Stability, Security and Development

1. Stability, Security and Development GP3200 August 8, 2013 Security, Civil Affairs I Dr Robert E. Looney relooney@nps.edu

2. Today’s Topics • Security and Development Framework (From August 6) • Discussion, A Bell For Adano • World Bank, Conflict, Security, Development, Part I • Rand, Cambodian Case Study • Failed State Environments

3. Security and Development Framework I • General approach taken in the class – system view rather than just examining components • Success of stabilization and reconstruction depends on each of four components: • Security • Political • Social and • Economic issues • Each is individually critical: achieving some threshold level of success in each component is necessary for overall success • Example: more foreign aid to a post-conflict country should be expected to do no good if the security situation is sufficiently abysmal • A static view shows these factors – • A dynamic view shows complexity --

4. Security and Development Framework II

5. Security and Development Framework III • Over time, “everything is connected to everything” • This interconnectedness makes analytical work difficult, but recognizing it is essential to good S&R planning • Separating the two views – static and dynamic allows us to modularize in functionally neutral ways to reason in causal terms at a given time • While recognizing that over longer periods of time recognizing interconnections are complex and the usual concept of causality needs to be modified. • Additional element is recognizing that effects of an approach or of individual factors depend on the context –the situation or case • Example – increasing interveners troops to stabilize a chaotic situation (static case) may be greeted with enthusiasm • However if foreign troops become associated with occupation rather than stabilization (dynamic case) – more of them may worsen the situation rather than improve it. • Alternative courses of action then need to be assessed.

6. Security and Development Framework IV

7. Security and Development Framework V • Are Security and Development Mutually Reinforcing? • Many different approaches attempting to establish this relationship. • Measurement and conceptual problems have resulted in a variety of models and policy recommendations • However all tend to agree that there is a sense of circularity both positive “virtuous circles” and negative “vicious circles”. • We see the pursuit of particular forms of development or increase in particular types of security as a way of further entrenching forms of development and promoting certain types of security • There are many variations of this pattern and the level of complexity often depends on the situation at hand • Conclusion: the relationship between security and development not linear – best looked at from a system perspective

8. Security and Development Framework VI

9. Security and Development Framework VII • Security and development can reinforce each other through self –reinforcing loops (diagram) where progress in each component positively influences developments in another. • Regrettably the possibilities work in both directions. Failure in one component can undercut progress in others. • Side effects are common • Most of the virtuous feedback effects do not occur automatically but must rather be planned for and enforced • Can be difficult to achieve when the parties in question (e.g. a government and a prime opposition party) are led by individuals or groups of individuals driven by personal ambitions rather than concern for people at large

10. A Bell for Adano I • Broad Issues for Discussion • What was Hersey’s mission (task and purpose) for writing A Bell for Adano? • What part of the story drew you in and best accomplished Hersey’s Mission • From the story can we characterize a good command climate? A bad command climate? • What part of the book seems most relevant to you? • What are the author’s specified and implied conclusions?

11. A Bell for Adano II • Other topics for discussion • Why do the townspeople hate Mayor Nasta? What does he represent for them • Imagine what would have happened if Joppolo had remained in Adano. What relationships would have continued? How would he have handled his popularity in the long-term • Critics have argued that Hersey oversimplifies his characterizations. Do you agree or disagree – why? • What stereotypes do you feel were most accurate? Least accurate? • How does the language barrier affect the way the troops interact with people in the town? • Can learn many lessons from A Bell for Adano: Question is how many of these are relevant in today’s environment

12. Overview: World Bank I • Insecurity has become a primary development challenge of our time • One-and-a-half billion people live in areas affected by fragility, conflict, or large scale organized criminal violence • No low-income conflict affected country has yet to achieve a single UN Millennium Development Goal • New threats • Organized crime and trafficking • Civil unrest due to global economic shocks • Terrorism • Have left countries far behind more peaceful settings • Their economic growth compromised and • Human indicators stagnant

13. Overview: World Bank II • The World Bank document asks: • What spurs risks of violence? • Why have conflict prevention and recovery proven so difficult to address? • What can be done by national leaders and their development, security and diplomatic partners to help restore a stable development path? • Central message of the World Bank report is that strengthening legitimate institutions and governance to provide citizen security, justice and jobs is crucial to break cycles of violence • Requires • Refocusing assistance on preventing criminal and political violence, • Reforming procedures and international agencies

14. Part I: Challenge of Repeated Cycles of Violence I • Global systems in the 20th century designed to address: • interstate tensions and • one-off episodes of civil war • War between nation states and civil war usually have a given logic and sequence • If a dispute escalated and full scale hostilities ensured, an eventual end to hostilities was usually followed by a short “post-conflict” phase leading back to peace • Global system largely built around this paradigm of conflict with clear roles for national and international actors. • 21st century violence does not fit the 20th century mold. • Interstate war and civil war are still threats, but have declined dramatically over last 25 years • Deaths from civil war are one quarter what they were in the 1980s.

15. Death from Civil Wars Declining

16. Part I: Challenge of Repeated Cycles of Violence II • Situation changed in that • While deaths down, violence and conflict have not been banished • One in four people live in fragile and conflict affected states or countries with very high levels of criminal violence • But because of the success in reducing interstate war, the remaining forms of conflict and violence to not fit neatly into “war” or “peace” or into “criminal violence” or political violence” • Many countries and subnational areas now face cycles of repeated violence, weak governance and instability. • First, conflicts are often not one-off events, but instead ongoing and repeated events • 90% of the last decade’s civil wars occurred in countries that had already had a civil war in the last 30 years

17. Violence Often Recurs

18. Part I: Challenge of Repeated Cycles of Violence III • Second, new forms of conflict and violence threaten development in counties that have successfully conclded peace agreements after violent political conflicts: • El Salvador, Guatemala, South Africa face high levels of violent crime constraining their development • Third, different forms of violence are linked to each other. • Political movements can obtain financing from criminal activities – DRC, Northern Ireland. • Criminal gangs can support political violence during electoral periods – Jamaica and Kenya • International ideological movements make common cause with local grievances – Afghanistan and Pakistan • Thus large majority of countries currently facing violence face it in multiple forms

19. Organized Criminal Violence Threatens Peace Process

20. Part I: Challenge of Repeated Cycles of Violence IV • Fourth, grievances can escalate into acute demands for change – and risks of violent conflict • Especially true in countries where political, social or economic change lags behind expectations, as in the Middle East or North Africa. • Repeated and interlinked these conflicts have regional and global repercussions – spillovers. • A country making economic progress like Tanzania, loses an estimated 0.7% GDP every year for each neighbor in conflict • Refugees and internally displaced ersons have increased threefold in the last 30 years • Nearly 75% of the world’s refugees are hosted by neighboring countries

21. Part I: Challenge of Repeated Cycles of Violence V • While most violence takes place in developing countries, still a problem for the advanced nations • More than 80 percent of fatalities from terrorist attacks over last decade were in nonwestern targets. • However for the 18 Western European countries, each additional transnational terrorist incident reduced their economic growth by 0.4% a year • Attacks in one region can impose costs all through global markets • One attack in the Niger Delta can cost global consumers of oil billions in increased prices • In the four weeks following the start of the uprising in Libya, Oil prices increased by 15% • Interdiction of cocaine shipment to Europe has increased four fold since 2003 with even areas such as West Africa seriously affected by drug related violence.

22. Part I: Challenge of Repeated Cycles of Violence VI • Attempts to contain violence are also extremely costly. • Naval operation to counter piracy in Horn of Africa and the Indian Ocean estimated to cost US$1.3-$2 billion annually, • Plus additional costs incurred by rerouting ships and increasing insurance premium • With regard to development and conflict: • No low income fragile or conflict-affected country has yet achieved a single Millennium Development Goal (MGD) • People in fragile and conflict affected states more than twice as likely to be undernourished as those in developed countries • More than three times as likely to be unable to send their children to school • Trice as likely to see their children die before age five • More than twice as likely to lack clean water

23. Part I: Challenge of Repeated Cycles of Violence VII • On average a country that experienced major violence over the period from 1981 to 2005 has a poverty rate 21 percentage points higher than a country that saw no violence • These repeated cycles of conflict and violence exact other human, social and economic costs that last for generations • High levels of organized criminal violence holdback economic development • In Guatemala violence cost the country more than 7% of GDP in2005 • More than twice the damage caused by Hurrican Stan in the same year • More than twice the combined budet for agriculture, health and education.

24. Gap in Poverty Widening Between Countries Affected by Violence and Others

25. Part I: Challenge of Repeated Cycles of Violence VIII • The average cost of a civil war is equivalent to more than 30 years of GDP growth for a medium size developing country • Trade levels after major episodes of violence take 20 years to recover • In other words a major episode of violence, unlike natural disasters or economic cycles can wipe out an entire generation of economic progress • Numbers have human consequences: • People hesitate to build houses or invest in small businesses because these can be destroyed in a moment • Men make up 96 percent of detainees and 90 percent of missing • Women and children are close to 80 percent of refugees and those internally displaced • Children who witness violence have higher tencency to perpetuate violence later in life • c

26. Part I: Challenge of Repeated Cycles of Violence IX • Yet when security reestablished and sustained these areas of the world can make the greatest development gains • Ethiopia more than quadrupled accessed to improved water, from 13 percent of population in 1990 to 66 percent in 2009-10 • Mozambique more than tripled its primary completion rate in just eight years from 14 percent in 1999 to 46 percent in 2005 • Rwanda cut prevalence of under-nutrition from 56 percent of the population in 1997 to 40 percent in 2005

27. Part I: Challenge of Repeated Cycles of Violence X • Vicious Cycles of Conflict • Internal causes of conflict arise from political, security and economic dynamics • Difficult to disentangle causes and effects of violence • Lower GDP per capita is • closely associated with both large-scale political conflict, and • high rates of homicide • Youth unemployment is consistently cited in citizen perception surveys as a motive for joining both rebel movements and urban gangs • Political exclusion and inequality affecting regional, religious or ethnic groups are associated with higher risks of civil war • Inequality between richer and poorer households is closely associated with higher risks of violent crime.

28. Part I: Challenge of Repeated Cycles of Violence XI • External factors can also heighten the risks of violence • Major external security pressures as with new patterns of drug trafficking, can overwhelm institutional capacities • Income shocks can also increase risks of violence • In Africa civil conflict is more likely following years of poor rainfall • Corruption – with international links through illicit trafficking, money laundering and extraction of rents from national resources • often fuels grievances and undermines the credibility and effectiveness of national institutions • New external pressures from climate change and natural resource competition could heighten all these risks • Still many countries face high unemployment, economic inequality or pressure from crime networks, but do not succumb to wide-spread violence

29. Summary: Causes of Conflict

30. Part I: Challenge of Repeated Cycles of Violence XI • World Bank finds the risk of conflict and violence in any society is the combination of • The exposure to internal and external stresses and • The strength of the “immune system” or the social capability for coping with legitimate institution • Both state and non-state institutions are important • Institutions include social norms and behaviors – as • The ability of leaders to transcend sectarian political differences and develop bargins and • Of civil society to advocate for greater national and political cohesion • Where states, markets and social institutions fail to provide basic security, justice and economic opportunities for citizens, conflict can escalate • In sum countries with the weakest institutional legitimacy and governance are the most vulnerable to violence and instability and least able to respond to external stresses.

31. Part I: Challenge of Repeated Cycles of Violence XI • Institutional capacity and accountability are important for both political and criminal violence. • In some areas state is all but absence and violent armed groups dominate local contests over power and resources • Colombia before the turn of the 21st century • Democratic Republic of the Congo today • Most areas affected by violence have deficits in their collaborative capacities to mediate conflict peacefully • Some countries institutions do not span ethnic, regional or religious divides and state institutions are viewed as partisan • Rapid urbanization – Latin America and Asia weakens social cohesion • Unemployment, inequalities and greater access to firearms and illicit drugs break down social cohesion and increase vulnerability to criminal networks and gangs.

32. Part I: Challenge of Repeated Cycles of Violence XI • Weak institutions explain why violence repeats in different form in the same countries or regions • Even societies with weak institutions have periodic out-breaks of peace • South central Somalia has had periods of low conflict ove the last 30 years • Based on agreements by small numbers of elites • Usually these arrangements do not provide grounds for sustained security and development unless followed by development of legitimate state and society institution • They are generally short-lived because they are too personalized and narrow to accommodate stress and adjust to change • Leader’s death, new shocks etc. and no sustained ability to respond and violence reemerges.

33. Part I: Challenge of Repeated Cycles of Violence XI • A focus on legitimate institutions does not mean converging on Western institutions • Many foreign models failed because they focused on form rather than function. • In Iraq CPA established commissions on every subject from tourism to the environment in parallel with struggling ministries • Laws were passed that had little relationship to national social and political realities • Institutions must be adapted to local circumstances • Truth and reconciliation, anti-corruption and human rights commissions that worked well in some countries have not worked well in others • World Bank stresses necessity of “Best-Fit” institutions.

34. Cambodia

35. Cambodia Overview I • 1991 conflict in Cambodia ended with the Paris Peace agreements • Conflict had lasted two decades with three phases: • Civil war with U.S. aerial bombardment in the early 1970s • Genocide of thousands by the Khmer Rouge late 1970s, and • Vietnamese invasion and subsequent civil conflict • To ensure implementation of the peace agreement the UN launched its most expansive post-conflict mission up to that point: • The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) • The mission was charged with addressing a host of security, administrative and humanitarian concerns • disarming combatants • promoting human rights • conducting elections

36. Cambodia Overview II • UNTAC failed to demobilize warring factions • Some level of conflict continued for a time. • Operation succeeded in • Resettling refuges • Overseeing a national election • Today Cambodia is a peaceful, relatively stable country • Growing and increasingly mixed economy • However problems remain • Corruption rampant • Rural development is stagnant and • Governing Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) won elections that were neither free nor fair.

37. Cambodia Progress at Governance

38. Cambodia I • Background • Cambodia’s conflicts can be attributed largely to the geopolitical struggle among the superpowers – US, Soviet Union (Vietnam) and China • Country’s neighbors a persistent source of insecurity • Largely an agrarian society with small population • Lies between Thailand and Vietnam – countries with a historical tendency for expansionism • Early Khmer empires ruled over what are today large portions of Thailand, Vietnam and Laos • Over the centuries Siam (Thailand) and Vietnam split off • Cambodians view border disputes which have occurred frequently as battles for survival of the Khmer people • Viewed Vietnamese invasion of 1979 in this light • Fear of Vietnamese domination sustained the conflict throughout the 1980s.

39. Cambodia II • Economic Conditions • Two decades of war devastated the Cambodian economy • Not well developed before the conflicts • Prince Sihanouk discouraged foreign ventures and avoided grand industrial projects in an effort to • Ensure Cambodian neutrality • Hinder urbanization • These policies discouraged civic organization • Cambodia had been largely self-sufficient in food until Sihanouk’s successor Lon Nol brought the country into the Vietnam war • After that Cambodia became highly dependent on imports of food and U.S. foreign aid • By 1973 total imports much of them agricultural products, reached $42 million while exports dropped to $4.9 million

40. Cambodia III • Vestiges of Cambodian economy that remained after the Vietnam War were wiped out under the Khmer Rouge • Infrastructure left to crumble • Ties to the outside world cut • What limited production occurred was dedicated to local consumption • Even with the entire population working in the rice paddies, food production fell • Instead of importing foodstuffs to feed the population, Khmer Rouge accepted mass starvation • Loss of life and human capital staggering • 21% of Cambodia’s population of 8 million died • 218,000 lost to migration • 75-80 percent of Cambodian teachers and higher education students fled or killed

41. Cambodia IV • According to the UN by 1979 there were no more than 300 qualified persons from all disciplines left in the country • All educational books, equipment and facilities had been destroyed • When Vietnam invaded it inherited a society of dependents living in a country without means • Land mines made cultivation too dangerous in many regions – country could barely feed itself • Vietnamese backed government tried to initiate reconstruction and development programs but lacked funding • After the Vietnamese forces withdrew and the Soviet Union reduced its assistance in the late 1980s government tried to generate income by • abandoning Marxism and • adopting a market based economic system

42. Cambodia V • Little progress occurred because • Cambodia lacked the capital needed to create private enterprises and • Continued fighting sapped government resources • At same time Khmer Rouge financing its battle against government forces by plundering natural resources – timber and gemstones • Amount derived from these sources grater than the government’s budget • By the time the UN arrived (1991) • economic activity in Cambodia insufficient for developing the society • Or even supporting the government • Its human and natural resources severely depleted

43. Cambodia VI • Political • Politics in Cambodia have historically been based on patron-client relationships • Loyalty exchanged for money, positions or protection • Patterns reinforced by deference to authority • Until recently Cambodians maintained low expectations of their government because it rarely entered their lives • As a result they did not develop organizations or tools with which to influence their government • Lack of intermediary structures between population and ruling class left way open for doctorial power • Over time citizens have cooperated more with state authorities • However it has been largely based on the distribution of material benefits and official positions from which supporters reaped illicit gains

44. Cambodia VI • Nation Building Efforts • Paris Peace Accords (1991) – UNTAC created. Mandate: • Supervision of the cease fire, the withdrawal of foreign forces and the cessation of foreign military assistance • Disarming and demobilizing the armed forces of Cambodia’s warring parties • Controlling and supervising the activities of state administrative structures including the policy • Ensuring respect for human rights • Settling Cambodian refugees • Organizing and conducting free and fair elections • Given less than two years to achieve objectives • When fully deployed UNTAC included a military contingent of 15,900 troops, 3,900 civilian police

45. Cambodia VII • Unfortunately UNTAC was unable to get cooperation from the Khmer Rouge – several other factions followed. • Still country was able to hold elections in May 1993 • Geographical and Geopolitical • Solution to the Cambodian conflict became possible when geopolitical changes shifted the priories of the outside parties. • As communism collapsed, Soviet Union reduced support to Vietnam and groups in Cambodia • Meant China had achieved most of its strategic objectives and now willing to support an agreement

46. Cambodia VIII • Economic • At a conference in 1990 international donors pledged $880 million to assist recovery efforts • Despite the strong international commitment, economic development measures had mixed results due to: • Enormity of the problem • Unstable political environment • Conditions in rural areas had scarcely improved since the 1970s • During early period of UNTAC economic assistance directed toward quick impact rehabilitation efforts • Small infrastructure repair and limited public health projects • International assistance was supposed to later fund and support long term development programs

47. Cambodia IX • However many donors did not meet their pledges • Afraid that existing government would benefit to the expense of other parties preventing UNTAC goal of maintaining political neutrality • Still many reforms that were introduced succeeded • Customs reforms and new tax measures raised government revenues • Sensible monetary policy slowed inflation and stabilized the exchange rate • In 1993 hyperinflation and food insecurity were avoided by UNTAC’s placement of additional imported rice on he market

48. Cambodia X • Since UNTAC ended the country has experienced impressive growth • Between 1994 and 2010 annual GDP growth was 7.8 percent lifting per capita income from $278 to $735 • Poverty fell from 39 percent in 1994 to 30 percent in 2007 • Trade and tourism have been main drivers of growth • Yet how far Cambodia has come is also a reflection of how underdeveloped it was at the end of its civil war • Even though standards of living have improved: • Cambodia ranks 139th of 187 countries in the HDI • It GDP per capita ranks only 185th of 226 countries • Cambodia ranks 164th among183 countries on Transparency International’s 2011 Corruption Perceptions Index

49. Cambodia XI • Corruption restrains development by siphoning off potential tax revenues and depressing competition • Which further reduces tax revenues • Current president Hun Sen faces dilemma • If he wants to broaden his popular support, he needs to combat corruption • However if he interferes in patronage he will lose current supporters and risk splits within his party • He has tried to solve the government’s revenue crunch by exploiting the country's natural resources • New oil revenue could ease fiscal situation – without having to challenge the country’s entrenched patron client networks • However introduction of oil wealth will also likely reinforce system that is already in place leading to greater corruption

50. Cambodia: Local Factors I • I. What local factors posed the greatest challenges? • 1. Geographical and Geopolitical • Geopolitical struggle among super powers and interference by neighbors were the most significant factors giving rise to conflict • Conflict resolution became possible when the priorities of external actors shifted • 2. Cultural and Social • Violence of the Khmer Rouge period grew out of group’s extreme version of traditional nationalist ideas and fears and Socially deep-seated xenophobia • Nation building efforts included only a limited attempt to overcome this legacy by fostering respect for human rights • Xenophobia remained strong and political leaders continued to stoke nationalist sentiment to garner support