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Significant Search & Seizure Decisions Maine Law Court

This article discusses significant search and seizure decisions made by the Maine Law Court, Office of the Maine Attorney General, and Continuing Legal Education Program on July 27, 2011. Topics covered include consent to search, voluntariness, Franks hearing requests, probable cause to arrest, OUI roadblocks, investigatory stops, custody, and inevitable discovery.

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Significant Search & Seizure Decisions Maine Law Court

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  1. Significant Search & Seizure DecisionsMaine Law Court Office of the Maine Attorney General Continuing Legal Education Program July 27, 2011

  2. Topics Addressed • Consent to Search • Voluntariness • Request for a Franks Hearing • Probable Cause to Arrest • OUI Roadblocks • Investigatory Stops • Custody • Inevitable Discovery

  3. State v. Boutilier12 A.3d 44, 2011 ME 17 Pertinent Facts:   The defendant was charged with trafficking and marijuana cultivation. He filed a motion for the disclosure of the identity of a confidential informant whose information had been used in the search warrant affidavit as well as a motion for a Franks hearing claiming that the affidavit itself demonstrated that the affiant had acted with reckless disregard for the truth. His motions were denied.

  4. State v. Boutilier(continued) Held on Appeal:   The State did not intend to call the CI to prove up the charges at trial and the defendant failed to establish that the CI had relevant knowledge that could assist in his defense at trial; therefore disclosure was not required under M.R. Evid. 509.

  5. State v. Boutilier(continued) The defendant’s presentation of “no more than a mere guess” that disclosure of the CI’s identity might support his defense was insufficient to raise the required legitimate question or doubt as to the affiant’s credibility for the purpose of a Frank’s request.

  6. State v. Boutilier(continued) “Beyond his bald allegation, Boutilier failed to provide any supporting evidence to demonstrate that [the warrant affiant] acted with reckless disregard of the truth.” The defendant also failed to establish that the allegedly false statements in the warrant affidavit were necessary to a finding of probable cause.

  7. State v. Flint12 A.3d 54, 2011 ME 20 Pertinent Facts: LEO saw two motorcycles on the road and followed them. They split up. Additional LEOs responded. The driver of one motorcycle was found and admitted he had been drinking over the last four hours. The second motorcycle was found parked.

  8. State v. Flint(continued) A canine tracked the defendant, who was found hiding in the woods. The defendant smelled of alcohol, was argumentative and was unable to stand without assistance. Once standing, officers handcuffed him.

  9. State v. Flint(continued) The defendant was charged with OUI and other driving offenses. The defendant filed a motion to suppress, alleging that his detention was a de facto arrest without probable cause. His motion was denied on the grounds that the detention was permissible as a Terry-type investigatory stop based on reasonable suspicion.

  10. State v. Flint(continued) Held on Appeal: There is no need to evaluate whether the LEOs’ actions exceeded the bounds of a Terry-type investigatory stop because there was probable cause to arrest the defendant for operating under influence (impairment to any extent) prior to placing handcuffs on him.  

  11. State v. Kent15 A.3d 1286, 2011 ME 42 Pertinent Facts: The defendant was charged with OUI following the stop of her vehicle at an OUI roadblock. She moved to suppress, alleging that the roadblock stop was an unreasonable seizure. Her motion was denied. 

  12. State v. Kent(continued) Held on Appeal: Vacated and remanded because the State did not meet its burden of demonstrating that the execution of the roadblock stop was reasonable within the Fourth Amendment. Reasonableness is evaluated by a number of factors identified in State v. Cloukey, 468 A.2d 143 (Me. 1985). The “crucial underlying criterion of reasonableness is the amount of discretion that a police officer is allowed to exercise in conducting a stop.”

  13. State v. Kent(continued) “In this case, the State did not establish that there was any leadership or accountability in the design, approval and execution of the roadblock.” The Court also noted that motorists without any violations were detained an average of three to five minutes at this roadblock, which the Court found suggestive of more than a minimal intrusion of a motorist’s liberty interest.

  14. State v. McDonald6 A.3d 283, 2010 ME 102 Pertinent Facts: An individual had informed LEO that the car behind had been tailgating him and attempting to pass in an unsafe manner. The motorist identified the car and path of travel to LEO, and LEO stopped the car. The defendant was found to be operating after habitual offender revocation. The defendant filed a motion to suppress alleging that the anonymous tip which led to his traffic stop was not properly corroborated. The defendant’s motion was denied. 

  15. State v. McDonald(continued) Held on Appeal: The tip from the motorist provided the officer with reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the investigatory stop. Although LEO did not ask for the motorist’s name, this face-to-face encounter with the motorist was not an anonymous tip and the totality of the circumstances provided sufficient indicia of reliability.

  16. State v. Nadeau1 A.3d 445, 2010 ME 71 Pertinent Facts: Two uniformed LEOs went to the defendant’s dorm room with information that he was in possession of child pornography. The defendant made admissions about images on his flash drive. One LEO stated, “Ah, we, we need to have that,” and the other LEO agreed. The defendant said, “yup,” then turned and handed the flash drive to the LEOs.  

  17. State v. Nadeau(continued) The defendant became very emotional at times but declined offers to find a better setting for the interview. When LEOs tried to advise the defendant of his Miranda warnings, the defendant told them that he had “already been through all of this.”

  18. State v. Nadeau(continued) Then an LEO stated, “But the more cooperative you are, the better things are for you.” When LEOs told the defendant that they were “going to have to take the computer too,” the defendant demurred.

  19. State v. Nadeau(continued) The flash drive and computer were seized and delivered to the Maine Computer Crimes Unit which, believing that the items had been obtained via consent, conducted a warrantless “preview” search which revealed child pornography. A search warrant was obtained for the purpose of conducting a more thorough forensic examination. The examination occurred approx. seven months after the warrant issued.

  20. State v. Nadeau(continued) The defendant filed motions to suppress, alleging that he was in custody for the purposes of Miranda, that his statements were not voluntary, that the seizures of the flash drive and computer were without his consent, that the state failed to file a timely return of the warrant and that the warrant had expired before the search was completed. The defendant’s motions were denied.

  21. State v. Nadeau(continued) Held on Appeal: The defendant had consented to the warrantless search and seizure of the flash drive as evidenced by his verbal consent and physical gestures. The defendant did not consent to the initial warrantless search and seizure of his computer.

  22. State v. Nadeau(continued) Although the warrantless preview search of the computer was not justified by exigent circumstances or required by U.S. v. Brunette, 256 F. 3d 14 (1st Cir. 2001), the preview search of the computer did not require suppression as the computer would have been inevitably discovered through lawful means.

  23. State v. Nadeau(continued) The State’s failure to return the warrant and file an inventory within the required ten-day period did not justify application of the exclusionary rule. Finally, the defendant’s statements to police in his dorm room were voluntary and not obtained in violation of Miranda.

  24. State v. Williams15 A.3d 753, 2011 ME 36 Pertinent Facts: LEO interviewed the defendant for approx. 1 hour in a cruiser in the defendant’s driveway. LEO told the defendant that he was not under arrest and he did not Mirandizehim. The defendant confessed to engaging in sexual conduct with a child. The defendant moved to suppress, alleging that he was in custody for Miranda purposes. His motion was denied.

  25. State v. Williams(continued) Held on Appeal: Considering ten factors in totality, the defendant was not in custody at the time of the interrogation.

  26. Significant Search & Seizure DecisionsUnited States Court of Appeals for the First CircuitDistrict of Maine Office of the Maine Attorney General Continuing Legal Education Program July 27, 2011

  27. U.S. v. Bach388 Fed.Appx. 2, 2010 WL 3038088 (C.A. 1 (Me.), August 5, 2010 Pertinent Facts: The defendant was questioned for 90 minutes in a confined space by two LEOs openly displaying weapons who had not advised him of his right to decline to give consent to search. Defendant consented to a search of his computer for child pornography.

  28. U.S. v. Bach(continued) Defendant moved to suppress the search, claiming that the consent was not voluntary, that the search exceeded the scope of the consent and that the search began before he signed the consent form. His motions were denied.

  29. U.S. v. Bach(continued) Held on Appeal: The defendant's consent to search the computer was voluntary. The 90 minutes of questioning in a confined space was in the defendant’s home, rather than a police station atmosphere. The LEOs did not restrict the defendant’s movements; their weapons remained holstered at all times; and the defendant was not told he was in custody.

  30. U.S. v. Bach(continued) The district court's finding that law enforcement did not begin to run computer scan before the defendant signed the consent form was supported by substantial evidence; and The scope of the computer search did not exceed the defendant’s consent to search. Law enforcement informed the defendant of the definition of child pornography, which was the object of the search, and the items seized fell within this definition.

  31. U.S. v. Hughes640 F.3d 428, 2011 WL 1332061, C.A.1 (Me.), April 8, 2011 Pertinent Facts: The M.S.P. computer crimes unit obtained information that the defendant had made secret recordings of a minor while she was in the bathroom. M.S.P. also became aware that the defendant’s physician felt that the defendant presented a threat to himself or others and had urged that the defendant be involuntarily committed if he was not otherwise taken into police custody following questioning.

  32. U.S. v. Hughes(continued) Four LEOs went to the defendant’s home to conduct a “knock and talk.” Two were in uniform. Two were in civilian clothes and did not participate in the subsequent recorded interview. M.S.P. advised the defendant that they wanted to speak to him and that he was not under arrest.

  33. U.S. v. Hughes(continued) During the interview, the defendant complained of dizziness, said he had not taken his antidepressant, and began hyperventilating. M.S.P. immediately called an EMT who found that the defendant was having a panic attack. Approximately 20 minutes later, the panic attack subsided, and the EMT left. The defendant asked for a cigarette break before questioning resumed, and his request was honored. When the interview resumed, M.S.P. asked for consent to a search of his home and computer.

  34. U.S. v. Hughes(continued) The defendant made admissions and offered to produce the requested tapes and DVDs. When further asked to sign a consent to search form, the defendant asked what would happen if he refused. M.S.P. responded that, regardless of whether he consented, M.S.P. was “probably” going to take the items with them. Following this exchange, the defendant signed the consent. The defendant was subsequently handcuffed and involuntarily committed.

  35. U.S. v. Hughes(continued) The defendant moved to suppress the evidence, claiming that he had been subjected to a custodial interrogation without the benefit of Miranda warnings, that M.S.P. had exploited his mental condition and had coerced his consent to the search. His motions were denied.

  36. U.S. v. Hughes(continued) Held on Appeal: Analyzing the objective circumstances of the interrogation, including the familiar or at least neutral surroundings, the number of LEOs, the degree of physical restraint and the duration and character of the interview, the Court found that the question of whether the defendant was in custody at the time of the “knock and talk” was “admittedly close” but upheld the district court’s factual findings against custody.

  37. U.S. v. Hughes(continued) Under the totality of the circumstances, the defendant's statements were not involuntary. There is no evidence to suggest that law enforcement exploited his mental or emotional fragility. There were no inducements or threats. Nothing was done or said to lead the defendant to believe that his continued stay at home was contingent upon his cooperation with the investigation.

  38. U.S. v. Hughes(continued) Evidence found on the defendant's laptop computers was admissible pursuant to the inevitable discovery doctrine. The court declined to address the claim that the consent to search was involuntary, instead finding that there was probable cause for a search warrant and stating that “this is a classic case for application of the inevitable discovery doctrine.”

  39. U.S. v. Reynolds---F.3d---, 2011 WL 1844220, C.A. 1 (Me.), May 17, 2011 Pertinent Facts:    LEOs responded to a residence upon an individual’s request to have the defendant removed. The complainant advised LEOs that the defendant had two unloaded firearms in her possession. LEOs entered the building with the complainant’s consent and proceeded with guns drawn to the defendant’s bedroom.

  40. U.S. v. Reynolds(continued) The LEOs knocked on the door and were told by the defendant to come in. One LEO asked the defendant if she had any guns, to which she answered “Yes” and pointed to the headboard. Two guns were then found in a compartment in the headboard.  

  41. U.S. v. Reynolds(continued) The defendant was ultimately charged with possessing two firearms after having been committed to a mental institution and possessing a firearm with an obliterated serial number. The defendant moved, inter alia, to suppress the evidence, claiming that she had not consented to the search of the headboard. Rather, she had merely affirmed the existence of the firearms. Her motion was denied.

  42. U.S. v. Reynolds(continued) Held on Appeal: Implied Consent: “By pointing to the headboard in response to the officer’s question asking whether Reynolds had any weapons, Reynolds demonstrated that she knew the officer intended to find the firearms.”

  43. U.S. v. Reynolds(continued) Voluntariness: “[U]pon consideration of the totality of the circumstances, there was no showing that Reynolds’ will was overborne by overtly coercive police conduct.” No evidence was presented that defendant was mentally incompetent when she gave consent to search to the officers. Mental illness is one factor of many a court must consider in evaluating the voluntariness of a statement.

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