Steve Rayner & Gwyn Prins James Martin Institute for Science and Civilization

1. JamesMartinInstitute for science and civilization Steve Rayner & Gwyn PrinsJames Martin Institute for Science and Civilization THE WRONG TROUSERS: RADICALLY RETHINKING CLIMATE POLICY

2. THEWRONGTROUSERS

3. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND • Negative learning (Oppenheimer) - looking at consequences of organizing research around wrong scientific model • Technological lock-in (Arthur & David) - looking at how early adoption decisions constrain subsequent developments • Wicked problems (Rittel & Webber) - recognizing intractable, multi-attribute problems & dangers of premature closure • Uncomfortable knowledge (Douglas, Ravetz) - highlighting problem of the social construction of ignorance arising from institutional commitments • Clumsy solutions (Shapiro) – focusing on creating conditions for emergent solutions in face of contradictory certitudes

4. CLIMATE POLICY IN THE BEGINNING • “Climate change will never be a major public policy issue” 1986 • Too far in future • Science too uncertain • No obvious villain • Sound diagnosis but wrong conclusion! • Something for everyone in climate change!

5. CLIMATE CHANGE: THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT • 3 decades of the European project (climate as a handy external threat to all) • Margaret Thatcher as Green Goddess – out to get the miners • Prevalence of precautionary principle (avoid disaster) • Focus on behavioural change • 70-90% of UK population sees climate as a significant problem • 70-90% sees the government as primarily responsible for action • Recent adoption of Europe-wide 20:20 emissions reduction targets – but how realistic are they?

6. CLIMATE CHANGE: THE US CONTEXT • 3 decades of decentralization • George Bush Sr & the “Whitehouse effect” – highlighted (misrepresented) disagreement • Prevalence of “proportional principle” (benefits and costs) • Greater faith in technological change • 60% sees climate as a significant problem • Only 40% looks to the Federal government to lead response – European failure to understand US political culture • New optimism about Federal leadership

7. GOVERNMENT POLICY CONFLICTS • Possible cautionary tale re new optimism in USA • The 3 major UK political parties are falling over each other to demonstrate their green credentials • UK government has set itself a target of 60% emissions reductions by 2050 • UK is falling well short of meeting its declared goals • Personal carbon credits and two new runways – emergence of carbon “governmentality” and moral posturing – who is toughest on profligacy

8. BUT AT LEAST EVERYBODY NOW AGREES… • But are they right? – Or was Kyoto a case of the wrong trousers

9. THE KYOTO PROTOCOL • Important symbolic expression of global concern • But profoundly flawed as instrumental arrangement for achieving emissions reductions (as distinct from “controls”) • Was DOA in White House: Clinton-Bush transition changed climate politics rather than policies • Was Bush’s repudiation a case of the bad guy doing the right thing for the wrong reasons?

10. FAILURE OF THE KYOTO APPROACH • Represents 14 years of negotiation – “only game in town” • 5% targets for industrialized countries have been watered down to about 2% in real terms, but are still falling short • Little realistic assessment of the politics of ramping up to 80% • Has isolated and demonized the USA • No viable strategy for engaging India and China • Created CDM scams such as HFC combustion • No sign of stimulating fundamental technology transformation • Primarily addresses emissions mitigation not climate impacts

11. LIFE AFTER KYOTO? • Currently have important window to think about the future of climate policy after 2012 • Increasing recognition of Kyoto shortcomings • Emerging new approaches and initiatives – but could they be derailed? • But what can we learn from the history of the design of the current climate regime?

12. THREE AVAILABLE MODELS • Stratospheric ozone regime • Strategic arms reduction treaty • EPA Acid Rain Program The first two are typical products of “summitry”

13. STRATOSPHERIC OZONE REGIME 1985-7 • Reducing emissions of gases from industrial activity • Convention + protocols approach • Targets and timetables • Production controls • Advised by Ozone Trends Panel scientists • But possible dis-analogies include: • Small number of chemically related gases • Handful of producers • Availability of technical alternatives • Smoking gun – Antarctic ozone hole

14. ALTERNATIVE LESSONS FROM THE OZONE REGIME • Initial failure of aerosol protocol at Vienna led to more rigorous regime – simple self-interest or science advisory processes? • Was Kyoto the necessary analogue of the failed aerosol protocol or an avoidable distraction? • Kyoto instituted production controls NOT emissions controls • Cross-national consensus built at non-governmental levels – UNEP, environmental groups, scientific organizations, firms, etc • BUT Governments had negative reaction – asserted top-down control • Government fingerprints • Intergovernmental not International Panel on Climate Change

15. STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATY – 1982-91 • Gore was known primarily as national security wonk • Problem framed as mutually assured reductions • Targets and timetables • Monitoring and compliance (harder for adaptation) • But possible dis-analogies include: • Focus on single technology – nuclear weapons • Warheads under direct government control • Only two parties • No obvious conflict with economic development goals

16. EPA ACID RAIN PROGRAM 1993 • Tradable SO2 allowances • Offered economic efficiencies • Required monitoring and compliance • But possible dis-analogies include: • Response to very specific issue of coal transportation costs • Initial permit allocation by auction • Trading in like-for-like gases (SO2) not divergent baskets • Legally enforceable contracts under one national authority

17. THE THREE MODELS COMBINED TO REINFORCE A NARROW PROBLEM FRAMING • Climate change is essentially a problem of limiting emissions – adaptation has been consistent “poor cousin” • Emissions mitigation is a global commons problem requiring consensus among 170+ countries – too many cooks! • Climate change is a discrete problem that can be solved independently of broader development imperatives • Climate policies should not disrupt economic assumptions –either development (China) or competitiveness (USA) • Improvements in scientific understanding will lead to policy consensus – underestimates role of values

18. WICKED PROBLEMS • Identified by Horst Rittel in late 1960s as characterizing social problems • Contrasted relatively easy challenges of public health engineering in late 19th & early 20th centuries with late 20th century urban planning • Also compared puzzle-solving in mathematics & natural science with complexities of social policy • Noted challenges of increasing heterogeneity & value conflicts in modern society

19. CHARACTERISTICS OF WICKED PROBLEMS • Symptoms of deeper problems • Little room for trial & error learning • Lack a clear set of alternative solutions • Characterized by contradictory certitudes • Involve entrenched interests • Persistent & insoluble • Coping not solving • Feasibility not optimality

20. CLIMATE CHANGE AS A WICKED PROBLEM • UN FCCC objective is to “stabilize atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” • No agreement on meaning of “dangerous” or “interference” • Climate change is a symptom rather than a problem • Product of “massively overdetermined” energy & industrial system • Industrialized world can protect itself through adaptation • Richer is safer! – California earthquakes and Florida hurricanes no barrier to migration • Poor in marginal environments will suffer first – more concern with future than present

21. SEARCH FOR TRANSCENDENT AUTHORITY • Idea that science compels agreement on action • Leads to unattainable expectations of science (The Platinum Standard) • But, “The data never speak – they mumble” • Surfeit of science is indeterminate (eg, US NAPAP)

22. THE REDUCTIONIST TRAP • Climate debate is latest manifestation of long-running clash of world views • Reduces “What kind of world do we want?” to climate; climate to CO2; and CO2 to just one number – 450ppm • Carbon pricing becomes the “silver bullet”

23. IT’S THE DEVELOPMENT PATH STUPID…(OH! & MIND THE GAPS!)

24. UNCOMFORTABLEKNOWLEDGE

25. CONFIDENCE IN MODELING

26. IT’S STILL THE DEVELOPMENT PATH STUPID…

27. SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT • Kept off climate policy agenda by US & China • Requires diversified approach by multiple actors • Emphasises benefits rather than restraints • Focuses on building resilience rather than economic efficiency

28. NO TECHNOLOGICAL FIX BUT NO FIX WITHOUT TECHNOLOGY • Assumption behind trading is that new energy technologies will become more competitive as fossil prices rise – but where will new technologies come from? • Reverse global collapse of energy R&D funding – 10 countries fund 95% of R&D, (new UK government investments) • Create conditions for accelerated capital turnover in energy • Focus on energy modernization benefits – health & economic - rather than fossil fuel limitation (China & EU) • Consider benefits of international competition as well as cooperation and coercion (EU and USA) • Expand technological options – including geo-engineering – the next taboo for “climate puritans” – Branson initiatives recognize lack of options for aircraft

29. ZEN AND THE ART OF CARBON CYCLE MAINTENANCE (Rayner & Malone 1997) • Emphasized importance of learning to manage under conditions of ignorance and unpredictability • Suggested that diversified strategies would be necessary to alter overdetermination of energy and industrial systems • Specifically: • Design policy instruments for real world conditions rather than make world conform to idealized model (a global carbon market) • Incorporate climate thinking into routine decision processes (now called mainstreaming) • Take a regional and local approach to climate policy making and implementation (emerging bottom-up initiatives) • Use a pluralistic approach to decision making (most policy thinking still focuses on national governments) • Direct resources to protect the most vulnerable (adaptation still resisted)

30. LIFTING THE TABOO ON ADAPTATION (Pielke, Prins, Rayner & Sarewitz 2007) • Unacceptable topic for many years • Vulnerability to climate impacts are increasing for reasons unrelated to greenhouse gas emissions • Present arrangements under Kyoto frame adaptation expenditures as costs of failed mitigation • Rich countries can avoid paying costs of adaptation in poor countries by enhanced mitigation efforts • Available level of MAFs are desultory • Adaptation in developed countries could be part of public mobilization strategy

31. TIME TO DITCH KYOTO (Prins & Rayner 2007) • Clumsy solution using silver buckshot • Abandon universalism and focus mitigation efforts on the big emitters (Gleneagles Climate Process) • Allow genuine emissions markets to evolve from the bottom up • Make wartime levels of public investment in energy technology RD&D - $80bn/year for USA • Increase investments in adaptation – comparable to mitigation efforts • Work the problem at the appropriate scales – provinces, states, cities • Confront the object and draw nigh obliquely“ – Montreal Protocol has had more impact on climate than fully implemented Kyoto

32. RAISING CARBOBN COSTS VERSUS LOWERING TECHNOLOGY COSTS

33. CONCLUSIONS • Significant opportunities are opening up for a more diversified approach • Essential to learn the lessons of premature closure • Science cannot cut through Gordian policy knots • Carbon trading is probably part of the solution, but will likely be through bottom-up linking of national/regional systems • A diversified strategy is desirable to find leverage points to change complex overdetermined energy/industrial systems • Significant new investment in energy and other technologies is required • A new emphasis on adaptation and geo-engineering is essential

34. THE ALTERNATIVE…