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Security Encryption and Management

Security Encryption and Management. Brian Murgatroyd Chairman: TETRA Association Security and Fraud Prevention Group. Agenda. Security threats TETRA security features Overall system security measures Air interface security functions End to end encryption

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Security Encryption and Management

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  1. Security Encryption and Management Brian Murgatroyd Chairman: TETRA Association Security and Fraud Prevention Group

  2. Agenda • Security threats • TETRA security features • Overall system security measures • Air interface security functions • End to end encryption • Interoperability and practical security measures TETRA Experience - Poland

  3. Security Threats • What are the main threats to your system? • Confidentiality? • Availability? • Integrity? TETRA Experience - Poland

  4. Message and User Related Threats • Message threats • Interception • Eavesdropping • Masquerading • Manipulation of data. • Replay • User related threats • traffic analysis • observability of user behaviour. TETRA Experience - Poland

  5. System Related Threats • , • Denial of service • Jamming • Attacks via the IP network to switch off the functional boxes • Natural disasters- • fire, flood, earthquake TETRA Experience - Poland

  6. Overall TETRA Security • Several aspects to TETRA security • Technical security countermeasures • Secure Network Management and procedure • Lawful Interception • Standard algorithms TETRA Experience - Poland

  7. Network Security • IT security is vital in TETRA networks • Gateways are particularly vulnerable. • Operating staff need vetting • Firewalls required at access points to the network TETRA Experience - Poland

  8. TETRA security classes • Class Encryption OTAR Authentication • 1 No No Optional • 2 Static key Optional Optional • 3 Dynamic key Mandatory Mandatory TETRA Experience - Poland

  9. Authentication • Used to ensure that terminal isgenuine and allowed on network. • Mutual authentication ensures that in addition to verifying the terminal, the SwMI can be trusted. • Authentication requires both SwMI and terminal have proof of secret key. • Successful authentication permits further security related functions to be downloaded. TETRA Experience - Poland

  10. Call Controller Authentication Generate RS Authentication Centre (AuC) K known only to AuC and MS K RS TA11 KS K RS Generate RAND1 KS (Session key) RS (Random seed) TA11 KS RAND1 RS, RAND1 KS RAND1 RES1 TA12 DCK Base station TA12 XRES1 DCK1 RES1 DCK1 Compare RES1 and XRES1 TETRA Experience - Poland

  11. Provisioning of authentication keys • Every terminal has a unique secret key (k) which has to be manually loaded to the terminal normally by the manufacturer • k associated with the TEI and sent to the network provider • Needs to be done securely and to the SFPG recommendation 01 file format • User organization provides the ISSI-TEI which it sends to the network provider • K-ISSI pairs in the authentication centre can be formed TETRA Experience - Poland

  12. standardair interface encryption protected vulnerable protected End-to-endencryption protected Air interface encryption protection TETRA Experience - Poland

  13. Air interface encryption • As well as protecting voice, SDS and packet data transmissions: • AI encryption protects control channel messages as well as voice and data payloads • encrypted registration protects identities and gives anonymity • Protection against replay attacks using an initialization vector derived form system timing (frame numbering) TETRA Experience - Poland

  14. Over The Air Re-keying (OTAR) • Populations of terminals tend to be large and the only practical way to change encryption keys is by OTAR • This is done securely by using a derived cipher key or a session key to wrap the downloaded key • The security functionality is transparent to the user as the network provider would normally be responsible for OTAR and management of AI keys TETRA Experience - Poland

  15. Air Interface traffic keys • Four traffic keys are used in class 3 systems:- • Derived cipher Key (DCK) • derived from authentication process used for protecting uplink, one to one calls • Common Cipher Key(CCK) • protects downlink group calls and ITSI on initial registration • Group Cipher Key(GCK) • Provides crypto separation, combined with CCK • Static Cipher Key(SCK) • Used for protecting DMO and TMO fallback mode TETRA Experience - Poland

  16. Disabling of terminals • Vital to ensure the reduction of risk of threats to system by stolen and lost terminals • Relies on the integrity of the users to report losses quickly and accurately. • Disabling may be either temporary or permanent • Disabling stops the terminal working as a radio and: • Permanent disabling removes all keys including (k) • Temporary disabling removes all traffic keys but allows ambience listening • The network or application must be able to remember disable commands to terminals that are not live on the network at the time of the original command being sent. TETRA Experience - Poland

  17. Standard air interface algorithms • TEA1 and TEA4 • Generally exportable outside Europe. Designed for non public safety use • TEA2 • Only for use in Europe for public safety and military organizations. Strictly export controlled • TEA3 • For use by public safety and military organizations where TEA2 is not allowed. Strictly export controlled TETRA Experience - Poland

  18. Transfer of security parameters between networks • The authentication parameters (based on k) are very sensitive and should never be sent to a visited network • The way forward is to provide a set of parameters that will only be used in the visited network • WG6 are working on a revision to the standard to accommodate practical security functionality across an ISI TETRA Experience - Poland

  19. Evaluation of security mechanisms • How can a system be judged secure? • Evaluate threats and risks, independently if possible • Ensure correct implementation of security • Ensure mobile terminals have been evaluated • Use standard encryption algorithms • Regular audit and inspection TETRA Experience - Poland

  20. End to end encryption • Protects messages across an untrusted infrastructure • Provides enhanced confidentiality • Voice and SDS services • IP data services (soon) MS Network MS Air interface security between MS and network End-to-end security between MS’s TETRA Experience - Poland

  21. Benefits of end to end encryption in combination with Air Interface encryption • Air interface (AI) encryption alone and end to end encryption alone both have their limitations • For most users AI security measures are completely adequate • Where either the network is untrusted, or the data is extremely sensitive then end to end encryption may be used in addition as a overlay. • Brings the benefit of encrypting addresses and signalling as well as user data across the Air Interface and confidentiality right across the network TETRA Experience - Poland

  22. Standard end to end encryption algorithms • There are no ‘standard’ algorithms defined by SFPG but: • IDEA was defined as a good candidate 64 bit block cipher algorithm for use with TETRA and test data and an example implementation was produced • AES128 (Rijndael) was defined as a good candidate 128 bit block cipher algorithm for use with TETRA and test data and an example implementation was produced • Both algorithms have proved popular with public safety organizations and give a good level of security assurance to sensitive data TETRA Experience - Poland

  23. Export control of crypto material • All cryptographic material and terminals capable of encryption are subject to export control • The authority has to be satisfied that the key length and algorithms used are allowed to be exported. • Guidance is given in the Wassenaar arrangement www.wassenaar.org but the export control authority must be approached in all cases TETRA Experience - Poland

  24. Lawful interception • In most countries public telecoms systems are subject to lawful interception by the security authorities • TETRA provides a standard interface to allow this functionality • Operators need to check with their security authorities whether their system needs to be equipped with this interface TETRA Experience - Poland

  25. Question • What would be the main reason for using end to end encryption for your users and is the additional expense worth the money and additional management bearing in mind the threats? TETRA Experience - Poland

  26. Conclusion • Security functions built in to TETRA from the start! Air interface encryption protects, control traffic, IDs as well as voice and user traffic. End to end encryption gives higher level of assurance • Key management comes without user overhead because of OTAR. TETRA Experience - Poland

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