime Type


C policy tools l.jpg
C. Policy Tools “take-off” period

  • Allocation of resources

    • Public Goods

      • Benefit the entire selectorate (S) – both supporters and opponents/defectors

      • Collective in nature: non-rivalrous (I can enjoy the good without taking any away from you) and nonexcludable (providing for one provides for all). Classic examples = economic growth, peace, absence of crime, clean air, etc.

    • Private Goods: Benefit supporters only (W) – Implies excludability

  • Leaders prefer to use private goods to remain in power (punish defection)


D the loyalty norm effects of s and w l.jpg
D. The loyalty norm: effects of S and W “take-off” period

  • W/S is Large: Chance of selector being needed in next coalition is high  defect if private goods at less than maximum



D the loyalty norm effects of s and w78 l.jpg
D. The loyalty norm: effects of S and W needed is high)

  • W/S is Large: Chance of selector being needed in next coalition is high  defect if private goods at less than maximum

  • W/S is Small: Chance of selector being needed in next coalition is low  defection offers little prospect of increased private goods



D the loyalty norm effects of s and w80 l.jpg
D. The loyalty norm: effects of S and W needed is high)

  • W/S is Large: Chance of selector being needed in next coalition is high  defect if private goods at less than maximum

  • W/S is Small: Chance of selector being needed in next coalition is low  defection offers little prospect of increased private goods

  • Small W: Easy to reward/punish with private goods

  • Large W: Hard to reward/punish with private goods


5 institutions and incentives l.jpg
5. Institutions and Incentives needed is high)

  • Leaders want: Small W (easy to bribe if desired) and large S (very small W/S means defection is unattractive). Result: Corruption possible but not required

  • Members of the winning coalition want: Small W (more private goods) and small S (large W/S means leader must devote most resources to bribes). Result: Corruption required.

  • The selectorate wants: Large W (focus on public goods)  implies Large S. Result: Corruption difficult.


E evidence for selectorate theory l.jpg
E. Evidence for Selectorate Theory needed is high)

  • Explains many previous failures

    • Agrarian elite coalitions reduced productivity (large estates, agricultural protectionism) but…

    • Urban elite coalitions also reduced productivity (food subsidies, Big Development and patronage, “the Iron Triangle” of rent-seeking)

    • State control  patronage and kickbacks (emphasis on private goods simply takes different forms in “socialist” or “capitalist” autocracies)

  • Economic/Political freedom associated with greater prosperity (weakly) and life expectancy (moderately)



4 limits of selectorate theory l.jpg
4. Limits of selectorate theory Public Goods

  • No advice for democrats: “Pursue public goods so people re-elect you” is vague

  • Growth is only part of development – government may opt for social insurance, education, social welfare programs, etc in lieu of economic growth (trade-offs between public goods)

  • Independent economic institutions (central banks) seem to work in industrialized democracies

  • Most NICs had Small W polities


V conclusions the puzzle of poverty l.jpg
V. Conclusions: The puzzle of poverty Public Goods

A. Overview:


B no panaceas l.jpg
B. No Panaceas Public Goods

  • No theory completely explains NICs: Autocracy and Protection  Export-led growth


B no panaceas88 l.jpg
B. No Panaceas Public Goods

  • No theory completely explains NICs: Autocracy and Protection  Export-led growth

  • No clear solution to “path dependence” – Different policies needed in LDCs, but which policies will work (path dependence discounts other countries’ experiences)


ad