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Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) & Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP)

Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) & Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). Agenda. Strategic Guidance Hierarchy GEF & JSCP Purpose and Organization Campaign Plan Construct Priorities, Resource Management, Assessments. Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF).

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Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) & Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP)

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  1. Guidance for Employment of the Force(GEF)& Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan(JSCP)

  2. Agenda • Strategic Guidance Hierarchy • GEF & JSCP Purpose and Organization • Campaign Plan Construct • Priorities, Resource Management, Assessments

  3. Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) Guidance for Development of the Force (GDF) Contingency Planning Guidance Security Cooperation Guidance Global Posture Guidance Strategic Planning Guidance Transfor-mation Planning Guidance Global Posture Guidance Human Capital Strategy Nuclear Weapons Planning Guidance Global Force Mgmt Guidance Analytic Agenda Guidance Joint Concepts & Experiment. Guidance Science & Technology Guidance CJCS Comprehensive Risk Assessment The New Strategic Guidance Hierarchy National Security Strategy (NSS) National Defense Strategy (NDS) National Military Strategy (NMS) Employ the Force Manage the Force Develop the Force

  4. Global Force Mgmt Guidance Security Cooperation Guidance Global Posture Guidance Contingency Planning Guidance Nuclear Weapons Planning Guidance Built together by Task Force GEF Purpose – Consolidate Guidance Consolidating five separate documents forces holistic thinking about previously stove-piped planning Guidance for Employment of the Force Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan

  5. Purpose of GEF Purpose:A single strategic guidance document that directs planning for foreseeable, near-term (FY 08-10) operational activities • Consolidates and streamlines 5 guidance initiatives into a single document. Built concurrently with the Chairman’s planning guidance (JSCP) and with input from State • Establishes strong and clear linkages from strategy to operations/activities by providing strategic context for planning • Guides development and integration of campaign, campaign support, and contingency plans • Integrates operational planning, force management, resources, and posture guidance

  6. Relationship of Guidance to Plans • GEF: Provides the“What” • Strategic end states (theater or functional) for campaign planning • Prioritized contingency planning scenarios and end states • Global posture and global force management guidance • Relative security cooperation and global force management priorities • Strategic assumptions • Provides overarching DOD and USG nuclear policy • JSCP: Implementing the “What” • Formally tasks campaign, contingency, and posture planning requirements to COCOMs • Detailed planning tasks and considerations for campaign, contingency, and posture plans • Specifies type of plan required for contingency plans • Planning assumptions • Provides detailed guidance to apportion forces • Nuclear guidance remains in the “Nuclear Supplement to the JSCP”

  7. Organization of GEF

  8. Introduction/Strategic Overview 12 Top Priority Plans CPG Directed Plans Unique to Specific Commands Plans Common to all COCOMs or in Support of Treaty Agreements Introduction Strategic Context & Global Priorities Resources & Forces Global Defense Posture Campaign Plan Requirement General Planning Requirements Functional Planning Guidance STRATCOM SOCOM JFCOM TRANSCOM Services, Defense Agencies, NGB Regional Planning Guidance NORTHCOM SOUTHCOM PACOM CENTCOM EUCOM AFRICOM Implementation Guidance Assessment Guidance TS CJCSI (separate document) JSCP Structure JSCP 06 JSCP 08 • JSCP 08 • Translates strategic policy end states from the GEF into military campaign & contingency plan guidance for COCOMs • Expands guidance to include security cooperation and other steady state activities • Moves detailed planning guidance found in CPG 05 back to the JSCP • Consolidates COCOM guidance into a single chapter for easy reference • Keeps JSCP at SECRET level by establishing a separate CJCSI for TS planning guidance

  9. Key Thrusts of GEF & JSCP • Shifts from “contingency-centric” planning to “strategy-centric” planning • COCOMs initiate planning from the perspective of their theater or functional strategy • COCOMs tasked to build campaign plans that achieve assigned theater or functional strategic end states – campaign plans “operationalize” COCOM strategies • Campaign plans comprehensively integrate steady-state operations, security cooperation initiatives and other shaping activities with “Phase 0” of contingency plans • Contingency plans become “branches” to campaign plans • Establishes regional and functional strategic end states that are aligned with NSS and USG foreign policy • Designed to provide hooks for interagency planning collaboration • Formally links nuclear weapons policy/planning to broader COCOM planning • Codifies and integrates Global Posture guidance with campaign planning • Accounts for resource-constrained environment by providing an integrated list of priorities, assumptions and resource-related guidance • Injects formal, comprehensive assessments to the planning process

  10. Campaign Planning Construct • Tasks COCOMs to create “campaign plans” designed to achieve theater and functional strategic end states • Campaign plans comprehensively integrate steady-state activities (security cooperation and other shaping activities) with “Phase 0” of contingency plans • Intent: • Operationalize combatant command strategies • Transition from “contingency-centric” to “strategy-centric” planning • Byproduct: • Identify all steady-state force and resource demands • Contingency plans become branches to campaign plan • “Force providers” and defense agencies tasked to produce campaign support plans • Chief, NGB tasked to produce an Estimate to capture National Guard activities while under State control

  11. Driven by Strategy Regional Dynamics Change Reflects Revised Strategy Campaign Plan LOEs LOEs Security Cooperation Security, Stability, Reconstruction Campaign Plan Regional/ Functional End States CTOs TSOs DP CONPLAN XXXX BPC BPC Regional/ Functional End States Strat Comms Strat Comms CTOs TSOs DP CONPLAN YYYY CWMD CWMD GWOT GWOT TSOs CTOs DP OPERATION ZZZZ Deter War Deter War Moving to Strategy-Centric Planning

  12. DOD Global Campaign Plan DOD Global Campaign Plan DOD Global Campaign Plan #### #### Relationship of Planning Efforts Theater Campaign Plan Campaign(s) Subordinate Campaign Plans YYY XXX ZZZ Indicates a supporting campaign plan synchronized with a Global Campaign Plan Indicates campaign or contingency plans nested under a Theater Campaign Plan Contingency Plans XXX YYY ZZZ Contingency plans to subordinate campaign plans are not stand alone plans, but are branches to the subordinate campaign plans.

  13. Campaign Planning Efforts

  14. Force and Resource Management • Force Apportionment Guidance for Contingency Planning • 3 Bins • Force Allocation Guidance [to the Global Force Management Board (GFMB)] for operations and shaping activities • 5 Tiers of Priorities • Global Resource Priorities for DOD Components with Global Support roles

  15. New Apportionment Construct JSCP 06 JSCP 08 Plans Force Bins Plans Force Bins HD NORTHCOM/ ELEMNORAD/PACOM HD NORTHCOM / PACOM USELEMNORAD/SOUTHCOM Homeland Defense - HD Homeland Defense - HD Campaign 1 XXXXXXXX Forces not available for planning Current Operations XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX Forces available for planning XXXXXXXXX Campaign 2 XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX NDS required the ability to conduct 2 overlapping campaigns XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX • Proposed construct accounts for employed forces • Establishes a more realistic start point for planning • Not intended to be the equivalent of contingency sourcing • Improves CCDR’s ability to assess military risk to execute a plan

  16. Assessments • Purpose is to provide feedback to SecDef on the following issues: • Changes to the Strategic Environment • Outcome of Executing Current Strategic Guidance • Implications of Executing Strategic Guidance • Program Execution and Output (see Annex C for program list) • Major shift from current assessment process • Chairman responsible for building a comprehensive assessment and providing independent analysis • Assessment focuses on more than security cooperation • GCCs and selected FCCs responsible for establishing baselines, intermediate objectives, and metrics that directly contribute to their end states • FCCs, Military Departments, NGB, Defense Agencies and entities that administer global security cooperation initiatives assess program execution and output, cross-cutting implications and execution of campaign support plans • Aligns with the JSPS revision, which establishes OCT as assessment submission date

  17. UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Back-Up Slides

  18. Campaign Support Plans Campaign Support Plans Subordinate Campaign Plan Campaign Support Plans Subordinate Campaign Plan Campaign Support Plans Campaign Support Plans Phase 0 of Contingency Plans Phases 1 through 5 Campaign Planning Construct Major Regional or Functional Campaign Plan Posture Plan “Seam Guidance” forces the integration of campaign plans that overlap

  19. Global Core Partners COCOM Regional or Functional End State(s) Security Cooperation Focus Areas Operational Access and Global Freedom of Action Operational Capacity and Capability Inter-operability Intelligence and Information Sharing Assurance and Regional Confidence Building Security Sector Reform Defense Exports and International Collaboration National and MultinationalInfluence Security Cooperation Activities/Tools Security Cooperation / Shaping Activities The COCOM campaign plan is the mechanism for organizing, integrating and prioritizing security cooperation activities Global End State(s) Critical Partnerships Key Supporting Partnerships Countries of Concern

  20. “A” BinCommitted Forces* GWOT/OIF/OEF * These forces may be used in top-priority planning efforts but their planned use and associated risks must be briefed to the SECDEF “B” BinForces Available for Planning Top-Priority Contingency Planning Efforts* * Does not include forces for top- priority homeland defense plans Homeland Defense Bin Draft Force Apportionment Construct Forces Grouped into Three Apportionment Bins1 • Proposed construct accounts for employed forces • Establishes a more realistic start point for planning • Improves CCDR’s ability to assess military risk to execute a plan 1 Note: this construct does not include institutional forces

  21. Campaign Planning Priorities • Critical Partnerships: • Countries and/or organizations that are direct recipients of US security cooperation • Cannot achieve one or more end states without engagement • Reflect a deliberately select group of countries or organizations • May be current relationships or desired future relationships • Partnerships must be pursued during the life of this guidance (next 2 years) • Key supporting partnerships: • Countries or organizations that assist a command in achieving one or more end states • May or may not be from the region in question • Militarily competent and provide one or more capabilities that complement or supplement US capabilities • Key countries or non-state actors of concern: • May or may not be potential adversaries • Security cooperation and Phase 0 activities designed to assist with problems or influence behavior, counter negative influence, or set the conditions for operational success • Must pose a problem to a region in an immediate and direct way Key Difference: GEF only provides “Tier 1” countries

  22. UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Security Cooperation Focus Areas • Operational Access and Global Freedom of Action Gain unfettered access to and freedom of action in all operational domains. Support global defense posture realignment and larger US political and commercial freedom of action and access needs • Operational Capacity and Capability Building Build usable, relevant and enduring partner capabilities that help reduce the burden on – and risk to – US forces while achieving US objectives • Interoperability with US Forces/Support to US Capabilities Develop operational and technical capabilities, doctrine, and tactics, techniques and procedures with partner nations to enable effective combined operations or improve a collective defense capability • Intelligence and Information Sharing Gain and/or share specific kinds of intelligence or information and developing shared assessments of common threats

  23. UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Security Cooperation Focus Areas • Assurance and Regional Confidence Building Assure allies and partners, enhance regional stability and security, reduce the potential for inter- or intra-state conflict and international consensus building, and/or expand community of like-minded states dedicated to more peaceful and secure international order • Defense/Security Sector Reform Assist allies with transforming their defense/security establishments to become publicly accountable, well-managed and subject to the rule of law • International Defense Technology Collaboration. Promote technological collaboration, foster mutually beneficial exchange of technology and defense equipment, gain access to foreign technology and reduce the overall cost of defense to the US taxpayer • International Suasion and Cooperation Build cooperative political-military relationships with key security influencers and offsets counterproductive influence in key regions and international organizations

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