1 / 16

referendums

referendums. Chapter VI, Veto Player, George Tsebelis, 2002. Luca Vezzoli, EPS 2013. referendum. Introduction The result of referendum Median voter preferences Direct and mediated democracy: different outcome Classification of Referendum Referendum agenda power Veto Player Refendum

cirila
Download Presentation

referendums

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript


  1. referendums Chapter VI, Veto Player, George Tsebelis, 2002 Luca Vezzoli, EPS 2013

  2. referendum • Introduction • The result of referendum • Median voter preferences • Direct and mediated democracy: different outcome • Classification of Referendum • Referendum agenda power • Veto Player Refendum • Popular Initiatives • Popular Vetoes • Conclusion

  3. Introduction • Referendum is a form of direct democracy. • Rousseau was one of the most important supporter of direct democracy: • «Sovereignty cannot be represented for the same reason that it cannot alieneted […] No act of theirs (the deputies) can be law, unless it has been ratified by the people in person; and without ratification nothing is law.»

  4. The result of referendum The referendum can be introduces the preferences of the population in the policymakingprocess. The referendum can havedifferentresults: • In single dimension the resultis the preference of medianvoter • In multiple dimension a medianvoterrarelyexist.

  5. Medianvoterpreferences in referendum • The winset of the SQ isbetweentwocircle (Y, d+2r) and (Y, d-2r) • If the number of voterincreases, the radius of the yolk (r) decreases. Thissimplifies the problem of identification of the medianvoter and the winset of the SQ because the winset of the SQ isapproximate by a circle of radius d.

  6. Direct and rapresentativedemocracy: differentoutcome • The result of the policymakingprocess in a directdemocracyisdifferent from the result in a rapresentativedemocracy. • The outcomein the parliamentis Y but the outcome of the referendum is Y’. • Also the winsets of the SQ are different. W(SQ) for mediateddemocracy and W’(SQ) for directdemocracy

  7. Direct and rapresentativedemocracy:differentoutcome (2) Referendums create oneaddictional veto player: the people. Thisimpliesthat: • The change of the status quo becomes more difficult • The finaloutcome of the referendum approximatethe preferences of the medianvoter So the finaloutcomeislocated in the intersection of the parlamentary and the popularwinsets.

  8. Classification of referendum • Required referendum: the document has to be ratified by the people. • VP referendum: an actor has decide to hold a referendum. • Popular Veto: the trigger actor may be the population at large or some minority in the parliament • Popular initiative: referendum is a proposal by some political groups the collected the required signatures

  9. Referendum agenda power The referendum agenda is diveded in two parts “who ask the question” and “who trigger the referendum”. • If both part are controlled by only one player: player usesthispower to eliminate the other veto players (VETO PLAYER REFERENDUM) • If agenda setting process is delegated through a competitive process: the preferences of the public will be better approximated

  10. Veto player referendum Wecondidertwopossiblecases: • «Parliamentary» government: coalitionbetween parties A, B and C • «Presidential» system: with anypossiblewinningcoalitionamong A,B,C,D and E ispossible In eachonewewillconsidertwopossible agenda setters: party A and E

  11. Veto player referendum (2):A control the agenda • In parliamentary goverment: A’ is the unanimity core of the governament coalition A,B ,C. In any case A obtains A’, with or without the referendum. • In presidential system: A chooces the coalition A, D E. This coalition is the only one can approve point in the circle (A, AA’). A’

  12. Veto player referendum (3):E control the agenda • Parliamentary governament: E tryes to negotiate a different government. If the goverment doesn’t change E will trigger referendum and obtain E’ • Presidential system: three possible coalition ABE ADE CDE. And E chooses ADE.

  13. Popularinitiative • The agenda setter power is delegate to the winner of a competitive process. • Different groups can become agenda setters in a referendum by winning the right to present their question to the electorate. • The whole legislative process is replaced by referendum

  14. Popularvetoes • Non-Veto Players will select a referendum if the government proposed result is not inside the winset of the median voter. • But the existing Veto Players can capturing the preferences of the median voter.

  15. conclusions • Referendum alters the rules and the outcome of the legislative proces. Because it introduces an extra veto player. • The differences among referendum depend on who control the agenda. • Median voter preferences results will be better approximated in the following order: • Popular initiative • Popular veto • VP referundum or mandatory referendum

  16. Thankyoufor the attention!!

More Related