1 / 17

CRD IV Restoring order in the financial system

CRD IV Restoring order in the financial system Hearing of the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament. Barbara Frohn May 3 , 2010. Basel III: The individual proposals are directionally correct ….

damon
Download Presentation

CRD IV Restoring order in the financial system

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript


  1. CRD IV Restoring order in the financial system Hearing of the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament Barbara Frohn May 3 , 2010

  2. Basel III: The individual proposals are directionally correct … Intrusive supervision has proven to be more effective than (over-) regulation; In the crisis, weak corporate governance and lack of internal control were key contributing factors, and in some cases even root causes; The aim should not just be to penalize and avoid bad practices, but equally to give full recognition to, and thus reward, good practices; Systemic risk cannot be measured by sheer size. SANTANDER shares the goal of the BCBS and the EC to strengthen the foundations of the financial sector and supports the direction of the individual BCBS and EC proposals. However, additional focus could be directed towards the following:

  3. …But the Combined Impacts may lead to Unintended Consequences Possible disruption of the interbank and equity markets i.e. Large Exposures rules, correlations, liquidity buffers, capital conservation standards: will (bank) investor and issuer interests prove reconcilable? Concentration risk may prove unavoidable; herd behaviour may lead to systemic risk i.e. ´Good Quality´ liquidity & capital restrictions, stringent rules for securitisation & CDS The CRD IV objective of level playing field cannot be served in a single market where full harmonization has not yet been achieved and where grandfathering may impact differently on banks. i.e. Deductions from Common Equity, Leverage ratio, Grandfatheringprovisions By whom will the growth of the real economy be serviced in future and will we then be better off? i.e. Maturity transformation and intermediation role, Leverage Ratio

  4. Forward Looking Provisioning: What is the purpose? • Economic activity is subject to periodic cycles: • where good years are followed by downturns or • even strong recessions. • Banks should, as the ant in the Aesop fable, store up • provisions for the “winter” during the “summer”. • (i.e. forward looking provisioning). But the current model • (“incurred loss” approach, the grasshopper view) • does not address this need. • The Spanish model, which uses generic provisions • for that purpose, has proved its usefulness to • mitigate the impact of the recession on the P&L. • The EC and Santander proposals on this subject are • forward looking provisioning based on the Spanish model • but taking advantage of the risk data already available for • Basel II, and using the concept of through-the-cycle • expected loss.

  5. Provisioning: Multiple Objectives, One Solution ? FASB: ´deliver right information on true financial condition of the firm & incentives to investors´; ´improve incurred loss model by earlier recognition of credit losses´ IASB: ´solution to ¨too little, too late¨, but only for closed portfolios´ Forward Looking Provisioning BCBS:´Capital Stability & Answer to Procyclicality´ EC: ´avoid underpricing & excessive credit growth´ G20: ´loan loss provisioning to incorporate a broader range of credit information´ FSB: ´better reflection in accounts of underlying economics of lending activities´

  6. Prudential proposals - Strengths and Weaknesses

  7. Accounting proposals - Strengths and Weaknesses *This is a mixed model aiming to satisfy both regulatory and accounting demands

  8. Main advantages of Expected Loss Provisioning In times of economic growth a cumulative provision buffer is being created: prevents overheating of the economy excessive credit growth is avoided ´real´ loan costs are being recognized from inception In periods of recession the accumulated provision is being used: less chance of major capital constraints on banks no sudden lending freeze As a consequence, depositors that have entrusted their money with a bank can be sufficiently at ease about the solvency situation of the bank in question financial stability will be preserved the negative growth of the real economy is not further aggravated by bank behaviour.

  9. Repeating the successful implementation of the Spanish system, uniformity, simplicity and transparency are key Uniformity: Aiming at reducing discretionality in the calculation of provisions; applicability to all firms; Simplicity: Using existing, externally and internally validated, parameters which were duly tested during the crisis; keeping the horizon oversee-able which reduces the risk of multiple re-adjustments; Transparency: Shareholders´ and depositors´ interests will not be served by implementing a dual system; their investment analysis will furthermore be accommodated by Pillar 3 disclosures a.o. on risk parameters and other factors supporting the EL estimations. Minimum Requisites for Forward Looking Provisioning

  10. Implications of a dual system BASEL IFRS

  11. …and therefore Convergence is the best way forward • Ideally, one unique forward looking provisioning regime should be in place responding to both accounting and prudential concerns; • On a similar note, a ´European only´ solution must be discouraged; • Decisions on a EL provisioning regime should not be made in isolation, but considering other procyclicality measures and capital buffers; • Increasing the provision pool in ´good´ years must also imply being able to consume it in ´bad´ years; provisions must go directly through P&L; • Contradictory incentives: it is evident that EL provisions leading to DTAs should not be deducted from capital; • If ultimately regulatory demands still exceed accounting solutions, the excess should be introduced as an economic cycle provision outside the perimeter of regulatory capital

  12. So can EL Provisions deal with procyclicality? • Accounting standard setters insist that they • Cannot accept provisions beyond existing portfolios and maturities and therefore do not promote ´Through-The-Cycle´ provisions • Aim to provide a true reflection of the firm´s current situation to investors and therefore dislike adjusting the value of a loan for its EL creating a ´day one´ loss • Therefore, only if: • Accounting standard setters are willing to compromise and to implement a system which does not lead to continuous fair value re-adjustments flowing through P&L • Regulators accept that the average lifetime of the portfolio is not too far off the objective of a full cycle • However, given the dynamic nature of lending practices and product development procyclicality can never be eliminated in full. A joint regime may be created resulting in a less marked procyclicality effect, even though the capital regime may still have to be reinforced by mandatory ´Through-The-Cycle´ rating parameters to become less procyclical

  13. Conclusions and Message Ifa constructive public-private sector dialogue on the new Basel proposals ensues, (cumulative) impacts are measured extensively and rules are tested before implementation, Then a new homogeneousregulatory framework could emerge that satisfies the expectations of politicians, governments, supervisors and accounting bodies, prevents (most) crises from happening whilst still allowing banks to remain private ventures in a level playing field context that allows the market to properly differentiate between good and bad practices. But for this to happen a silo´ed approach to regulation and standards must be avoided. Only then the financial sector stability can be restored and preserved.

  14. Annex A new model for provisioning (I) • No ´in advance´ recognition of credit losses in good years (mispricing) • Strong fluctuation of provisions • Volatility of results and possible loss of market confidence in the institution • Procyclicality: possible excessive credit growth in good years and credit squeeze in bad years

  15. A new model for provisioning (II) • Recognition in advance of credit losses in good years • Use of generic fund in bad years • Flat Provisions (for a stable portfolio) • Stability of Results • Mitigation of procyclicality

  16. A new model for provisioning (III) • Recognition in advance of credit losses in good years • Use of generic fund in bad years • More stable provisions but not flat • Results less volatile • Mitigation of procyclicality

More Related