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ELECTRIC POWER GRID INTERDICITION. Javier Salmeron and Kevin Wood, Naval Postgraduate School Ross Baldick, University of Texas at Austin. Sponsored by DoJ, Office of Domestic Preparedness. Purpose. In this presentation we will...

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ELECTRIC POWER GRID INTERDICITION

Javier Salmeron and Kevin Wood, Naval Postgraduate School

Ross Baldick, University of Texas at Austin

Sponsored by DoJ, Office of Domestic Preparedness


Purpose

  • In this presentation we will...

    • Show the importance of analyzing vulnerabilities of electric power systems to terrorist attacks

    • Present our models, and exact and heuristic algorithms to carry out this analysis

    • Present results on standard IEEE Reliability Test Networks


A Long-Recognized Issue (I)

  • “One can hardly imagine a targetmore ideal than the U.S. domestic energy” (A.B. and L.H. Lovins, 1983)

  • “Any U.S. region could suffer lasting and widespread blackouts if three or more substations were targeted.” (OTA, 1990)

  • “The U.S. is at, or is fast approaching, a crisis stage with respect to reliability of transmission grids.” (NERC, 2001)

  • “The U.S. electric power systems must clearly be made more resilient to terrorist attack.” (Committee on Science and Technology for Countering Terrorism, NRC, 2002)


A Long-Recognized Issue (II)

  • (On Ahmed Ressam) “They were specifically trained to attack critical infrastructure, including electric power plants.” (CNN, 2002)

  • “And the threat isn't simply academic. U.S. occupation forces in Afghanistan discovered Al Qaeda documentation about the facility that controls power distribution for the eastern U.S., fueling fears that an attack on the power grid may one day become a reality.”(Energy Pulse, 2003)

  • “Blue Cascades” project (simulated terrorist attack on the Pacific Northwest's power grid). The study showed that such an attack, if successful, could wreak havoc on the nation's economy, shutting down power and productivity in a domino effect that would last weeks. (Energy Pulse, 2003)


Terrorist Threat

Potential targets:

  • Generating plants

  • Transmission and distribution lines

  • Substations

    Easy disruption + Widespread damage + Difficult recovery


Our Approach

  • Assumes Information Transparency: Same information is available to both sides

  • Uses optimization to assess worst-case disruptions

  • Goal:

  • To provide insight on physical vulnerabilities and protective plans that proactively hedge against disruption caused by terrorist attacks


Mathematical Analysis of the Problem

  • In order to better defend the electric grid it is valuable to understand how to attack it!

    • Optimal power flow model (minimizing load shedding)

    • Interdiction model (maximize disruption)

  • Additional features of the problem are:

    • Time scale: Very short-, short-, medium- and long-term

    • Customer types; ability to “share the pain”

    • Uncertainty about terrorist resources

    • Assumptions on protection resources


DC-OPF:

Power Flow Model (DC Approx.)

s.t.

i: bus, l: line, g: generator, c: customer sector

PLine, PGen: power (MW) S: power shed  : bus phase


I-DC-OPF:

DC-OPF

after

interdiction

Interdiction Model

Where:

s.t.

Etc...


Heuristic

Solve the DC-OPFPower Flow Modelgiven the current grid configuration

Based on the current and previous flow patterns, assign a “Value” (V) to each interdictable asset

Interdictthe assets that maximize “Total Value”



Load shedding: 1,258 MW

Load shedding: 1,373 MW

IEEE Reliability Test System 96-99

Total load: 2,850 MW

Interdiction resource: 6 terrorists

Line x1

Single transformer x2

Bus or substation x3

Salmeron, Wood and Baldick (2004), IEEE Transactions on Power Systems


IEEE Reliability Test System 96-99

Load: 5,700 MW

12 terrorists

Shedding:

2,516 MW

Salmeron, Wood and Baldick (2004), IEEE Transactions on Power Systems


Trafos with spares

Lines

Slow repair

One to several days

Days to one week

Weeks

Grid Component

Interdictable

Resources M (no. of terrorists)

Outage Duration (h)

No repair

Lines (overhead)

YES

1

72

Lines (underground)

NO

N/A

N/A

E.g.:

Transformers

YES

2

768

Buses

YES

3

360

Generators

NO

N/A

N/A

Substations

YES

3

768

System Restoration

MW shedding

>1 months

t

(Attack)


Total Load: 2,850 MW

Substation

Protected

Substation

Protected

MW

2

3

3

4

Salmeron, Wood and Baldick (2004), IEEE Transactions on Power Systems

t

Attack

+360h

+768h

+72h

IEEE Reliability Test System 96-99



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