2005 CUHK International Conference on Corporate Governance in China and Asia. Discussion of: Tycoons Turned Leaders: Market Value of Political Connections Authored by: Pramuan Bunkanwanicha and Yupana Wiwattanakantang Discussant: Karl Lins University of Utah. Research Question.
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Tycoons Turned Leaders: Market Value of Political Connections
Pramuan Bunkanwanicha and Yupana Wiwattanakantang
University of Utah
What this paper does in big picture terms:
Since the paper’s stated focus is on rent seeking, it would be interesting to see whether a tycoon’s ultimate cash flow stake in the firm matters
It would be interesting to test whether relatively more distressed (or worse performing) firms owned by TCLs did better after the election
Another way to get at testing this idea is to interact the TCL dummy with distress proxies such as market to book ratio (or its inverse) in the regressions.
Results might be driven by size, despite the fact that size is a control variable in the regressions
Some Minor Quibbles:
Sentences are often too strong:
Overall, I think that the paper is interesting
My primary big picture concern is that the result seems somewhat economically obvious.
A different economic question to ask where the outcome may be less preordained: