Design of Multi-Agent Systems. Teacher Bart Verheij Student assistants Albert Hankel Elske van der Vaart Web site http://www.ai.rug.nl/~verheij/teaching/dmas/ (Nestor contains a link). Student presentations. Student presentations. Some practical matters.
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Not or differentin the book
Reflexive:
Transitive:
Comparable:
But money isn’t always the right measure: think of the subjective value of a million dollars when you have nothing or when you are Bill Gates.
Simplification: two agents
Constant sum games
The sum of all players' payoffs is the same for any outcome.
ui(w) +uj(w) = C for all wW
Zero-sum games
All outcomes involve a sum of the players’ payoffs of 0:
ui(w) +uj(w) = 0 for all wW
Chess
0, ½, 1
-½, 0, ½
highest social welfare
Pareto efficient
Pareto improvements
Nash equilibria
‘Nashincentives’
outcomes corresponding to strategies in Nash equilibrium
no Nash equilibrium
unique Nash equilibrium
unique Nash equilibrium
highest social welfare & Pareto efficient
Always defect
At the first meeting of an opponent: cooperate. Then do what your opponent did on the previous meeting
First: defect. If the opponent retaliates, play TIT-FOR-TAT. Otherwise intersperse cooperation and defection.
As TIT-FOR-TAT, except periodically defect
Dominant for a2
Dominant for a1
B
A
D
C
time(c) = 5 + 2c, where c is the number of cars
time(c) = 20 + c
What will happen when a new highway is made between B and C?