Nicola Paltrinieri 1 , Giordano Emrys Scarponi 1, 2 , Faisal Khan 3 , Stein Hauge 1

1. 6th International Conference on Safety & Environment in Process & Power Industry - 13-16 April, 2014, Bologna , Italy Addressing Dynamic Risk in the Petroleum Industry by Means of Innovative Analysis Solutions Nicola Paltrinieri1, Giordano Emrys Scarponi1,2, Faisal Khan3, Stein Hauge1 1SINTEF Technology and Society, Trondheim, Norway.   2University of Bologna, Italy 3Memorial University of Newfoundland, St. John’s, Canada

2. Introduction Recent O&G industry accidents Snorre A 2004 Gullfaks C 2010 Montara 2009 Macondo 2010 Every event was unique and the direct causes often differed, but many of the underlying causes were identified as recurring problems, such as: • the failure to perform risk evaluation during changes/modifications, and • the inadequate verification of safety barriers (Tinmannsvik et al. 2011) In particular it was reported: • poor information flow between night and dayshifts and onshore and offshore teams operating at Montara, Macondo and Snorre A, and • poor involvement of measured pressure drilling experts in the planning, risk assessment and operational follow-up of the Gullfaks C well operation.

3. Introduction Integrated Operations In the Petroleum industry, Integrated operations (IO) refers to new work processes and ways of performing oil and gas exploration and production, which has been facilitated by new information and communication technology. The IO Centerconducts research, innovation and education within the field of IO. Integrated planning &execution Smarter Decisions through Integrated operations Decision processes across disciplines & organizations Data acquisition Data processing, modeling, prediction Visualization & communication

4. Methodology New dynamic risk approaches Three innovative techniques, whose main feature is their dynamicity and capacity to be reiterated and produce updated risk assessment, are applied and evaluated for their potential suitability with IO solutions and related implications. Methods Novelties NORSOK Z-013 standard steps

5. Methodology Dynamic Procedure for Atypical Scenarios Identification

6. Methodology Dynamic Risk Analysis

7. Methodology Risk Barometer

8. Application Case-study: oil production process area The case-study is a typical oil production process area located topside on an offshore platform. The process area consists of the following separate modules: • Choke/manifold module • Separation module • Gas compression module • Gas recompression module • Water injection/production module

9. Results Data retrieval The following search systems were used to identify related risk notions: • MHIDAS, (HSE – United Kingdom), • ARIA (French Ministry of Environment), and • Google Scholar (Google inc.).

10. Results Logic tree diagram Detail of the bow-tie diagram (right-hand side) referring to a multiphase loss of containment in the 1st stage separator. COND. PROB. COND. PROB. COND. PROB. COND. PROB. COND. PROB. COND. PROB. COND. PROB. LOC

11. Results Posterior frequency of accident scenarios On the basis of the risk notions identified, some fictional accident sequence precursors were defined in order to show the application of DRA. Ev./year Year

12. Prevent release Technical condition PSD system Competence & training PSVs Leak Preparations and frequency planning Containment of process segments Work practice and work load Disassembling of HC - system Work supervision / management Quality of procedures and documentation Results Definition of indicators Aset of indicators defining the status of the safety barriers in the process area and organizational influencing factors was defined. Average values with representative variations were applied. Practice (actual oil company case-study) Theory QRA parameter: Barrier PFD RIF: Technical measures RIF: Operational measures RIF: Organizational measures Indicator

13. Results Real-time risk level High high risk Low risk tp ti Very high risk Normal risk High risk

14. Discussion Qualitative assessment of the techniques DyPASI and DRA demonstrated to be mutually complementary and to give a relatively effective support to the continuous review and update of the risk picture. DyPASI and DRA are still relatively tied to the QRA structure, but the Risk Barometer aims to overtake and improve the QRA process by introducing new risk influencing factors. Both DRA and Risk Barometer aim to evaluate how the performance of the safety barriers in the plant affects the overall risk picture, but they respectively adopt a reactive and proactive approach. The Risk Barometer aims to effectively visualize the result, in order to provide a better decision support during daily operations.

15. Conclusions Conclusions All techniques were effectively applied to the generic case-study considered. A clear complementarity between the different approaches was not identified because of overlaps and different strategies adopted in the assessment of the risk picture. The Risk Barometer, despite the fact it is still under development, was proven to be the most suitable technique to dynamically assess the risk in the context of Integrated Operations. In fact, it is based on indicators that can be automatically collected from the system, in order to give a real-time response, and addresses the issue of the visualization of results, in order to share information across geographical, organizational and discipline boundaries as a support for critical decision-making.