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On Black-Box Separations in Cryptography

On Black-Box Separations in Cryptography. Omer Reingold. Closed captioning and other considerations provided by Tal Malkin, Luca Trevisan, and Salil Vadhan. Crypto - The Merry “Old” Days. Cryptographic Protocols, Primitives, and Assumptions. Strong RSA. Homomorphic Encryption. UOWHFs.

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On Black-Box Separations in Cryptography

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  1. On Black-Box Separations in Cryptography Omer Reingold Closed captioning and other considerations provided by Tal Malkin, Luca Trevisan, and Salil Vadhan

  2. Crypto - The Merry “Old” Days

  3. Cryptographic Protocols, Primitives, and Assumptions Strong RSA Homomorphic Encryption UOWHFs PIRs ID Based Encryption Dense Crypto System Electronic Voting Factoring Encryption Digital Signatures Identification Electronic Commerce RSA One-Way Functions Pseudo-Random Generators Trapdoor Permutations Oblivious Transfer DDH

  4. Determining The Relationships Among Different Primitives Most tasks in complexity-based crypto imply P¹NP (or even OWF). • Simplify our conception of the world. • Construct protocols with as strong security guarantee as possible. Reductions: Given any implementation of primitive A, construct implementation of primitive B.

  5. Some Known Reductions OWF TDP CLAW-FREE COM PRG UOWHF NIZK PKE OT PRF KA ZK SIG CCA-PKE CF-HASH MAC ENC ID

  6. Are All Crypto Primitives Equivalent? • If so: either no cryptography or Cryptomania! • But some tasks seem “significantly harder” than others (e.g. private key vs. public key encryption). • In what sense can we claim that primitive A does not imply primitive B if we believe that both exist? After all, a reduction of B to A can ignore A and build B from scratch ...

  7. Black-Box Separations – Where it Begun Impagliazzo-Rudich [89] While not clear how to formalize/show non-implications in general can do that wrt black-box reductions.

  8. A B A Adv. for B Adv. for A (Fully) Black-Box Reductions Given a black-box implementation for primitive A, construct implementation of primitive B. Usually, still not structured enoughto rule out: Need black-box proof of security (several flavors). Such fully black-box reductions relativize (hold relative to every oracle).

  9. What's not Black Box? • No idea … ask Boaz … • Oh well … Cook-Levin reduction is used in: OWF  “ZK proofs for all NP” [GMW91] Non–BB carries on to applications: • Semi-honest OT  malicious OT [GMW87] • OWF  ID schemes [FFS88] • Similarly, circuit of f used in secure computation of f. [Yao86,GMW87] • [Beaver96] Few OTs + OWF -> Many OTs • Barak’s Non-BB ZK and subsequent results. Use both old and new non-bb techniques.

  10. What do Black-Box Separations Mean? • This talk will concentrate on mathematical rather than philosophical meaning. Still … • Few Non black-box techniques (and in limited settings). Inherent limitation on efficiency. • Therefore, black-box separations are explanation/indication for the hardness of finding reduction (esp. efficient ones). • BB-reductions more robust – work wrt. “physical implementations” of primitives.

  11. What do Black-Box Separations Mean? • Insight into the relevant primitives. Guidance for non black-box reductions or even for black-box reductions. (Sometimes most meaningful when looking inside the box.) Analogy from complexity: • A Cook/Karp reduction of problem A to problem B is a black-box proof that B P A  P. • SAT P QBF2 P true but inherently non-BB (QBF2 is “quantified Boolean formula with 2 alternations”).

  12. What do Black-Box Separations Mean? • Insight into the relevant primitives. Guidance for non black-box reductions or even for black-box reductions. (Sometimes most meaningful when looking inside the box.) Examples from cryptography: • TDP seems to be of different complexity than OWF. [IR89] supports. • Collision resistant hashing might have seemed similar in nature to OWFs. [Simon98] challenged (this is consistentwith recent cryptanalysis attacks against popular hash functions).

  13. What do Black-Box Separations Mean? • Insight into the relevant primitives. Guidance for non black-box reductions or even for black-box reductions. (Sometimes most meaningful when looking inside the box.) Guidance for black-box constructions? • Particular construction cannot be proved in BB? May be easier to change the construction than overcome the obstacle. • Examples: • Want to reduce Stat-Commit to OWF? Probably not a good approach: Stat-Commit -> OWP -> OWF. • [Myers 04], shows no BB proof for one particular natural construction (static to adaptive security).

  14. What do Black-Box Separations Mean? • Insight into the relevant primitives. Guidance for non black-box reductions or even for black-box reductions. (Sometimes most meaningful when looking inside the box.) Word of warning: • Potentially, a non black-box proof may follow a black-box approach most of the way with a “small” non black-box fix.

  15. Black-Box and Oracle Separations • [IR89] there exists an oracle relative to which one-way function exists but key-agreement does not:No fully black-box reduction of key-agreement to one-way function. • Many other BB separations/lower bounds[Rud91,Sim98,KST99,KSS00,GKM+00,GT00,GMR01,CHL02,...] • Various notions of BB reductions, in particular not always implying oracle separation (e.g. [GMR01]).

  16. Not even an hierarchy of problems [GKMVR00] CryptoMania MiniCrypt Crypto After IR (Impagliazzo’s Worlds) Trapdoor Permutation Secure Multi-Party Computation (OT) Public Key Encryption Key Agreement Private Key Encryption Pseudorandom Generators One Way Functions Digital Sig. Algoritmica, Heuristica, Pessiland

  17. This Talk • [IR89]: The separation, its proof and interpretation of results. • As many separations and proof intuitions. Focus on techniques and subtleties. Beware: some cheating involved

  18. The Impagliazzo-Rudich Results • Thm:If P=NP, Key Agreement (KA) is impossible in the Random Oracle model: KA (Alice,Bob) Eve, for random permutation f, Evef breaks (Alicef,Bobf) • Cor 1:There is an oracle relative to which OWP exists and KA does not. The oracle:(f, PSPACE) since PPSPACE=NPPSPACE • Cor 2:There is no fully-BB reduction from KA to OWP. • Cor 3: …

  19. [IR89] - Why f is OWP • Intuitively obvious: when trying to invert f on some y=f(x), have no chance unless accidentally query f on x. • With q queries chances for that < 2q/2n More formally: •  M making q queries, n-bit y Prf[Mf(y) = f-1(y)] < (2q+2)/2n • Fix n, by MarkovPrf { Pry [Mf(y) = f-1(y)] > n2(2q+2)/2n } < 1/n2 •  M, with prob. 1 over fPry [Mf(y) = f-1(y)] > n2(2q+2)/2n only finitely often …. • With prob. 1 over f,  M …

  20. Why f is OWP Against Circuits • Too many circuit families for uniform argument (not enumerable). • [GT00]: f is exponentially hard even against circuits. • High level idea: Consider C that makes q queries and -inverts f. • C gives some non-trivial information on f a compact description of f, relative to C. • Loosely, the description of f contains two carefully chosen subsets X and Y and f|{0,1}n\X • f(X)=Y. • Y contains ≥ 1/q frac. of y’s on which C inverts. • X and Y allow reconstruction of f|X. • Setting parameters correctly: #descriptions << (2n)! C only -invert exp. small fraction of the f’s.

  21. [IR89] – How Eve Finds the Secret • Recall, we assume P=NP, and want to show that Evef breaks (Alicef,Bobf). • P=NP implies that without f no cryptographic hardness. In particular, no KA ! • In fact, for the purpose of oracle separation, we can essentially assume Eve, Alice and Bob are all powerful and only bounded by number of queries to f. • In this setting, a clear characterization of “knowledge”: The queries made to f and its answers.

  22. [IR89] – How Eve Finds the Secret Cont. • If s is the key agreed by Alice and Bob, assume wlog that both parties query f on s. Therefore s is an “intersection query”.  Enough that Eve finds all “likely” intersection queries. Eve’s algorithm (over simplified): • Let T be the transcript of (Alicef,Bobf), let L be a list of queries and answers to f (initially empty). Repeat polynomial number of times: • Simulate: sample a random view of Alice which is consistent with T and L. • Update: Repeat all the “simulated queries” Alice makes, but this time to real f. Insert to L. • Output a random query from L.

  23. [IR89] – How Eve Finds the Secret Cont. Eve’s algorithm (over simplified): • Let T be the transcript of (Alicef,Bobf), let L be a list of queries and answers to f (initially empty). Repeat polynomial number of times: • Simulate: sample a random view of Alice which is consistent with T and L. • Update: Repeat all the “simulated queries” Alice makes, but this time to real f. Insert to L. • Output a random query from L. Intuition: • Whenever simulated Alice is consistent with real Bob’s view, simulated Alice has a fair chance to query s. • Any inconsistency reveals one of Bob’s queries. This can happen only polynomial number of times.

  24. [IR89] Results – Revisited • Thm:If P=NP, Key Agreement (KA) is impossible in the Random Oracle model. • Cannot get a more natural and meaningful separation. • How can a reduction overcome this separation? • Traditional interpretation: to overcome the separation the construction of KA must use code of OWP. • [RTV04] shows that there is no limitation in using OWP as a black box in construction of KA. Separation might be overcome using code of adversary in proof of security (as in [Bar01,Bar02]).

  25. f (Alice, Bob) Taxonomy of Black-Box Reductions I (the case OWF)KA) [RTV04] Black-box implementation:  eff. (Alice, Bob) s.t. OWFf (Alicef,Bobf) is a secure KA. Proof of security:Eve breaking (Alicef,Bobf) ) Adv inverting f Fully-BB reduction: eff. Adv Eve (even not eff) [ Eve breaks (Alicef,Bobf) ) Advf, Eve inverts f ] Semi-BB reduction: eff Eve  eff. Adv [ Evef breaks (Alicef,Bobf) ) Advf inverts f ] [IR89] No relativizing, thus also No Fully; If P=NP no Semi

  26. Semi-BB vs. Relativizing Fully-BB reduction: eff. Adv Eve (even not eff) [ Eve breaks (Alicef,Bobf) ) Advf, Eve inverts f ] Semi-BB reduction: eff Eve  eff. Adv [ Evef breaks (Alicef,Bobf) ) Advf inverts f ] [IR89] No relativizing, thus also No Fully; If P=NP no Semi Semi: BB implementation with arbitrary pf of security? No - [RTV04] No relativizing ) No Semi • Pf idea: can embed into f an arbitrary oracle, in particular can embed Eve. “Embedding technique” due to [Sim98]

  27. Semi-BB vs. Relativizing Semi-BB reduction: eff Eve  eff. Adv [ Evef breaks (Alicef,Bobf) ) Advf inverts f] [RTV04] No relativizing ) No Semi Pf sketch: • Let O be oracle s.t. 9OWFg and no KA • Define • Every (Alicef,Bobf) can be broken in PPTf, but f cannot be inverted in PPTf) no semi-BB reduction

  28. Free Fully-BB Relativizing Semi-BB Mildly-BB Free Fully-BB Relativizing Semi-BB Mildly-BB Taxonomy II – BB Implementation with Free Proof of Security Fully-BB reduction: eff. Adv Eve (even not eff) [ Eve breaks (Alicef,Bobf) ) Advf, Eve inverts f ] Semi-BB reduction: eff Eve  eff. Adv [ Evef breaks (Alicef,Bobf) ) Advf inverts f ] Mildly-BB reduction: eff Eve  eff. Adv [ Eve breaks (Alicef,Bobf) ) Advf inverts f ] Now Eve is really efficient.

  29. The Power of Mildly-BB Mildly-BB reduction: eff Eve  eff. Adv [ Eve breaks (Alicef,Bobf) ) Advf inverts f ] • Only Mildly-BB separations are about efficiency of reductions [GT00,GGK03]. • Thm: 9OWF)9KA if and only if there is a mildly-BB reduction from KA to OWF. • Conclusion: the restriction is in BB proof of security rather than in BB implementation. Fully-BB Free Relativizing Semi-BB Mildly-BB

  30. The Power of Mildly-BB Free Fully-BB Relativizing Semi-BB Mildly-BB Mildly-BB reduction: eff Eve  eff. Adv [ Eve breaks (Alicef,Bobf) ) Advf inverts f ] • Thm: 9OWF)9KA if and only if there is a mildly-BB reduction from KA to OWF. • Pf sketch: Given OWF oracle f (against PPTf), construct secure KA (against PPT). Case I: 9KA • Construction ignores oracle, just executes secure KA

  31. The Power of Mildly-BB Free Fully-BB Relativizing Semi-BB Mildly-BB Mildly-BB reduction: eff Eve  eff. Adv [ Eve breaks (Alicef,Bobf) ) Advf inverts f ] • Thm: 9OWF)9KA if and only if there is a mildly-BB reduction from KA to OWF. • Pf sketch: Given OWF oracle f (against PPTf), construct secure KA (against PPT). Case II: No KA and therefore no OWF • Every function easy to compute is easy to invert.) Oracle-OWFf must be hard to compute. • KA protocol: Alice sends random (x,r), agree on hf(x),ri

  32. OWF vs. OWP • [IR,KSS00] Random Oracle separates OWF from OWP. • A much simpler argument for weaker result: Thm.Gf is a permutation for every functionf  For all f can invert Gf (using a PSPACE-complete oracle). Adv algorithm on input y= Gf(x): • Let L be a list of queries and answers to f (initially empty). Repeat polynomial number of times: • Simulate: generate some f’ and x’ such that f’ is consistent with L and y= Gf’(x’). • Update: Repeat all the “simulated queries” of Gf’(x’) but this time to real f. Insert to L. • Output last x’. Correctness: If x’  x then the evaluations Gf(x) and Gf’(x’) must reveal a new inconsistency of f and f’.

  33. OWF vs. OWP Cont. Where is the weakness? To argue that G is insecure we assumed it is correct: Gf is a permutation for every functionf. Is this legitimate?

  34. More on Relatevizing vs. BB Reductions • In some scenarios (e.g. KA -> OWF), No relativizing reduction ,No fully-BB reduction. • Not always: Consider the construction of Trapdoor (poly-1) Functions from PKE. • [BHSV98] gives a construction in the random oracle model.  Hard to come up with an oracle separation (as the oracle may potentially be used for BHSV-transformation). • [GMR01] solves it by showing for any particular construction an oracle that foils it (rather than giving one oracle that foils all constructions). • [Myers04] takes it further, considers one specific (but very natural) construction and gives an oracle that foils it. Are we happy/unhappy with this?

  35. Alicez,r Bob s m1=f1 (z,r) m2=f2 (s,m1) m3=f3 (z,r,m2) z = R(s,m3) z [Rudich91]: Hard to Reduce Interaction • [Rud 91] Separate k-message KA from (k-1)-message KA. For k=3 oracle O contains: f1, f2, f3,length tripling random functions, R defined below, П - PSPACE complete. 3 KA : On an “incorrect” input R outputs a random string.

  36. m1=f1 (z,r) Alicez,r Bob s m2=f2 (s,m1) m3=f3 (z,r,m2) z = R(s,m3) z [Rud91]: No 2-KA ( PKE) relative to O • Without R no KA [IR89] • Let (Alice’,Bob’) be two message protocol. • Assume Alice’ makes a useful query R(s,m3). • (s,m3)is a “correct” input toR must have been created by 3 “correct” consecutive invocations either Alice’ or Bob’ must already knowz,r,s. • If its Alice’,Ris not needed. • Otherwise, Eve can also know(s,m3)and applyR.

  37. How do we define BB access to a protocol? • In [Rudich91] and most subsequent works this means black-box access to the message and output functions of the parties. • Can consider a more restricted notion where the access is to a third party implementing the functionality. (Closer in spirit to a physical implementation). • May make arguments much simpler but need to be careful. For example OT in this model does not imply OWF. • Other possible formalizations in between [HKNRR05]

  38. OWF vs. Collision Resistant Hashing • [Simon98] gives an oracle separating the two. • Here “Simon Light”: In particular, consider only regular hash functions (every image has the same number of preimages). • Regular coll. resistant implied by claw-free permutations. • Oracle:f - random functions, П - PSPACE complete, and Q on input circuit C defined as follows: If Cg is regular for every function gthen Q outputs uniformly selected x and x’ such that Cf(x) = Cf(x’). Note: relative to this oracle may have collision-resistant hash functions (using Q itself). [Simon98] handles this case as well.

  39. OWF vs. Collision Resistant Hashing Cont. • Oracle:f - random functions, П - PSPACE complete, and Q on input circuit C defined as follows:If Cg is regular for every function gthen Q outputs uniformly selected x and x’ such that Cf (x) = Cf (x’). Proof intuition: Assume want to find f-1(y). • Due to universal regularity, the only information given by x and x’ are the values of f queried by the evaluations Cf(x), and Cf(x’). • As long as none of these queries is f-1(y) not much help. • By regularity, x and x’ are each uniformly distributed (though they are correlated). • By union bound, only negligible chance to encounter f-1(y).

  40. f seed m bits PRG output m+k bits Limitation On Efficiency • This line considers the most efficient (black-box) construction (rather than the minimal assumption necessary) [KST99,GT00, GGK03]. • Example: OWP  PRG. • Thm[GT00] PRG that expands the seed by k bits requires (k/s) invocations of the OWP (where s is the security parameter of the OWP).

  41. f seed m bits PRG output m+k bits Limitation On Efficiency Cont. • Thm[GT00] PRG that expands the seed by k bits requires (k/s) invocations of the OWP (where s is the security parameter of the OWP). • Idea: Define f(w,z)=g(w),z,where w is O(s)-bit long and g is random Each invocation only gives O(s) bits of randomness Can simulate f using randomness from the seed.

  42. Concluding Remarks • Many more beautiful arguments we did not touch! • BB separations - a useful research tool. • The extent to which the proof of security is black-box plays a major role. • Definitions are subtle, need to make sure we understand the mathematical/philosophical meaning of what we prove.

  43. Some Open Problems • More Non black-box techniques. • Can we “Razborov-Rudich” Impagliazzo-Rudich ? • Power of reductions that use code of primitive but are BB wrt adversary?

  44. Alicer Bob z,s m1=f1 (r) m2=f2 (z,s,m1) z = R(r,m2) z [GKMVR00] incomparability of PKE and OT OT  PKE by an extension of [Rud91].PKE  OT by oracle containing:f1, f2,R, П, (similar to [Rud91]) to allow PKE. But with a small twist… Important: definef2 and R to output  on “incorrect” inputs (sort of validity tests)  Prevent this specific key agreement from being “fakable”, and turns out to be sufficient.

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