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DRAFT Space Code of Conduct: Principles, Policies, Options

DRAFT Space Code of Conduct: Principles, Policies, Options. A Presentation by the Fletcher School’s Space Policy Working Group Dr. William Martel, Principal Investigator Elisa Perry, Tim Ridout , Anthony Sung, Basak Sefii , Ches Thurber, Peshala Wimalasena December 2, 2010. Outline.

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DRAFT Space Code of Conduct: Principles, Policies, Options

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  1. DRAFT Space Code of Conduct: Principles, Policies, Options A Presentation by the Fletcher School’s Space Policy Working Group Dr. William Martel, Principal Investigator Elisa Perry, Tim Ridout, Anthony Sung, BasakSefii, Ches Thurber, PeshalaWimalasena December 2, 2010

  2. Outline • Problem statement • Case study: Chinese ASAT • Interference possibilities • Responding to interference in space • Code of conduct • Applying code to case studies • Directions for future research

  3. Problem Statement • Goal: peaceful and efficient use of space • However, rapid increases in space activity heighten risks • Lack of norms and consequences encourages actors to test boundaries of permissible conduct • Critical importance of space to national security, economic systems • Significant concepts of transparency and deterrence

  4. Transparency • Definition: open interactions among actors in space to understand actions, intentions • Transparency requires: • Space situational awareness • Clear rules of behavior • Communication among actors • Accountability for actions

  5. Deterrence • Definition: assure security through clear, credible threat of retaliation • Deterrence requires: • Clear rules of behavior • Evident consequences, “red lines” • Capability, will of actors to respond consistently • To reduce risk of escalation: • Mutually agreed-upon rules, clearly understood consequences • Open channels of communication

  6. Previous Attempts at Space Code • Existing treaties, norms, proposed codes insufficient • Stimson Center Code (2007) • Share information on space activities • Minimize debris • Refrain from interference • Implement domestic regulations • EU Code (2010) • Register, report, and share information • Adopt Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines • Minimize accidents • Abide by ITU recommendations • All express desire for peaceful use of space • We need a code of conduct to guide behavior

  7. Our Solution • Code of Conduct • Enhance transparency, predictability, security • Specify, codify permitted, prohibited behavior in space • Provide communication mechanisms for information sharing, dispute resolution • Clarify principles for legitimate responses to interference • Credibly signal consequences to would-be rule-breakers • Encourage consistent policy responses from states

  8. Research Process (2009-2010) • Survey of space problem • Demographics of space • Policy challenges • Analysis of potential models of governance • Air and maritime analogies • Other proposed space codes • Existing regulatory and legal frameworks (ITU, OST) • Study and brainstorm interference possibilities • Assess actors’ likely responses • Draft code of conduct • Suggest modes of implementation

  9. Outline • Problem statement • Case study: Chinese ASAT • Interference possibilities • Responding to interference in space • Code of conduct • Applying code to case studies • Directions for future research

  10. Case Study: 2007 Chinese ASAT • January 2007: China launches ground-based SC-19 missile that destroys own FY-1 weather satellite in LEO • Collision created considerable debris • Diplomatic protests: Australia, Canada, EU, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, UK, US • International response stronger than China anticipated

  11. Chinese ASATHighlights Central Problem • No laws or norms prohibit China’s action • Inability to predict international response • No agreed framework on deterrence • Absent clear rules, consequences, China conducts ASAT • Results in escalation, damage to space environment

  12. Other Incidents of Concern • Radio frequency • Cuba jams uplink of US broadcast signal to Iran (2003) • Proximity operations • US, China test microsat proximity operations (2005, 2008) • Laser dazzling • US claims Chinese lasers dazzle US satellites (2006) • Hacking satellite systems • Hackers obtain control of British satellite (1999) • Kinetic • Chinese ASAT (2007), US ASAT (2008) • Iridium/Cosmos accidental collision (2009)

  13. Outline • Problem statement • Case study: Chinese ASAT • Interference possibilities • Responding to interference in space • Code of conduct • Applying code to case studies • Directions for future research

  14. Types of Satellite Interference • Radio frequency • Proximity operations • Directed energy (laser dazzling) • Cyber (hacking) • Kinetic (damage, degrade, destroy)

  15. Satellite Interference Spreadsheet • Columns • Specific interference activity • Duration/intensity of attack • Level of damage caused • Level of proof needed to identify source/intent • The interference methods (rows) are ordered by level of escalatory potential

  16. Outline • Problem statement • Case study: Chinese ASAT • Interference possibilities • Responding to interference in space • Code of conduct • Applying code to case studies • Directions for future research

  17. Potential Responses 1) Absolutely nothing 2) Evasive, defensive action 3) Back-channel political communications 4) Public protest/shaming 5) Demand for compensation/ restitution 6) Official diplomatic responses 7) Economic sanctions • 8)Selective retaliation,reversible consequences • 9)Selective retaliation, irreversible consequences (satellites) • 10)Selective retaliation, irreversible consequences (ground-based assets) • 11) Outright war

  18. Criteria for Effective Responses • How should policymakers choose appropriate responses from range of options? • Criteria: • Protect national security • Minimize impact, end interference event • Deter future attempts • Comply with international laws and norms • Minimize risk of further escalation

  19. Factors Affecting Level of Response • Nature, degree, and intent of interference • Quality of information: Interfering actor? Intent? • Function of “victim” satellite • Clarity of rules • Previous attempts to resolve conflict peacefully • International context

  20. Interference Response: Purposes • Clearly identify types of interference • Categorize plausible responses • Differentiate diplomatic to forceful responses • Rationalize responses based on context • Illustrate potential for escalation

  21. Satellite Interference Responses • Classifying potential for escalation: • Low potential • Medium potential • High potential

  22. Satellite Interference Responses Radio Frequency

  23. Satellite Interference Response Proximity

  24. Satellite Interference ResponsesDirected Energy

  25. Satellite Interference ResponsesCyber/Hacking

  26. Satellite Interference Responses Kinetic

  27. Outline • Problem statement • Case study: Chinese ASAT • Interference possibilities • Responding to interference in space • Code of conduct • Applying code to case studies • Directions for future research

  28. Code of ConductWhat It Should Do • Enhance transparency, predictability, stability, and security • Protect states’ capabilities • Help distinguish between accidental and intentional actions • Specifically prohibit or minimize certain provocative types of behavior in space • Thus, provide written framework for avoidance, peaceful resolution of disputes

  29. Important Elements of the CodePositive Principles • Promote peaceful and efficient use of space • Protect equal access to space • Satellites protected as sovereign property of state

  30. Important Elements of the CodeNegative Principles • Prohibit dangerous, provocative acts in space: • Radio frequency jamming • Proximity operations • Cyber hacking • Directed energy attacks • Kinetic attacks • Unnecessary creation of debris

  31. Important Elements of the CodeDispute Resolution Mechanisms • Joint efforts to improve space situational awareness • Protocols for information sharing • Protocols for communication in event of interference • Forums for discussion of space disputes • Possible mechanisms for arbitration, adjudication of disputes

  32. Important Elements of the CodePrinciples to Guide Responses • Right to self-defense applies in space • Critical concept for state • Limitations on self-defense also apply • Peaceful means should be exhausted first, when possible • Responses must be proportional to level of interference • Responses must be discriminate • Actors may wish to declare more specific response policies • Unilaterally or through bilateral agreements

  33. Outline • Problem statement • Case study: Chinese ASAT • Interference possibilities • Responding to interference in space • Code of conduct • Applying code to case studies • Directions for future research

  34. 2007 China ASAT Revisited • Code of conduct explicitly prohibits such action • Rule against unnecessary debris creation • Potential rule prohibiting ASAT first-use • Code narrows range of responses • Clear violation of established rule makes lowest-level responses more likely

  35. Impact of Code on China ASAT • China likely expected “Green” response • Code would make clear that “Yellow” response more likely • By making consequences transparent, consistent, code enhances deterrence • Uncertainty: With code in place, would China have been deterred from conducting ASAT?

  36. Microsatellite Case Study • Chinese microsatellite approaches US imaging satellite • Given unknown Chinese intentions, national security mission of US satellite creates dangerous situation • Current legal regime provides no basis for determining who has right of way, how to respond • Lack of clarity increases risk of escalation

  37. Microsatellite Case StudyPotential Application of Code • Code clearly prohibits Chinese action • Satellite maintaining orbit has right-of-way • “Keep-out box” encircling US satellite establishes protected “zone” • Code clarifies possible responses • Clear violation makes lowest-level responses unlikely • Clear violation has implications for higher-level responses • Mechanisms for communication, dispute resolution make higher-level responses less likely, unnecessary, provocative

  38. Microsatellite Case StudyImpact of Code • Code establishes which satellite has right of way • Imposes obligation on microsatellite to move away • Communication and crisis resolution mechanisms increase likelihood of de-escalation • Cold War examples • Clarity of rule, consequences may deter microsatellite approach to begin with

  39. Outline • Problem statement • Case study: Chinese ASAT • Interference possibilities • Responding to interference in space • Code of conduct • Applying code to case studies • Directions for future research

  40. Further Steps to Implementing the Code • Unilateral policy declaration • National Space Policy • Bilateral treaty • US-Soviet agreements • Multilateral convention • Outer Space Treaty • Customary international law • Maritime rights-of-way, rules of engagement • Regulatory regime • ITU regulations for GEO • ICAO system for airspace

  41. Directions for Future Research • Study responses based on satellite type and function • Further development, analysis of code of conduct • Create “model” bilateral, multilateral scenarios • Study institutions to enforce code of conduct • Analysis of forceful responses (Red Zone) • Incorporate “traffic management” and other non-deliberate interference issues

  42. Questions and Extended Discussion

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