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Large Disturbance in the European Power System on the 4th of November 2006

Large Disturbance in the European Power System on the 4th of November 2006. CAMS/RRPA Panel Session Mitigation and Prevention of Cascading Outages: Methodologies and Practical Applications PES General Meeting, Vancouver, Canada July 24, 2013

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Large Disturbance in the European Power System on the 4th of November 2006

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  1. Large Disturbance in the European Power System on the 4th of November 2006 CAMS/RRPA Panel Session Mitigation and Prevention of Cascading Outages: Methodologies and Practical Applications PES General Meeting, Vancouver, Canada July 24, 2013 Janusz Bialek (Durham), Vladimir Terzija (Manchester), Taiying Zheng (Manchester), Walter Sattinger (Swissgrid) janusz.bialek@durham.ac.uk

  2. Durham University • Site of two UNESCO Wold Heritage Sites • 3rd oldest university in England

  3. PMAPS 2014, Durham • International Conference on Probabilistic Methods Applied to Power Systems, 7-10 July 2014 • Paper submission deadline 30 Nov 2013 • www.dur.ac.uk/pmaps.2014, pmaps.admin@durham.ac.uk

  4. Source of data and diagrams: UCTE “Final Report System Disturbance on 4 November 2006” • 15M households affected, 16,724 MW lost • The worst disturbance in 50 years of UCTE/ENTSOE in terms of the number of TSOs affected and frequency deviations involved • Duration 1 hour and 35 minutes (22:10-23:45) but only 38 minutes three island operation

  5. Loading pre-disturbance Voltage phase angle differences in the UCTE system at 22:00 • East-West transfer • 15 GW of wind (5.5%) • High flows around Germany Source: UCTE Source: UCTE Abschlussbericht zur Systemstörung 4. Nov. 2006

  6. Note the difference between scheduled and actual flows (e.g. FR-D, FR-BE) due to loop flow phenomenon • Especially important D-NL, D-PL due to high wind Source: UCTE

  7. Timeline • 18 Sept: a shipyard request EON for a routine disconnection of double circuit 380 kV line in Northern Germany on 5 Nov • 3 Nov: the shipyard request to bring forward the disconnection by 3 hours • EON agrees provisionally but does not modify Day Ahead Congestion Forecast (DACF) distributed to all TSOs • 4 Nov, 7 pm: EON informs RWE and TenneT about new time for the line outage • 9.30 pm: EON concludes empirically, without updated (N-1) analysis, that the outage would be secure (it wasn’t!) Image: http://www.cruise-ship-report.com/News/110506.htm

  8. RWE does (N-1) analysis of its area which indicates high but secure loading • 9.38: EON disconnects the line • 9.39-41: warnings of high flows • EON assesses the situation empirically, without simulations, and decides to couple a busbar to reduce the current by 80 A • Result: the current increases by 67 A and the line trips • Cascading line tripping all over UCTE and separation into 3 regions with different frequencies Source: UCTE

  9. 10 GW surplus 51.4 Hz 8.9 GW deficit 49 Hz 0.8 GW deficit 49.7 Hz Source: UCTE

  10. Western Europe: 8.9 GW deficit • Drop of frequency halted by load shedding • But frequency drop caused tripping of 10.7 GW of generation (40% wind)

  11. North-Eastern Europe: 10 GW surplus • Initial rise of frequency halted by AGC and tripping of frequency-sensitive generation (mainly wind) • As frequency started to drop, windmills started to reconnect automatically worsening the situation • Situation stabilised by manual action of TSOs Source: UCTE

  12. South-Eastern Europe: modest 0.8 GW deficit • No load shedding activated, subsystem (N-1) secure Source: UCTE

  13. Resynchronisation • A number of uncoordinated unsuccessful attempts made without knowledge of the overall UCTE situation • Full resynchronisation after 38 minutes Source: UCTE

  14. UCTE root cause analysis • Main points: • (N-1) security rule, inadequate inter-TSO coordination • Lack of situational awareness • Other factors (wind farms, lack of coordination)

  15. Improvements since 2006: situational awareness • Web-based visibility of cross-border flows in Europe, ACE, generation • traffic light system to indicate security, control reserves and state of IT infrastructure • RAAS – real-time awareness and alarming system, EAS (ENTSO-E awareness) • all TSOs have the same view • the information maintenance is done on two central points with highly redundant infrastructure.

  16. Improvements since 2006: coordinated (N-1) security analysis • All national files are merged into one common CE load flow file • each TSO downloads the complete system and perform complete (n-1) calculation. • Evening phone/web/video conference of all the TSOs to coordinate remedial actions

  17. Further Measures: Synchronized Measurement Technology, WAMS WAMS HSE/PMU-SE Situational Awareness Dynamic Security Assessment Decision Making

  18. Data Records during 39 Minutes of the Islanding System Operation All measurements are synchronised by GPS signal Source: W.Sattinger, Swissgrid

  19. Large Disturbance in the European Power System on the 4th of November 2006 CAMS/RRPA Panel Session Mitigation and Prevention of Cascading Outages: Methodologies and Practical Applications PES General Meeting, Vancouver, Canada July 24, 2013 Janusz Bialek (Durham), Vladimir Terzija (Manchester), Taiying Zheng (Manchester), Walter Sattinger (Swissgrid) janusz.bialek@durham.ac.uk

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