1 / 18

Dumping Allegations as a (Less) Free Trade Tool Michael R. Czinkota Georgetown University Masaaki Kotabe Temple Universi

Dumping Allegations as a (Less) Free Trade Tool Michael R. Czinkota Georgetown University Masaaki Kotabe Temple University Preet S. Aulakh Temple University March 23, 2002. U.S. Antidumping Orders in Effect as of Dec. 1, 2001. Based on: http://ia.ita.doc.gov/stats/inefecta.html.

daisy
Download Presentation

Dumping Allegations as a (Less) Free Trade Tool Michael R. Czinkota Georgetown University Masaaki Kotabe Temple Universi

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. Dumping Allegations as a (Less) Free Trade Tool Michael R. Czinkota Georgetown University Masaaki Kotabe Temple University Preet S. Aulakh Temple University March 23, 2002

  2. U.S. Antidumping Orders in Effectas of Dec. 1, 2001 Based on: http://ia.ita.doc.gov/stats/inefecta.html

  3. U.S. Antidumping Orders in Effect as of Dec. 1, 2001 127 61 27 Number of Cases 18 Regions Based on: http://ia.ita.doc.gov/stats/inefecta.html

  4. Total Global Antidumping Actions Taken Annually Total Cases Year Based on: www.wto.org and http://ia.ita.doc.gov/stats

  5. Total Global Antidumping Actions Taken Annually by Category CHEMICALS STEEL FOOD/AGRICULTURE TEXTILES INDUSTRIAL EQUIPMENT/MACHINERY CONSUMER GOODS OTHER TOTAL Based on: www.wto.org

  6. Research Questions • ITC Filings and Decisions: Strategic Actions or Salvage Operations? • ITC Beneficiaries: Corporate Bullies or Competitive Underdogs? • Does the Type of Filing Influence the ITC Outcome? • Does the Country of Origin of Competition Matter? • Does the Pre-Petition Process Affect Trade Flows? • Does the ITC Decision in Favor of the Filing Companies Positively Affect their Post-Decision Stock Prices?

  7. Research Questions A. ITC Filings and Decisions: Strategic Actions or Salvage Operations? H1. Dumping cases will be filed with the ITC not only by industries with declining markets but also by industries with stable or growing markets. H2. The ITC is more likely to issue positive findings of injury, the higher the import penetration ratio is. H3. The ITC is more likely to issue positive findings of injury, the faster the import growth rate is.

  8. B. ITC Beneficiaries: Corporate Bullies or Competitive Underdogs? H4a. The ITC is more likely to issue positive findings of injury for industries which are dominated by a few firms, irrespective of market growth rate. H4b. The ITC is more likely to issue positive findings of injury for atomistic industries if their markets are declining.

  9. C. Does the Type of Filing Influence the ITC Outcome? H5. Fillings by large numbers of firms are more likely to result in positive ITC decisions. H6. The higher the current import tariff rates, the less likely the ITC is to make positive antidumping decisions. H7. Consumer goods filings are more likely than industrial product filings to receive positive ITC decisions.

  10. D. Does the Country of Origin of Competition Matter? H8. The ITC is more likely to issue positive findings of injury for industries where Japan and/or Asian Tigers are accused of dumping than otherwise.

  11. E. Does the Pre-Petition Process Affect Trade Flows? H9. A longer pre-petition process is likely to result in negative ITC decisions.

  12. F. Does the ITC Decision in Favor of the Filing Companies Positively Affect their Post-Decision Stock Prices?

  13. Table 4 Regression Model for % Change in Stock Price on ITC Decision Variable Estimate Standard Error t-value p-value Intercept -2.23 1.51 -1.47 .14 Decision File Date .002 .003 .66 .51 % Stock Price Change on Filing Date - .27 .08 -3.26 .001 ITC Decision (1 = in favor; 0 = against) 3.45 1.39 2.48 .02 R 2 = 10.8% F (df = 3, 124) = 4.88 p-value = .003

  14. Conclusions and Implications • Political Strategies • Public action and private benefits • Collective action and free riding potential of firms • Market signaling • Post-filing versus post-decision market reaction

More Related