Energy & Military Effectiveness:

1. Energy & Military Effectiveness: Changing How Energy is Considered in DoD Planning and Acquisition David Bak SAIC supporting OUSD(AT&L)/Energy MORS P&E Special Meeting 30 Nov 2009

2. What’s Changed Since Last Year • OSD(AT&L) issued guidance and tools for calculating the Fully Burdened Cost of Fuel in all acquisition program AoAs • https://acc.dau.mil/GetAttachment.aspx?id=285803&pname=file&aid=43783&lang=en-US • https://acc.dau.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=318097&lang=en-US • Navy and Marine Corps leadership have publicly committed to making systemic changes in operational energy • FBCF and Total Ownership Cost in ALL acquisition programs and procurements • Global 09 Navy wargame challenged old assumptions on operational energy vulnerabilities to US forces • OSD(AT&L), JS J4 and Navy Energy Coordination Office collaborating on two case studies to vet Energy Efficiency KPP and FBCF use • OSD Policy committed to including energy logistics risks in Defense Planning Scenarios for first time – can’t just assume fuel will get there • NATO Research & Technology Organization exploratory team on Energy Analysis

3. DoD Energy - Root Cause Analysis • How rigorously have we assessed DoD’s energy problems? • How did those problems come about? • Where were the choices made that created them? Have we looked across stove-pipes as well as down them? • What assumptions, analysis or decisions should be revisited to guide our energy plans? • Through what process should we decide where to spend our marginal dollar on energy improvements? • How should energy investments compete with other issues for resources? How important is energy to core business? • How do we best reconcile improving capability, reducing costs and meeting mandates in energy? Moving from point solutions to analytically-informed prioritization & resourcing

4. Where Energy Really Needs to Play Differently • Build fuel delivery, protection and vulnerability risk into Service & Joint campaign models, wargames, Defense Planning Scenarios (DPS’) and force planning builds (MSFDs) • Examine RED threats to “tail” much more realistically Service & Joint Force Planning • Realistically constrain operational fuel demand requirements to improve endurance, flexibility, mobility and supportability • Develop the Energy KPP methodology for all “materiel solutions” JCIDS • Use the planning scenarios to set programs’/platforms’ fuel demand objective and threshold metrics • Require SAEs-PEOs-PMs to apply the Fully Burdened Cost of Fuel (FBCF) to TOC estimates to better inform tradespace decisions • Incentivize better relationship btw the PMs, analysts, and loggies Acquisition Slow, steady progress so far – proof will be in RFPs

5. Backup

6. DoD Energy Landscape Grand Strategy View Preserving US interests, resource competition, climate impact, etc. Operational Energy Installation Energy Demand Supply Demand Supply Grid Dependence Adequate Back-Up Power More DoD critical missions conducted from CONUS, MOBs Facility Inefficiency Green Building Principles Treat Buildings as Systems in Planning Assured Domestic Supply Synthetic Fuels Supply Chain Efficiency Creating a Market Fuel Productivity in Warfighting Reducing “Tail” to Enhance “Tooth” Valuing Tech & Design Options Properly Near, Mid and Long-term planning and investing goes on in each domain

7. Definition: Fully Burdened Cost Of Fuel • FBCF Defined The commodity price plus the total life-cycle cost of all people and assets required to move and protect fuel from the point of sale to the point of use. • FBCF is… …an analytical factor for helping select among competing force structure, platform design and technology choices based on the logistics and force protection costs driven by operational energy demand • FBCF is not… …a budgeting number.

8. New Acquisition Procedures Include FBCF Production & Deployment O&S Technology Opportunities & Resources User Needs Full Rate Prod DR MS B MS C MS A Engineering & Manufacturing Development & Demonstration Materiel Solution Analysis ICD Strategic Guidance Joint Concepts CDD CPD C B A TechDev MDD AoA Incremental Development FCB COCOM OSD/JCS FBCF to be calculated Future: Energy KPP set Where Requirements meet Acquisition, value is determined – fuel logistics demand should especially be in perspective here

9. What’s Next on Operational Energy? Appointment of a DoD Director for Operational Energy Plans and Programs and formation of the office – timing is TBD On-going focus on rapid equipping of energy fixes to field Continued OSD-led discussion on DoD strategic energy goals QDR release in February Energy KPP and FBCF case studies deliver in late winter 2010 Collaboration with Services on FBCF and KPP implementation in acquisition processes on-going Grid risk to mission – OSD-led internal discussions on-going Increased interagency collaboration – DoD wants to be a test bed All other activities and progress dependent on decisions above

10. Chris DiPetto Acting Director, Developmental Test & Evaluation OUSD(AT&L)/DDR&E/DT&E 703-695-4421 DT&E Energy Team Dave Bak 703-412-3685 Rick Cotman 703-412-3673 Tom Morehouse – consultant 703-750-6840

11. Steps to Managing DoD Fuel Risk Sponsor acquisition and logistician involvement in Defense Planning Scenario writing & negotiation – today these perspective are never at the table Create an AT&L strategy for greater involvement in and redesigning of JCIDS – i.e. don’t let logistics be treated as only a dependent variable Raise the priority and accountability of “sustainability” KPPs – Energy Efficiency KPP, Materiel Reliability KPP, and Total Ownership Cost Motivate programs and S&T to innovate in force protection and propulsion more quickly – heavy armor guzzles more fuel, makes a larger (soft) logistics tail for RED to attack Work with SAEs to prioritize fuel demand reduction into Service “Reset” programs immediately – almost all budgeted upgrades increase energy demand (or are neutral) Require closer AT&L oversight of how scenarios are used to justify how duty cycles (hence, performance specs) are applied and modified through acquisition process – reveals unit and platform assumptions; makes requirements creep more obvious Work with PA&E to rescind current Fully Burdened Cost of Fuel memo and reissue in line with AT&L methodology (more realistic measure of “tail” demand, cost) Issue new Fully Burdened Cost of Fuel policy to clarify DoD I 5000.02, and require a FBCF estimate at each milestone decision for all ACAT levels Actively manage fuel demand in ways that increase military capability, and ensure “greening” is done as a pleasant secondary effect, not the primary goal

12. RESET/Upgrade Opportunities Large Cost: Army estimates its RESET requirement at ~$47 Billion…but Army RESET program is also an upgrade program Abrams & Bradleys stripped to the bolts – opportunity to reduce energy demand & support req. Current RESET upgrade priorities include tank gun, targeting & sensor upgrades – is our operational experience really being considered correctly? Up-armoring HMWVV to reduce combatant vulnerability shifts risk to the “tail” Added weight increases fuel and fuel logistics demand, roll-over deaths, reduces mobility Fuel trucks can’t be armored – combat forces must diverted to protect – reducing combat capability What is it worth to ground forces to reduce the fuel demand of legacy equipment? Was unit, theater or enterprise (fuel) risk considered when deciding on investments? Were modern diesel engines considered for M1 upgrades? Are APU upgrade programs aggressive enough? What demand reduction steps are underway on combat and combat support assts? SecDef FCS decision is an opportunity to revisit fuel demand assumptions in the legacy and future ground force

13. Current DoD Fuel Assumptions… Impair Force Effectiveness Increases risk of mission failure Constrains maneuver, limits endurance Increases casualties Dilutes combat effectiveness by increasing force protection demands Increase Costs to DoD Increases budget turbulence from volatile energy prices Funds used for energy are not available to buy capability Skew Force Structure Toward the Support “Tail” Smaller # of “exquisite” systems w/ growing fuel demand

14. Energy Technologies exist, but current DoD processes discount their value Land Systems Lighter, more resilient materials Control systems Innovative design concepts More efficient propulsion systems Stirling cycle opposed engine Hybrid drive Electric drive Fixed Wing Systems Blended wing body Lightweight materials Novel actuator technologies Populated flatwire Adaptive propulsion systems Soldier Systems Higher density batteries Power starved electronics designs More efficient solar charging

15. FBCF In DoDI 5000.02 & the Energy KPP • 2009 NDAA mandates implementation of the Fully Burdened Cost of Fuel and Energy Efficiency Key Performance Parameter • DoDI 5000.02 requires use of FBCF in AoA analysis; new CJCSI 3170.01G updates Energy Efficiency KPP language • Defense Acquisition Guidance (DAG) revision pending – interim guidance is available Enclosure 7, Resource Estimation (AoAs) “6. ENERGY CONSIDERATIONS. The fully burdened cost of delivered energy shall be used in trade-off analyses conducted for all DoD tactical systems with end items that create a demand for energy.” DODI 5000.02, 2 Dec 08

16. Service & Joint Force Planning Energy in Force Planning & Campaign Analysis • Examine RED capabilities and CONOPS threat to BLUE “tail” much more realistically than planners do today • Put convoys, tankers and oilers in as integrated “at risk” parts of battlespace • Allow RED the chance to play realistically, but unconstrained in scenarios • Build fuel delivery, protection and vulnerability risk into: • Service & Joint campaign Models (TRAC series, Storm, etc.) • Major wargames (Service Title 10, JFCOM and others) • Defense Planning Scenarios (DPS’) & force build-out (MSFDs) • This more accurately values forces with greater unrefueled range and loiter as well as smaller “tails” *

17. Energy Key Performance Parameter All KPPs build on future force planning assumptions Energy KPP thresholds and objectives should be set by scenario-based force planning analysis Energy KPP adds fuel “tail” risk to the speed/range/weight tradespace Cooks energy “productivity” into performance specifications Energy KPP under purview of Joint Staff in CJCSI 3170.01G (the JCIDS instruction) Methodology study w/ J4 beginning soon JCIDS *

18. Acquisition The Fully Burdened Cost of Fuel • Definition: FBCF is the commodity price plus the total life-cycle cost of all people, assets and infrastructure required to move and protect fuel from the point of sale to the user • Calculation derived from the scenarios selected • FBCF represents delivered fuel risk in the acquisition tradespace • Complements the KPP on the “cost” side of cost, schedule and performance • Informs S&T prioritization too • FBCF under purview of AT&L and PA&E in DoDI 5000.02 *

19. FBCF - Delivery “Cost” is not the “Price” $1.44 or ???/gal $1.44/gal or $42/gal* $1.44 or $15* or ???/gal w/ escorts & helo protection? * Consistent FBCF results from 2001 DSB task force, PA&E, JASONs and IDA ..these more realistic costs don’t reflect the operational risks

20. DoD Energy Governance & History Legacy oversight structures exacerbate ignorance of fuel burdens Installations (not incl. FOBs) DoD Installation community focused on energy efficiency for 25 years Fiscal ROI is the baseline metric, pay-off typically must be in the year of execution to be funded Little to no focus on assurance of base operations from denial or natural disaster; no realistic risk assessments DUSD(I&E) leads, w/ Service 3-star equivalents Operationally deployed forces (incl. FOBs) 2001 Defense Science Board Task Force first raises risks from operational energy demand in the deployed force – no DoD reaction 2006-08 new DSB stood up, reported in Feb. 08 – Chaired by fmr. Sec. Schlesinger DAWG briefed on FBCF in 2006, “pilot” FBCF effort directed in Apr 2007 USD(AT&L) memo DoD Energy Security Task Force stood up in 2006 under DDR&E Young USD(AT&L) has been lead DoD Energy official since first raised by DAWG in 2006 2009 NDAA – HASC puts Director for Operational Energy Plans and Programs into OSD, mandates use of FBCF and Energy KPP w/in 3 years DUSD(LM&R) has lead for logistics - focus is supply-side – does not play in demand discussions DUSD(A&T) has ostensible lead on FBCF implementation with DoD 5000.02 Dir, Operational Energy will notionally have some responsibility to advocate for fuel demand management, depending on perceived rank and which “seats at the table” he/she can get

21. Plus, Operational Energy Demand gets much less attention than Installations Installations Energy ~25% of DoD energy demand Operational Fuel ~75% of DoD energy demand vs. • No Invisible Tail • 4-Star equivalent in charge • Facilities are easy to count • Clear focus • Energy Policy Act of ‘05 • Executive Order 13423 • Numerous award programs - • incentives • Easy COTS solutions to exploit And no one is in charge below the waterline ...but what processes decide what we build and field?

22. Revisiting Energy in DoD Strategic Reshaping So how does DoD reduce it’s energy risk and improve warfighter capability?

23. But, If Energy Played Differently… JCIDS Acquisition • Build fuel delivery, protection and vulnerability risk into Service & Joint campaign models, wargame, Defense Planning Scenarios (DPS’) and force planning build (MSFDs) • Examine RED threats to “tail” much more realistically Service & Joint Force Planning • Realistically constrain operational fuel demand to improve endurance, flexibility, mobility and supportability • Develop scalable Energy KPP methodology for all “materiel solutions” • Use the planning scenarios to set programs’/platforms’ fuel demand objective and threshold requirements • Require SAEs-PEOs-PMs to apply the FBCF to TOC estimates & demonstrate achieved fuel demand targets at milestone reviews • Build relationship between the analysts, loggies and PM officers …and these real costs don’t show the operational risks

24. So, How Did We Get Here… Through DoD Planning Processes that Undervalue Fuel & Its’ Delivery Costs and DoD Business Practices and Culture that Disincentivize Strategic Investment or Savings

25. And Senior Leaders Agree Gen James Mattis, USMC “Unleash us from the tether of fuel” Lt Gen Richard Zilmer, USMC, Al-Anbar Commander Urgent request to reduce military dependence on fuel* Road-bound convoys, supply lines vulnerable to insurgent attack by ambush and IEDs Personnel loss rates, continued casualty accumulation can to jeopardize mission success * Defense News, August 2006

26. “Price” is not “Cost”… Fuel for DoD Operations • Direct Price • ~$12B to purchase in FY07 • Indirect Costs • Huge “tail” to deliver • Airborne tanking • Refueling trucks & helos • Navy oilers • Personnel • Force Protection Fiscal and Operational Costs from DoD’s fuel demand are orders of magnitude bigger than we appreciate

27. And it’s not just combat systems Top 10 Battlefield Fuel Users – Swiftly Defeat Scenario SWA scenario using Equipment Usage Profile data Of the top 10 Army battlefield fuel users, only #5 and #10 are combat platforms 1. Truck Tractor: Line Haul C/S 50000 GVWR 6X4 M915 2. Helicopter Utility: UH-60L 3. Truck Tractor: MTV W/E 4. Truck Tractor: Heavy Equipment Transporter (HET) Shooter 5. Tank Combat Full Tracked: 120MM Gun M1A2 6. Helicopter Cargo Transport: CH-47D 7. Decontaminating Apparatus: PWR DRVN LT WT 8. Truck Utility: Cargo/Troop Carrier 1 1/4 Ton 4X4 W/E (HMMWV) 9. Water Heater: Mounted Ration Shooter 10. Helicopter: Attack AH-64D Source: CASCOM study for 2001 DSB using FASTALS for SWA.

28. Perspective on Fuel for DoD Petroleum-based fuels will remain the primary energy source for DoD mobile platforms for the next 25+ years DoD use: ~ 0.3million barrels per day (bpd) compared to >80m bpd globally and ~21m bpd domestically DoD has eminent domain over fuel contracts DESC maintains robust global network of supply points and sources for all types of DoD fuels 3 2 3 3 3 4 3 MILSPEC Petroleum ProductsWorldwide Tanker Supply Chain DoD has very low strategic fuel supply risk – focus elsewhere

29. Task Force Leadership Study Co-Chairmen Dr James Schlesinger Gen Michael Carns, USAF Ret Executive Secretaries Mr. Chris DiPetto ODUSD (A&T) Mr. Jack Taylor ODUSD (S&T) • Policy Panel Chairman • Mr. James Woolsey, BAH • Platform Panel Co-Chairs • ADM Greg Johnson, USN • GEN Greg Martin, USAF • Facilities Panel Chairman • VADM Al Konetzni, USN • R&D Panel Co-Chairs • Dr. Ed Reedy, GTRI • Dr. Jeff Tester, MIT 77 Task Force members and government advisors May 2006 to March 2007: 10 months, 37 meetings, 143 briefings March 2007 to February 2008: 11 months of deliberations and writing

30. FBCF: Fuel to “USE” the SystemTo Acomplish the Capability Force Composition CONOP OTEMPO Force Composition CONOP OTEMPO Force Composition CONOP OTEMPO Force’s Fuel Demand Task Performance Conditions & Standards Capability Need ICD CBA AoA ALT “A” ALT “B” ALT “C” • ALT “A”, “B”, “C”’ • System Performance • Effectiveness Metrics • Suitability Metrics • ALT “A”, “B”, “C”’ • Capability Fuel Footprint • System Demand • Force Demand KPPs & KSAs Fuel Demand from Using

31. FBCF: Fuel Cost for USE Q: Why would the Force’s demand for Fuel vary by alternative? A: The Presence of the Alternative in the Force may change: Force Composition Improve tooth to tail ratio in the scenario (free up MOG, speed arrival in theater, reduce timeline, etc.) CONOPS Reduce the total number of forces (esp. non-combatants) needed for mission completion OTEMPO Duration of mission reduced Long-term scenarios put less stress on total force Each of which affect the amount of fuel needed by the involved Force to wield the capability AND the logistics and protection needed to provide that fuel.

32. FBCF: Fuel to “OWN” the System System’s Fuel Demand Task Performance Conditions & Standards Capability Need ICD CBA AoA ALT “A” ALT “B” ALT “C” Peace-Time OPTEMPO Peace-Time OPTEMPO Peace-Time OPTEMPO ALT “A”, “B”, “C”’ System Life Peacetime Fuel Consumption Fuel Demand from Owning

33. AoA Calculation of FBCF FBCF refers to the comprehensive Cost of Fuel when using the Alternative to accomplish the ICD specified Capability FBCF for an AoA Alternative = Fuel Cost of OWNING the System Alternative Life time, Peace-Time OPTEMPO Fuel Consumption + Fuel cost of USING the Alternative to provide the needed Capability The Cost of field delivered Fuel: Fuel Cost to the Force (with the system embedded) performing the Needed Capability Includes the Cost of Distribution AND Protection of the Distribution of Fuel to the involved Mission Force + Cost of fuel consumed by the involved Force (with the system in it) while accomplishing the Capability

34. FBCF + Fuel to USE it in the Force Fuel to OWN the System Force Without an Alternative Fuel Demand to accomplish the Task BASELINE Force’s Fuel Demand to Accomplish Capability System’s Fuel Demand Peace-Time OPTEMPO + ALT “A” + ALT “B” + ALT “C”

35. AoA FBCF Method INITIALLY Cost of Owning: Peace time OPTEMP Life-cycle fuel demand + Cost of Using: A “FIXED” CONOP, OTEMPO and Force Composition for calculating a Fuel Distribution and Protection cost. EVENTUALLY JROC may determine when a variable CONOP is to be used Analytic processes need to be developed: Mission Scenario description CONOP description Fuel consumption analysis methodology Process for authoritatively altering CONOP, Force Composition as a consequence of the presence of the Alternative in the Force.

36. Fuel & Energy AoA Touchstones FCB MS A • JS • COCOMS • SERVICES • FORCES • CONOPS Materiel Solution Analysis JCD FSA FAA FNA CBA JSPS Scenario JOpsC FAA FNA FSA CURRENT FUTURE ICD JCIDS CONOPS MDD JROC Assigned Sponsor CBA A0A Joint Concepts Strategic Guidance MDD ICD OSD JCS COCOM

37. OA-08 JPG JPG JPG JPG JPG JPG MCRS OA 06 Shaping Etc. OA 07 Analytic AgendaFuture Year Process • Department-wide effort to make major, joint analysis efforts more effective, efficient, relevant • Includes Defense Planning Scenarios (DPS), Multi-Service Force Deployment (MSFD) data, baselines, Tools and Methods, Studies Multi-Service Force Deployment Defense Planning Scenarios Studies/Wargames, etc Strategy Future Year Analytical Baseline CC-1 CC-1 SSSP SSSP IR-1 IR-1 NSS NMS CC-2 CC-2 NDS IR-2 IR-2 CC-3 CC-3 CPG NMS QDR GDF GEF Joint Staff w/OSD,Services, & COCOMS National Leadership OUSD (P) PA&E

38. USD(AT&L) Tasking Memo “Effectively immediately, it is DoD policy to include the fully burdened cost of delivered energy in trade-off analyses conducted for all tactical systems with end items that create a demand for energy and to improve the energy efficiency of those systems, consistent with mission requirements and cost effectiveness.”- 10 April 2007 Pilot Programs established to refine methodology Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) (MS B mid 2007) CG(X) - Maritime Air and Missile Defense of Joint Forces alternative ship concepts AoA (MS B mid 2007) Next Generation Long-Range Strike (MS B FY11)

39. 2001 DSB Findings • The requirements process does not require fuel efficiency • The acquisition process does not recognize the total force structure effects of efficiency • Investments based on the platform level view • Logistics force structure implications not determined or considered • PPBES does not consider the total force effects of improved efficiency • Few Science & Technology investments focus on fuel efficiency • Laboratories not asked to determine total contributions to capability, cost or environmental issues (only S&T investment prioritization has changed since 2001)

40. “This won’t work” – defensive reactions #1 “But we (the system developer) are doing everything possible” (e.g., to reduce weight, fuel demand, etc.) • Probably true given assumed tradespace constraints (with FYDP cost & platform-specific performance as the focus) • “Art of the Possible” expands as you invest resources up front… • A luxury at $2.50/gal, looks pretty cost-effective at $42/gal • …and innovative solutions/options now surface That efficient engine that was a budget buster when viewed only through a first-order-cost lens. What else is out there? Can multiple PMs co-invest in lighter-weight materials? Is it worth waiting two years for big engine efficiency improvements? Can reengening be planned for later spirals? • Energy S&T investments will increase (and must be done at a portfolio level) when energy is properly valued Tradespace needs more sunlight – huge unexplored assumptions – little defense of long-term ROI – poor understanding of system effects of platform decisions

41. “This won’t work” – defensive reactions #2 “OK, but we’ll never retire a tanker due to greater platform fuel efficiency” • That’s a bias uninformed by strategic-level capability analysis • The benefit is the choice • May not retire one, but the resources are now freed to meet other requirements • If not retired, what utility does the force gain by increasing total fuel delivery capacity? • But, if we’re more efficient, can we move some “tail” investment to the “tooth”?

42. Poor Planning Assumptions - M1 APU Fuel efficiency impacts tactics and maneuver by limiting our endurance in the battlespace M1 tank IRAQ (50% more fuel efficient From COTS Auxiliary Power Unit install) DSB Task Force 2001 Baghdad Al Basrah M1 tank (Desert Storm) KUWAIT KKMC DoD sometimes makes bad value assumptions that ignore operational reality: Experience and strategy need to influence platform mods and system development more quickly

43. Fully Burdened Cost of Fuel… What it Is What it Isn’t • A force planning variable • An input to JCIDS (requirements) • and the Acquisition process • A denominator for metrics • A facilitator for portfolio analysis • A composite of capability and • cost • A budgeting number • A budgeting number • A budgeting number • A budgeting number • A budgeting number • A budgeting number FBCF assumes a dollar saved in fuel delivery is at least a dollar available to invest in warfighter capability

44. Consumption Entities Storage Node Consumption Entities Conversion/ Storage Nod e Air Refueling Local Transport Acquisition Renewable Production Fleet Refueling CONUS Acquisition Refinery CONUS Acquisition Acquisition SWA Fuel Delivery – High Risk • Delivering fuel in theater and en route is expensive and dangerous • Requirements and acquisition processes do not adequately value these costs, vulnerabilities or burdens on combat capability

45. DoD “Energy Security” Assumption DoD has energy concerns at Strategic, Operational and Tactical levels DoD has energy concerns in the short, mid, and long-term DoD has different energy concerns in the “operational” force than at “installations” DoD energy “performance” and “value” are different from DoD energy “costs” DoD contributes strategic analysis and policy advice to US energy security planning via the USD(Policy), the Joint Chiefs and the COCOMs Lacking policy direction from the WH on specific energy issues, DoD needs to focus on its own energy risks on the basis of its core business – providing the most effective, sustainable* force to deter and succeed in conflict Lots of significant energy work is going on in technical, policy, planning and operational domains, but it is largely not rationalized to a DoD problem statement, strategy or prioritization scheme The most vital energy concerns for DoD in managing its own energy risks are: Unnecessarily high and growing energy demand from US equipment and CONOPS Risks to critical reach-back missions from fixed installations from disruption of power supply – the grid is fragile and there are insufficient back-ups at critical facilities Energy prices are turbulent and growing, but operational fuel delivery forces are extremely expensive given the options to reduce demand in the future force Based on recent independent assessments on DoD energy issues (DSB, Jasons, CNA, etc.) and DoD staff’s own deliberations over past 2-3 years * Sustainable: Sustain forces in austere environments over long periods of time to ensure mission success

46. Challenges to Forming DoD Energy Strategy To Date No clear political leadership engagement or direction to date – left staff to struggle and negotiate with each other – independent assessments have not been endorsed nor embraced by senior leaders as basis for strategy so far No alternative DoD assessment to identify the core DoD energy problems to address now agreed methods to itemize and prioritize DoD energy fixes – leaves much attention on low hanging fruit and regulatory compliance DoD energy management typically focuses on “monetary costs” versus “performance” or “value”, while metrics are unrelated to mission success Many have good intentions and want DoD to develop the silver bullet technical solutions to save the nation, or the economy, or the environment – but DoD’s best innovations came from fixing defense problems, not public policy problems (ex. the internet, composite materials, microelectronics, GPS, etc.) Desire to show DoD “moral commitment” to energy and climate agenda lacks senior leader direction today – direction on political signaling must come from WH or SecDef if competing for resources with core DoD business

47. Conjecture in DoD Energy To Date If DoD can reduce its fuel demand, it will seriously help the US get off foreign oil DoD S&T budget should be spent to help the US innovate in green energy technology and synthetic fuels DoD has to show moral leadership in GHG reduction to support climate change policy globally DoD needs to help fix the national energy grid because it is a national security issue DoD can’t reduce its fuel burden much because machines demand a lot of energy. Period. DoD’s first priority is to save fuel today in Iraq and Afghanistan because saving our convoy operators’ lives today is the most important thing we at headquarters can do How did we decide these were relevant? Who decided? By what analysis?

48. Fuel Delivery Risk in Context Since nuclear weapons arrived in DoD strategy, attention to logistics in DoD force planning declined steeply – short wars don’t stress sustainability – 2 MTW force planning perpetuated this Fuel has a special personality in logistics – uniquely large delivery tail (i.e. aerial tankers), high weight and cube compared to other supplies, a large targetable ground infrastructure, with volatile and growing commodity costs Bottom Line: Fuel delivery risks are neither assessed nor managed systematically in DoD - assumes logisticians will just supply it when the time comes, and Congress will pay the bill – this is out of touch with reality

49. Problem Statement As acquisition has separated from strategy, sustainability of forces in operations has been soft-pedaled in force planning and force development Horizontal Escalation is accepted in cyber and space plans, but never in physical/kinetic domains – tactical and theater logistics always assumed “safe” in planning Combatants only want “loggies” who say yes, combatants’ perspectives dominate everything, and logistician culture does not encourage questioning warfighter assumptions IW and homeland force demands challenge capacity and sustainability more than capability – need to design the future force to need less “tail” to be more sustainable