CENTCOM Political-Military Challenges

1. TSDM-23 CENTCOM Political-Military Challenges

2. Motivation It’s necessary to understand the relationships between the political and military factors within a region as an important step in developing a Regional Commander’s engagement strategy, and more importantly, how Commanders can best utilize their scarce resources to deal with the challenges posed by these relationships. The Arab Uprisings provide a glimpse into some of the important political-military issues that can ignite a revolt and how they can affect security in a region after the uprising.

3. Middle East Youth Bulge Samantha Constant • Most countries in the Middle East are experiencing an unprecedented youth bulge (15-29 yrs) • Adds significant pressure on education and health care systems, natural resources and labor markets • Many of the regimes used to guarantee jobs upon graduation • Youths w/ more-advanced education suffer higher unemployment • Youth unemployment rate 4X higher than those over 30 Edward Sayre

4. Middle East Youth Bulge Samantha Constant • Governments must focus on helping youths by: • Promoting entrepreneurship • Encouraging private-public partnerships • Provide development outside security framework “Middle East Governments need to make the young the priority and to work more closely with the private sector and civil society to produce long-term solutions.” Edward Sayre

5. Frontline’s“Revolution in Cairo” Mona Eltahawy “And they weren't demonstrating against Israel-Palestine; they weren't demonstrating against the United States and its invasion of Iraq. They were demonstrating against the Mubarak regime and what people believed at the time to be his wish to pass on the presidency to his son; just against, basically, tyranny and dictatorship.....”

6. Frontline’s“Revolution in Cairo” Mona Eltahawy “The Internet did not invent courage in Egypt. The Internet did not invent activism in Egypt. But what April 6 was trying to do was it was trying to attract a generation, young people in Egypt, the majority, basically, that are politically disaffected, that are marginalized, and who recognize that they have no future in the country, no political future, no economic future under the Mubarak regime.”

7. Islam, Democracy andConstitutional Liberalism(2004) Fareed Zakaria • The road to Democracy – falls to the peoples of the region (Can’t impose democracy) • Washington will continue to aid the Egyptian regime, protect the Saudi monarchy, and broker negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians (National Interests)

8. “The Whole World is Watching,” The National Journal Edward Sayre and Samantha Constant

10. Middle East under age 15 http://www.globalhealthfacts.org/data/topic/map.aspx?ind=79

11. Arab Human Development Report 2009 “Challenges to Human Security in the Arab Countries”, The U.N. Development Program

12. Arab Human Development Report 2009 “Challenges to Human Security in the Arab Countries”, The U.N. Development Program

13. Source: 2010 Arab Public Opinion Poll

14. President Obama Speech in Cairo, 4 June 2009 I have come here to seek a new beginning between the United States and Muslims around the world; one based upon mutual interest and mutual respect; and one based upon the truth that America and Islam are not exclusive, and need not be in competition. And I consider it part of my responsibility as President of the United States to fight against negative stereotypes of Islam wherever they appear….But that same principle must apply to Muslim perceptions of America. So let there be no doubt: Islam is a part of America. In Ankara, I made clear that America is not – and never will be – at war with Islam. We will, however, relentlessly confront violent extremists who pose a grave threat to our security... And it is my first duty as President to protect the American people.

15. President Obama Speech in Cairo, 4 June 2009(Israel, Palestine, and the Arab World) Six million Jews were killed – more than the entire Jewish population of Israel today. Denying that fact is baseless, ignorant, and hateful. Threatening Israel with destruction – or repeating vile stereotypes about Jews – is deeply wrong, and only serves to evoke in the minds of Israelis this most painful of memories while preventing the peace that the people of this region deserve. On the other hand, it is also undeniable that the Palestinian people – Muslims and Christians – have suffered in pursuit of a homeland….America will not turn our backs on the legitimate Palestinian aspiration for dignity, opportunity, and a state of their own. But if we see this conflict only from one side or the other, then we will be blind to the truth: the only resolution is for the aspirations of both sides to be met through two states, where Israelis and Palestinians each live in peace and security… That is in Israel’s interest, Palestine’s interest, America’s interest, and the world’s interest.

16. President Obama Speech in Cairo, 4 June 2009(Iran and Nukes) Rather than remain trapped in the past, I have made it clear to Iran’s leaders and people that my country is prepared to move forward. The question, now, is not what Iran is against, but rather what future it wants to build. This is not simply about America’s interests. It is about preventing a nuclear arms race in the Middle East that could lead this region and the world down a hugely dangerous path. I understand those who protest that some countries have weapons that others do not. No single nation should pick and choose which nations hold nuclear weapons. That is why I strongly reaffirmed America’s commitment to seek a world in which no nations hold nuclear weapons. And any nation – including Iran – should have the right to access peaceful nuclear power if it complies with its responsibilities under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

17. An Update: President Obama Speech on the Middle East and North Africa (19 May 2011) Bin Laden was no martyr.  He was a mass murderer who offered a message of hate –- an insistence that Muslims had to take up arms against the West, and that violence against men, women and children was the only path to change.  He rejected democracy and individual rights for Muslims in favor of violent extremism; his agenda focused on what he could destroy -– not what he could build. Bin Laden and his murderous vision won some adherents.  But even before his death, al Qaeda was losing its struggle for relevance, as the overwhelming majority of people saw that the slaughter of innocents did not answer their cries for a better life.  By the time we found bin Laden, al Qaeda’s agenda had come to be seen by the vast majority of the region as a dead end, and the people of the Middle East and North Africa had taken their future into their own hands. What has been the reaction to Bin Laden’s death in the region? Does this represent a threat or opportunity for greater regional stability?

18. An Update: President Obama Speech on the Middle East and North Africa (19 May 2011) But the events of the past six months show us that strategies of repression and strategies of diversion will not work anymore.  Satellite television and the Internet provide a window into the wider world -- a world of astonishing progress in places like India and Indonesia and Brazil.  Cell phones and social networks allow young people to connect and organize like never before.  And so a new generation has emerged.  And their voices tell us that change cannot be denied. Those shouts of human dignity are being heard across the region.  And through the moral force of nonviolence, the people of the region have achieved more change in six months than terrorists have accomplished in decades. Of course, change of this magnitude does not come easily...it will be years before this story reaches its end.  Along the way, there will be good days and there will bad days.  In some places, change will be swift; in others, gradual.  And as we’ve already seen, calls for change may give way, in some cases, to fierce contests for power. Do you agree that fundamental change will occur in the region? How does this affect U.S. national interests in the region?

19. An Update: President Obama Speech on the Middle East and North Africa (19 May 2011) The question before us is what role America will play as this story unfolds.  For decades, the United States has pursued a set of core interests in the region:  countering terrorism and stopping the spread of nuclear weapons; securing the free flow of commerce and safe-guarding the security of the region; standing up for Israel’s security and pursuing Arab-Israeli peace. We will continue to do these things, with the firm belief that America’s interests are not hostile to people’s hopes; they’re essential to them. Yet we must acknowledge that a strategy based solely upon the narrow pursuit of these interests will not fill an empty stomach or allow someone to speak their mind The status quo is not sustainable…after decades of accepting the world as it is in the region, we have a chance to pursue the world as it should be. It will be the policy of the United States to promote reform across the region, and to support transitions to democracy.  So in the months ahead, America must use all our influence to encourage reform in the region.  This represents a significant change in U.S. policy – what are the strategic risks associated with this approach?

20. Tehran’s Take: Understanding Iran’s U.S. Policy • Tehran's foreign policy has its own strategic logic. • Tehran's top priority is the survival of the Islamic Republic as it exists now. (Status quo) • Tehran views the United States as an existential threat and to counter it has devised a strategy that rests on both deterrence and competition in the Middle East. • To deter any possible military actions by the United States and its allies, Iran is improving its retaliatory capabilities by developing the means to pursue asymmetric, low-intensity warfare, both inside and outside the country; modernizing its weapons; building indigenous missile and antimissile systems; and developing a nuclear program while cultivating doubts about its exact capability. • And to neutralize the United States' attempts to contain it, the Iranian government is both undermining U.S. interests and increasing its own power in the vast region that stretches from the Levant and the Persian Gulf to the Caucasus and Central Asia. Do you agree with the authors’ argument that the regime in Tehran does not consist of a bunch of “mad mullahs,” but “calculating ayatollahs”? What are the implications for CENTCOM?

21. Tehran’s Take: Understanding Iran’s U.S. Policy • Iran's deterrence strategy has four components: • Develop the means to fight an asymmetric, low-intensity war, inside and outside the country (the IRGC has a critical role here) • Modernization of Iran’s weapons systems • Embargoes have cause an indigenous military-industrial complex to develop, controlled and financed by the state • Develop indigenous missile and antimissile systems • Iran claims the Shahab and Ghadr ballistic missiles can reach Israel and gives the regime the power to retaliate against attacks • Iran’s Nuclear program (symbol of nationalism) • Iran claims its program is designed for peaceful purposes, but Washington (and much of the West) accuses it of having a secret program to build a bomb, while simultaneously developing missile technology to accurately deliver a nuclear payload. Is Iran’s deterrence strategy working? What are possible U.S. responses to this approach?

22. Tehran’s Take: Understanding Iran’s U.S. Policy • Iran's counter-containment plan: • Create a wedge between the United States and the United States' European allies. • Exploit differences between the EU’s 27 members. • Leverage trade with the EU (Iran’s largest trading partner) and its dependence on energy. • Move closer to states that could counterbalance the United States. • Iran has signed major economic and military agreements with China and Russia. • SCO • Western Hemisphere (i.e., Cuba, Venezuela) • Use Iran’s energy resources to reward its allies. • “Oil diplomacy” • Create “spheres of influence” • Syria, Lebanon, Afghanistan and Iraq (“war by proxy” – Hamas, Hizbollah) Is Iran a credible regional power? How much influence does Iran have outside the region? The author recommends “full engagement” with Iran – do you agree with this approach?

23. Bahrain and the Battle Between Iran and Saudi Arabia • The U.S. decision to withdraw from Iraq will create a vacuum • Iran intends to fill this vacuum with their own influence; doing so makes perfect sense from their point of view. • Iran never wants to fight another war with Iraq, making and keeping Iraq permanently weak and fragmented is in Tehran’s interest (U.S. withdrawal “sets the stage” for Iran to pursue this goal). • With the psychology of the Arab masses changing (Arab Spring), as they are no longer afraid to challenge their rulers, Iran will enjoy an enhanced capacity to cause instability. • The Iranian nuclear issue largely has been a diversion from the more fundamental issue -- the regional balance after the departure of the United States. • The U.S. withdrawal does not mean that the United States is powerless against Iran. • Reconstituting a pre-positioned BCT set in Kuwait and has substantial air and naval assets in the region. Friedman makes the argument that Iran is attempting to change the balance of power as it gets stronger, while the U.S. and Saudi Arabia get weaker (Iraq will only exacerbate the situation). Do you agree with this assessment? What are the implications for CENTCOM?

24. Bahrain and the Battle Between Iran and Saudi Arabia • Bahrain as the “test case” in the struggle between Saudi Arabia and Iran: • Bahrain and Saudi Arabia are geographically linked by a causeway • Leading economic center and home to the U.S. 5th fleet (U.S. national interest) • Majority of the population is Shia, but government is Sunni • Saudi Arabia concerned with potential toppling of government in Bahrain and resultant emboldened Shia in Saudi Arabia and the region • The Iranians clearly have an interest in overthrowing the Bahraini regime. • Bahrain is the point where the Iranians have their best chance, since it is both the most heavily Shiite nation and one where the Shiites have the most grievances • Other “targets” include Oman (a U.S. support facility), Qatar (CENTCOM forward HQs and Al Udeid Air Base), and Kuwait (a key logistical hub). • The Iranians would be delighted to cause regime change throughout the region, but that is not likely to occur, at least not everywhere in the region. They would be equally happy simply to cause massive instability in the region, however. Saudi Arabia eventually committed military forces to Bahrain to support its government’s hold on power. The U.S. largely stayed out of the “fray” – why was this the case? What happens if Iran gets its wish and these Sunni regimes fall?