JEREMIE and JESSICA Conference Brussels, 30 November 2010

1. JEREMIE and JESSICA ConferenceBrussels, 30 November 2010 JESSICA: STATE AID PRINCIPLESEgléStriungyté, DG CompetitionEuropean Commission* * DISCLAIMER: The views expressed are purely those of the presenters and may not in any circumstances be regarded as an official position of the European Commission

2. Overview • State aid presence: • Beneficiaries and rationale • State aid compliance: • From general principles to specific conditions • Notification: • Content and process • Concluding remarks

3. JESSICA: State aid beneficiaries State aid to private investors (at the UDF or project level) Preferential treatment of private co-investors compared to UDF investments State aid to HF/UDF managers “Sub-commercial” remuneration for HF/UDF investment management services State aid to project promoters “Sub-commercial” UDF financing to urban development projects

4. JESSICA: State aid rationale • Incentives to change market behaviour to promote integrated urban development: • Engage project promoters in urban development activities which they would otherwise not deliver • Leverage funding from market investors to maximise urban development impact • Involve investment intermediaries for effective implementation

5. General Block Exemption Guidelines Directly under TFEU exceptionally Standard assessment Detailed assessment State aid compatibility architecture No notification Notification obligation, approval of the Commission Specific policy instruments: defined market failures and limited distortions Detailed economic assessment: effect-based balancing test

6. State aid compliance • Urban development policy - no specific instrument in GBER / Guidelines: • Maximising the application of one set of guidelines - too restrictive • Applying jointly the mix of rules– cumbersome & complex to apply to integrated urban development • Direct application of Art 107(3)TFEU: • Detailed economic assessment – flexible approach, effect-based balancing test

7. State aid compliance • Objective of State aid control: • Change of market behaviour for public interest objectives, whilst ensuring competitive behaviour • State aid control in the context of JESSICA: • Promote urban development by remedying market failure and/or enhancing socio-economic equity • Limit aid to the minimum necessary to achieve the desired market outcome • Minimize potential distortions of competition and trade

8. Objective of common interest • UDF must target projects that are in the public interest, which is integrated urban development: • Form part of an Integrated Plan for Sustainable Urban Development (IPSUD): • UDFs assess compliance with the objectives of IPSUD: expected project results, benefits for end users and impact in tackling urban deprivation issues • Pursue eligible investment activities: • UDFs assess nature of investment activities and compliance with the SFs Regulation, further criteria to be developed: only capital investments, not operations, other

9. Necessity • UDFs must target projects that would not otherwise be delivered by the market due to: • Market failure to achieve the desired outcome: • UDFs verify if a project corresponds to project types defined ex ante based on a market failure analysis and/or the project is not sufficiently viable to access market financing • Urban deprivation affecting projects’ viability: • UDFs verify if urban deprivation makes projects less viable

10. Incentive effect • UDFs enable the market to undertake projects of the public interest and leveraging match funding: • Overcome market failures to achieve the desired market outcome (efficiency rationale) : • UDFs mitigate risks, improve projects’ economic viability • Offset urban deprivation (equity rationale): • UDFs compensate for the extra costs related to urban deprivation

11. Minimum necessary • UDF intervention limited to the minimum necessary to achieve the desired outcome: • Limiting expected returns for promoters and private investors in a project/UDF: • UDFs (i) benchmark required private returns against market rates and (ii) adjust their financing terms accordingly • Market benchmark rates defined through a competitive process (preference), sometimes independent experts • Beyond success, public and private investors share proportionally the upside

12. Minimum necessary • Maximising performance of HFs/UDFs: • Repayable investments in economically viable projects: investments based on business plans, defined exit strategy • Performance-based UDF management incentives • Mechanism in place ensuring that private capital is put at risk alongside public investment • Commercially managedHFs/UDFs: • Independent fund manager, operating at arm length from the public investor, selected in a transparent competitive process • Investment decision-making involving private investors • Best management practice and regulatory supervision (regulated funds, EIB involvement)

13. Limiting potential distortions • UDF activities should limit potential distortions of competition and effects on trade • Member States should provide market impact assessment identifying affected markets and justifying limited potential distortions • Equal level-playing field to all market participants: • Available to all project promoters, investors, fund managers, contractors and end users – selection in a competitive process • Less distortive form of aid (repayable investment) and the set-up involving commercial investment intermediaries

14. Notification content • Need to provide complete information: • Policy rationale: • Objectives: targeted project types, eligible investment activities, targeted end users; justification of market failures and nature of deprived urban areas based on independent market studies • UDF set-up, investment policy and terms: • Conditions ensuring that UDFs tackle market failures, equity objectives, the form of the aid and the beneficiaries, conditions limiting aid to the minimum and ensuring that UDFs maximise public investment performance and are commercially managed • Market impact assessment: • Information on the relevant markets and expected impact based on the evidence from a market impact assessment

15. Providing guidance to Member States: Clarity on assessment principles and criteria Clarity on notification content and process Feedback on measures to improve quality Developing State aid approach: Developing State aid principles applicable to urban development and PPPs Setting out a coherent set of compliance criteria Notification process Informal pre-notification dialogue

16. Notification process • Best Practices Code (OJ C136, 16/06/09, p. 13): • Pre-notification contacts recommended: • Written draft General notification form sent via secured email (SANI, PKI), followed by meetings • Relatively short: 2 months for standard cases, extended for complex • Mutually Agreed Planning: identified key issues, agreed amendments and time-frame • Formal notification after the pre-notification phase: • Complete notification based on the outcome of the PN phase

17. Concluding remarks • Well-targeted State aid measures to promote integrated urban development • Effective State aid notification process: • Setting out a general compatibility approach and key compliance criteria - work in progress • Extensive pre-notification dialogue with Member States, the EIB • State aid policy approach to urban development and PPPs in general: • First decisions will provide guidance, possibly new State aid guidelines to be developed

18. Contacts Eglé Striungyté Tel: +32 2 2953524 egle.striungyte@ec.europa.eu H – State aid: Cohesion, R&D&I and Enforcement DG Competition, European Commission