COCOM The „Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls“

1. COCOM • The „Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls“ • Prof. Dr. Hanns-D. Jacobsen, Studienforum Berlin • Contribution to the conference • „The Economics of the Cold War“ • Hamburg Institute for Social Research, 2-4 Sep 2009 • Panel 6: Economic warfare vs. economic cooperation Hanns-D. Jacobsen – www.studienforum-berlin.de - Cold War: CoCom

2. CoCom – basic facts I • Purpose and duration: • CoCom was the primary international institu-tion through which the U.S. and other non-communist countries controlled the export of goods and technolo-gies for security reasons. • CoCom was founded in 1949 and dissolved in 1994. Hanns-D. Jacobsen – www.studienforum-berlin.de - Cold War: CoCom

3. CoCom – basic facts II • Member countries: • NATO member countries in 1949 (United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, France, Denmark, Italy, Norway, Norway, Portugal, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxemburg) and Japan • 1952: Greece and Turkey • 1955: Federal Republic of Germany • 1985: Australia • 1989: Spain • Target countries: • Warsaw Pact member countries (USSR, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Repulic, Hungary, Poland, Rumania) • People‘s Republic of China • Cuba, Vietnam Hanns-D. Jacobsen – www.studienforum-berlin.de - Cold War: CoCom

4. CoCom – basic facts III • Control instruments: Three lists • Munitions list • Commodity list (this turned out to be the most impor-tant and controversial one because it contained „dual use“ technology, products and services) • Atomic energy list Hanns-D. Jacobsen – www.studienforum-berlin.de - Cold War: CoCom

5. CoCom controversies • Definition of strategic goods • Impact of„negative“ or „positive“ sanctions • Exterritorial application of U.S. legislation • German division and divided Berlin Hanns-D. Jacobsen – www.studienforum-berlin.de - Cold War: CoCom

6. The „success“ of CoCom I • The CoCom members were basically successful in keeping a lead over the Soviet bloc in critical technologies • But the CoCom controls were ultimately not able to reduce the military threat by the communist countries Hanns-D. Jacobsen – www.studienforum-berlin.de - Cold War: CoCom

7. The „success“ of CoCom II • CoCom controls proved to be a liability, even an obstacle, when East-West rela-tions improved (“détente”, “perestroika”) • CoCom contributed to economic and political isolation of the Soviet Union as well as Central and Eastern Europe. This isolation gave the Soviet Union much room for tightening the grip on its allies Hanns-D. Jacobsen – www.studienforum-berlin.de - Cold War: CoCom

8. The „success“ of CoCom III • CoCom induced the Soviet Union and its allies to develop sophisticated military technology of their own. Thus, CoCom strengthened intra-bloc cooperation • Some CoCom member countries and third non-CoCom countries provided ways and means for the Soviet Union and its allies to get access to strategic techno-logy illegally and by means of diversion Hanns-D. Jacobsen – www.studienforum-berlin.de - Cold War: CoCom

9. The „success“ of CoCom IV • Export, including CoCom, controls vis-à-vis the communist countries as well as the extraterritorial application of U.S. law were subject to several conflicts between the United States and her allies • This contributed to a weakening of NATO and transatlantic cooperation Hanns-D. Jacobsen – www.studienforum-berlin.de - Cold War: CoCom

10. The „success“ of CoCom V • The insistence of the U.S. on tightening strategic controls and CoCom rules had an economic impact that was perceived by some West European and Japanese actors as an activity that primarily in-tended to secure global U.S. lead in high technology Hanns-D. Jacobsen – www.studienforum-berlin.de - Cold War: CoCom

11. The „success“ of CoCom VI • CoCom controls induced Western Euro-pean countries and Japan to initiate huge technological programs of their own • This contributed to the rise of non-U.S. technology and finally a loss of U.S. inter-national competitiveness Hanns-D. Jacobsen – www.studienforum-berlin.de - Cold War: CoCom

12. Conclusion • A final „cost-benefit analysis“ of Co-Com‘s impact is almost impossible be-cause one has to distinguish between intended and unintended consequences • Particularly since the end of the seventies it was clear that CoCom became more of a liability than an asset in East-West rela-tions Hanns-D. Jacobsen – www.studienforum-berlin.de - Cold War: CoCom