On McCauley’s Why Religion is Natural and Science is Not : Some Further Observations

1. On McCauley’s Why Religion is Natural and Science is Not: Some Further Observations Gregory R. Peterson South Dakota State University greg.peterson@sdstate.edu

2. My Argument in Religion, Brain, and Behavior, Part 1 • Argument 1: The Maturational Natural (MN) • The dilemma: either anything can be MN or the study of MN-linked processes is primarily the study of children and traits that develop in early childhood. • First horn: If limited to childhood, traits, then much of religion is not explained • Second horn: if not limited to children, then includes such beliefs as “the sun rises in the east” and “only women have babies”

3. McCauley’s response • Agrees that some MN traits are late • Acknowledges also the vagueness issue

4. A further concern: Is “Natural” simply a red herring? • Very often, “natural” does imply something fixed, genetic and biological • Suggestion: drop “natural” and instead speak of maturational traits, which are divided into: • (nearly) universal maturational traits (UM) • Non-universal maturational traits (RM) • Implications for religion • Some religious practices would be UM, some RM • But: by itself, this seems a well-recognized point • A further point: It seems possible for a trait to be MN and not be either genetic or biological (in an ordinary sense). Is this desirable?

5. My Argument in Religion, Brain, and Behavior, Part 2 • Characterization of model of religion as HADD+TOM+CulturalEpidemiology (CE) • Another dilemma: • If the goal is to provide a comprehensive account, then HADD+TOM+CE is not up to the job • If the goal is not to provide a comprehensive account, then his broader conclusions (notably in the last chapter) do not seem to follow • Revised title of the book should be: Why SOME Religion is Natural and Why Science (and SOME Religion) is Not • Problem 1: While HADD might seem plausible, we don’t have evidence that individuals spontaneously generate new CI agents as explanations • We also have known instances of religions which seem to have other explanatory causes (e.g., Mormonism) • Problem 2: We have known instances of the spread of religion being not simply a matter of cultural epidemiology (e.g., spread of Islam)

6. McCauley’s response • Agrees that it is not a comprehensive theory, and that this is beyond science (p. 60) • While not quite rejecting HADD for origin of religion, he indicates that he is not very interested in it • Argues that characterization of theory as HADD+ToM+Cultural Epidemiology simplistic • Emphasizes role of selection effects • Supports Jason Slone’s sexual selection account of religious commitment • Argues that I downplay prevalence of MR religion in Christianity, e.g., statuary devotion

7. “Why, for example, do people go on pilgrimages? Why do they both leave things at and take things from pilgrimage sites (Nordin, 2009a, 2009b)? Why do they pray to statues? Why are they more likely to pray to statues that are nearby? Why do they cover statues’ mouths with scarves when air pollution is bad? Why (in America) do they bury icons of Saint Joseph in their yards when they want to sell their houses? Why do people open Bibles randomly and drop their fingers to the page to find solutions to personal problems? Pilgrimages, interactions with icons, and religious magic are just three types of behaviors that appear to be grounded in theological incorrectness. Ask the clergy. They know about this, because their job is partly to police such behavior.” (2013, 59)

8. On Downplaying • I agree with McCauley that more experimental work is to be done • Crucially: what percentage of beliefs/practices can be profitably described as UM (or MN)? • Example 1: • what percentage of Catholics engage in statuary practices that are best explained by CSR theorized UM/MN traits? • How would we actually show this (i.e., exclude alternatives?) • Example 2: • What percentage of Catholics and/or mainline Protestants engage in theological debates? • To what extent to such debates affect their behavior in a non-UM/MN way? • How would we show that? • Needed: operationalized definition of UM/MN

9. On Being Simplistic • A bit: • McCauley’s modification: cultural epidemiology modified by selection effects (CES)+Sexual Selection (SS), so: HADD+CIA+CE+SE+SS • And other elements include theological incorrectness (TI), a ritual theory (TR), and a myth theory (TM), so: • HADD+CIA+TI+TR+TM+SS+CES • Do these hang together with equal strength? • Issues with mythology account • Perplexities on relation of CIA and TI

10. Reasons & Causes • McCauley acknowledges the importance for me of distinguishing reasons and causes (perceptions & inferences), but indicates that this is not so important to him • Implications of a perceptual (causal) theory • Need not be an error theory • Implications of an inference theory or inference+perception theory • Could also be an error theory, since inferences may constantly be poor • But: the claim would be more difficult, and would have to deal with beliefs being internally rational • Such inferences may be largely unconscious, but more likely a complex interplay of modes of processing over time