Private Militaries: Myths and Missions

1. Private Militaries:Myths and Missions Security for a New Century 107th Congress Friday, April 13th, 2001 Presented by Doug Brooks, Hoosier84@aol.com

2. About me . . . • BA in History from Indiana University (’84) • Worked as teacher in Zimbabwe (’84-85) • MA in History from Baylor University (’89) • Worked at the Institute of International Education (’89-95) • Ph.D. Studies Pitt, GSPIA (to present) • Bradlow Fellow, SAIIA (Sept. ’99-Dec. ’00) • Founding IPOA with Coley Hudgins (Apr. ’01)

3. Outline • What are “Private Militaries?” • Who are PMCs? • Why do PMCs matter? • PMC Potential.

4. I. What Are “Private Militaries”? Threats Or Opportunity?

5. What are Private Militaries? • Are Private Military Companies (PMCs) just modern mercenaries? • Depends on your definition . . . • “Foreign soldiers who fight for money,” or • UN definition • “Mercenary” is derogatory term, and deceptive. • Most PMCs have more to do with training than with combat.

6. What are Private Militaries? • Logical Step in Worldwide Privatization • Driven by worldwide demand for security – post Cold War vacuum. • In many places in the world the basic human needs of food, warmth and shelter are being subordinated to the need for security. • Private companies decided they could do security tasks more efficiently than old state system. • How many PMCs are there?

7. Military Service Providers (MSPs)

8. PMC Services • Training (Passive) • Basic Military • Civil Military Relations • Special Forces • Presidential Security • Maritime protection • Surveillance and Reconnaissance (Passive)

9. PMC Services • Combat Support (Active) • Medical and Evacuation services • Combat insertion • Actual Combat (Active) • Strategic Advice • Heavy Weapons Support • Air Support

10. Reality Check:Money Makes the World Go Round • MSPs exist to make profits • Currently MSPs thrive on mitigating effects of conflict • Investors recognize the value of peace • Value of concessions . . . • Save cost of security, infrastructure, salaries • Peace is MUCH more profitable than war • Globalisation = economic rationalization • War is extremely uneconomical • Why not use these companies to end Wars?

11. II. Who are PMCs? Pillagers Or Paladins

12. Famous Firms - I • Executive Outcomes (EO) • “Active” PMC • South African - multinational • Angola, Sierra Leone, PNG • MPRI • “Passive” PMC • Alexandria, VA - American • Nigeria, Colombia, Balkans, Equatorial Guinea

13. Famous Firms II • Sandline International • PMC • London – multinational • Sierra Leone, PNG • ICI of Oregon • NSP/PMC • Salem, OR – American & Russian • Liberia, Sierra Leone, Haiti

14. Famous Firms III • Dyncorp – Colombia, East Timor, Balkans • SCI – Tim Spicer • AirScan – Surveillance, Angola, Wildlife • ArmorGroup/DSL – Security, Demining

15. II. Why PMCs Matter Threat to World Order Or New World Order?

16. Political Will Proxies • Bold security policies require political will • PMCs make bold policies possible, costing less political will • DynCorp in Colombia • MPRI in Bosnia • Difference between dead reservists and dead soldiers • If Colombia, why not Sierra Leone?

17. Larger implications . . . • Are states losing their legitimate monopoly of violence? • In most developing countries, the violence is rarely legitimate. • Armies are a much, much greater threat to own governments than to external invaders. • An end to the Age of Sovereign States? • An evolution towards Management States.

18. IV. PMC Potential Old Strategy: Perpetuate Wars New Strategy: End Wars

19. PMC Potential • PMCs have proved their effectiveness • Protecting commerce in conflict zones • Protecting humanitarian operations • Professionalizing State Militaries • Stabilizing tottering democracies • Enhancing regional security organizations • Why not take the next step: End Wars?

20. EO Cost $36m ($1.2m month) Avg. 150 troops Secured Capital Recaptured Mines Routed RUF Won the War UN Cost $500m + ($60m+ month) Avg. 10,000 troops Evacuated Capital Gave RUF tanks Gave RUF hostages Lost the Peace EO vs. UNPeace Operations in Sierra Leone

21. Insurmountable Problems with the UN’s Conflict Ending Mechanisms • Chapter 6 vs. Chapter 7 mandates – irrelevant • Lack of strong peace agreements • Quality of proffered troops – Poor man’s NATO? • Fear of robust action • Politics, red tape and delays • Expense • Size – 17,000 in Sierra Leone • Members lack political will

22. Unassailable Answers to UN Problems: PMCs • Faster – deploy in weeks not months • Cheaper – rule of thumb: 10% UN PKO • Smaller – hundreds vs. thousands • Neutral – no political agenda • More transparent and more accountable • Militarily capable • NATO quality – often elite forces • Less likely to suffer casualties - less likely to withdraw due to casualties

23. Can we control PMCs? • How do we prevent these powerful companies from backing the wrong guys? • Controls – Legal, Financial, Ethical. • Contractual – bonuses and penalties • Legitimization = Control . . . • What about unscrupulous Clients? • Mining Companies • Despots

24. Ethics of PMCs • What is unethical about PMCs? • Soldiers in any army are paid • UN pays contributing members $1,000/mo • What’s difference with giving a mandate to contracted private firms? • What is ethical about allowing small wars to continue for decades? • Who else is willing to do it?

25. PMCs are . . . • Motivated by money • Not mercenaries • Providing useful services • Cost effective • Constrained financially, legally and ethically • Able • Willing • Capable of making international peace operations work

26. END Doug Brooks IPOA (202) 297-9717 Hoosier84@aol.com