Airpower: End of WW I Through WW II

1. Airpower:End of WW I Through WW II

2. Overview • Background—The 1920s • General Mitchell’s Crusade • The Air Corps Act of 1926 • Air Corps Tactical School • Move To Autonomy in the 1930s • WWII Begins • The Battle of Britain • The United States Prepares for War • The Army Air Forces

3. Overview (cont’d) • The US Enters the Second World War • America and its Allies Plan Strategy • The United States on the Offensive • US Strategic Bombing Effort Against Germany • The Air War Against Japan • Tactical Airpower in the Pacific • Strategic Airpower in the Pacific • The End of the Second World War • Review CFD Model

4. The Interwar Years

5. Background to the Interwar Years • Following WW I, the United States returned to isolationism • Army Air Service reduced from 190K men in • in 1918 to 10K in 1920 (Officers: 20,000 in 1918 to 200 in 1919) • Civilian aviation boomed; military budgets were cut • Air service sought to develop an air doctrine • Period marked by organizational changes and personality clashes • Few saw the potential of the airplane

6. Military Airpower Advocates Italy – General GiulioDouhet • In future wars armies & navies serve as defensive holding grounds • Bombers deliver massive attacks on enemy cities • Civilian morale would crack & war would end quickly Britain – Sir Hugh Trenchard • Britain’s Chief of Air Staff • Bombing of cities was the central plank in British air strategy

7. Gen William “Billy” Mitchell • Deputy Chief of Air Service in 1919 • Believed the airplane would change the defense establishment • Believed the air service was an offensiveforce equal to the Army and Navy • The Army and Navy strongly opposed these views • Americans wanted no part of a service that looked offensive in nature

8. Billy Mitchell (cont’d) • A visionary, fanatic, and prophet • Alienated many due to constant attacks and need for 100% support • Technology not capable of meeting his expectations—cost him credibility

9. Creation of Army Air Service • President Woodrow Wilson used his executive powers to create the Army Air Service in May 1918 • Army left the Signal Corps and became a combat arm • Congress made it into law with the Army Reorganization Act of 1920 • Army Air Service became its own branch within Army

10. Army Reorganization Act • Passed by Congress in 1920 • Air Service raised in stature equal to the Infantry, Artillery, etc. • Air Service granted procurement, research, and training autonomy • Air Service units assigned to ground control (opposed by General Mitchell) • Army aircraft coastal defense mission specified and limited

11. Gen Mitchell vs. Navy • Claimed the battleship was obsolete • Replaced by more effective and economical airplane • Air Service planes bombed and sank three ships • Infuriated the Navy leadership • Sparked interservice feuding • Air Service still not given the mission of coastal defense

12. Mitchell’s Last Campaign • 1922-1924—General Mitchell concentrated on developing doctrine; advocated strategic bombardment • 1925—Demoted to colonel because of his unrelenting support for a separate air force • After the crash of the dirigible “Shenandoah,” he accused military leaders of “incompetence and criminal negligence” • Court-martial began on October 28, 1925

13. Mitchell’s Legacy • Focused attention on airpower • Forced acceptance of the potential of airpower • Mentored many aviators who would carry on his work—some became instructors at the Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS)

14. Air Corp Act of 1926 • Can be thought of as being triggered by General Mitchell • Army Air Service became Army Air Corps • Additional Assistant Secretary of War appointed to oversee air units • Air sections authorized in General Staff divisions • Flying units to be commanded by rated officers

15. Air Corp Tactical School (ACTS) • Founded in 1920 at Langley Field, Virginia • Renamed Air Corps Tactical School in 1926 • Moved to Maxwell Field, Alabama in 1931 • Original mission to teach air strategy and tactics • Mission changed to developing and teaching air doctrine (principles and philosophy)

16. ACTS (cont’d) • Future wars would be decided by airpower • Airplane would be the primary offensive weapon of modern forces • High-altitude, strategic, daylight bombing could paralyze and defeat an industrialized enemy without heavy losses

17. ACTS (cont’d) • Preoccupation with bombers and their missions overwhelmed other teachings • Claire Chennault • Led the Flying Tigers in WW II • Taught pursuit aviation—advocated escorting bombers and strafing enemy rear areas • George Kenney • Commanded the Pacific Air Force in WW II • Taught attack aviation—strafing attacks on enemy troops and behind enemy lines

18. Chennault Video

19. Organizational Changes • Army Reorganization Act of 1920 • Air Service gained autonomy in R&D, procurement, personnel, supply, and training • Air Corps Act of 1926 • Changed the name of the Air Service to Air Corps; implied the Air Corps was capable of independent operations • Establishment of General Headquarters (GHQ) Air Force in 1935 • Placed all tactical units under the Commander, GHQ • Recognized an independent aviation branch within the Army

20. The German Blitzkrieg • 1 Sep 1939—Germany attacks Poland • Luftwaffe aircraft were employed: • To gain air superiority • Cut supply lines • Support ground forces • Germany then easily conquered Denmark, Norway, The Netherlands, Belgium, and France

21. Battle of Britain • June 1940—Britain stands alone against German aggression • Germany attacks in four phases • Attacks against shipping lines • Day and night bombing of RAF airfields • Daytime bombing of the cities • Nighttime bombing of the cities

22. Phase I (10 July to 7 Aug) • The Luftwaffe concentrated on offensive reconnaissance in Phase I. Specific actions included: • Attacks on convoys in the English Channel • Attacks on air defense, especially radar (radio detection and ranging) stations • Attacks on coastal towns in the planned invasion area

23. Phase II (8 Aug to 6 Sept) Having tested and reconnoitered the defenses, the overall strategy was to focus on destroying aircraft of Britain’s Fighter Command, both on the ground and in the air.

24. Phase III (7 Sept-5 Oct) • Massed attacks began against London and other major cities, as well as aircraft factories and other strategic targets • When British fighters were successful against the day raids, the Germans switched to night bombing.

25. Phase IV (6-31 Oct 1940) • Heavy night bombing raids against cities continued, while Luftwaffe fighter-bombers attacked airfields, coastal towns, and other strategically-significant targets. • As the winter weather approached, the raids became less numerous and produced less damage. By November it was apparent that the offensive had failed.

26. Reasons for Luftwaffe’s Defeat • Luftwaffe not trained or equipped to conduct strategic bombing • British had excellent command, control, and communication systems in place • Luftwaffe had poor intelligence capabilities

27. Spaatz Video

28. Col Carl Spaatz’ Observations • The Luftwaffe • Primarily a ground-supporting air force • Tactically ill prepared for strategic bombing • Lacked a strategic bombing doctrine

29. United States Prepares for War • Army Air Corps was expanded • July 1940—Air Corps expands to 54 combat groups to include 14 heavy bomb groups • March 1941—Air Corps expands to 84 combat groups to include 24 heavy bomb groups • Emphasis placed on bombers, not escort aircraft—hurts US bombing efforts B-17 B-24

30. Air War Plans Division Plan # 1 • Formulated in response to Roosevelt's call for American air doctrine • Established independent operating objectives for the Air Corps • Called for precision bombing of German industry and economy • Flawed because it did not provide for long-range fighter escort P-51

31. AWPD 1—Target List • Emphasized the offensive nature of the mission • Ground support missions were secondary • Four major targets were… • Electrical power facilities • Transportation assets and structures • Synthetic petroleum production plants • Aircraft industry facilities

32. Forming the Army Air Force (AAF) • Army Air Corps and GHQ Air Force merged in June 1941 to form AAF • Merger resulted from decentralization of the War Department General Staff begun by General George Marshall in 1940 • General Hap Arnold named commander • One step from full independence as a separate service

33. The United States Enters WW II • Relations between the United States and Germany deteriorate—USS Reuben Jamessunk in October 1941 • Relations with Japan worsened in 1941 • Japan continues Asian aggression • July 1941—Roosevelt froze Japanese assets in U.S. and halts all American trade with Japan • 7 Dec 1941—Japan attacks Pearl Harbor

34. Allied Strategy for Winning World War II • Priority One: Safeguard Britain and United States • Priority Two: Fight a decisive air offensive against the Axis powers in Europe and fight defensively in Asia • Priority Three: Sustained air offensive against Japan after the Axis powers weredefeated in Europe • Use land forces when, and if, necessary I + II + III = Victory

35. First US Offensive Action of WW II—North Africa • First use of US Ground forces against the Germans • Provided valuable combat experience for ground and air forces • Opportunity for British and US to fight a combined arms campaign • First defeat of the German forces since 1930

36. North Africa (cont’d) • United States learned valuable lessons concerning the employment of airpower in tactical situations • Initial problems experienced by the Allies • Air units were split among ground units • Ground commanders didn’t share aircraft • Airpower used defensively • Airpower employment fragmented and inflexible

37. North Africa (cont’d) • Allied airpower reorganized in 1942 • Command of the air forces went to Airmen • The air officer decided the missions and allocated forces • Missions became offensive in nature • Flexibility of Allied airpower was restored and air superiority was attained • Tactical missions followedand techniques refined • Allies achieve victory in North Africa in May 1943

38. North Africa (cont’d) • “Anyone who has to fight, even with the most modern weapons, against an enemy in complete command of the air, fights like a savage against modern European troops, under the same handicaps and with the same chances of success.” • ~ Field Marshal Erwin Rommell

39. Davis Video

40. US Strategic Bombing of Germany • Heavily influenced by ACTS and bomber advocates • Some felt strategic bombing alone would defeat Germany • Others believed strategic bombing would weaken Germany and a ground invasion would be required for her surrender

41. US Bombing Strategy • United States committed to high-altitude, daylight precision bombing • Believed heavy bombers, flying in formation, could fight their way to the target and back • Fighter escorts not necessary • Targets identified by AWPD-1 best hit in day time • US strategy ignored weather conditions, target obstruction, fighter opposition, and antiaircraft artillery

42. Strategic Bombing of Germany—Early Efforts • Strategic bombing of Europe was Eighth Air Force responsibility • First raids were against marshaling yards in France—little effect • Late 1942 and early 1943: Eighth AF attacked small targets in Europe—good experience, little effect

43. Strategic Bombing Becomes a Major Objective • Casablanca Conference (Jan 1943) established strategic bombing as a major objective • Destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial, and economic system • Undermining of morale of the German people • German aircraft industry was the top priority target • The ball bearing industry was a complementary target • Destruction of enemy aircraft industry would help achieve Air Superiority

44. Strategic Bombing of Schweinfurt Germany • Eighth AF bombs the ball bearing plants at Schweinfurt in Summer 1943 • Aug 1943—Eighth AF inflicts heavy damage but loses 36 B-17s and 360 crewmen • Oct 1943—AAF loses 60 bombers and has 138 aircraft damaged and 600 men lost • Losses were unacceptable • No fighter escorts left bombers vulnerable to enemy fighters and antiaircraft artillery

45. Strategic Bombing of Ploesti • Aug 1943—AAF launches attacks against oil refineries at Ploesti, Romania • 180 aircraft launched—55 lost • Raids were costly but needed to shorten the war • Attacks were designed to reduce Germany’s oil and lubricant production • Generally ineffective and deliveries increased until attacks were resumed in 1944

46. Strategic Bombing in Europe (cont’d) • Long-range fighter escorts arrived in theater December 1943 • Took significant toll on German aircraft and their experienced pilot force • Eighth AF resumed raids into Germany in February 1944 • Launched a 1000-plane raid by end of February 1944 • Attacked Berlin in March 1944 • German POL production was reduced to 25% capacity by September 1944

47. European Strategic Bombing: Lessons Learned • Target list was not what it should have been • Attacks on sub pens and ball bearing plants were ineffective • Best targets were the POL production facilities and sources of electrical power • Terror bombing of civilians was ineffective and did little to lower morale • Bombers needed fighter escorts to and from the target

48. Pacific Theater in World War II “In our victory over Japan, airpower was unquestionably decisive. That the planned invasion of the Japanese Home islands was unnecessary is clear evidence that airpower has evolved into a force co-equal with land and sea power, decisive in its own right, and worthy of the faith of its prophets.” ~ General Carl A. Spaatz

49. Japanese Objectives • Territorial expansion to reduce overcrowding at home and gain raw materials • Fill the power vacuum in the Southwest Pacific created by German aggression in Europe • Keep the U.S. out of the war for two years with a knockout blow at Pearl Harbor • Underestimated American resolve and anger

50. Tunner Video