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Seville, march 26th, 2011

Seville, march 26th, 2011. The Mathematics of Games: Strategies, Cooperation and Fair Division Theory An Equitable Electoral System for the Congress of Deputies. Prof. Dr. Victoriano Ramírez-González University of Granada (Spain) vramirez@ugr.es. OUTLINE.

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Seville, march 26th, 2011

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  1. Seville, march 26th, 2011 The Mathematics of Games: Strategies, Cooperation and Fair Division Theory An Equitable Electoral System for the Congress of Deputies Prof. Dr. Victoriano Ramírez-González University of Granada (Spain) vramirez@ugr.es

  2. OUTLINE • Introduction to electoral systems • Properties of an electoral system • Discordant allocations: Some illustrative examples • Proposal of a proportional electoral system. Empirical applications to the cases of: • Spain, • Italy, Greece, Sweden, Germany. Properties for a proportional electoral system

  3. Introduction to electoral systems • Size of the Parliament • No problem in designing a E.S. It can have 300, 500,…seats. • Constituencies • Tradition. • Geographic limitations. • Gerrymandering is important when there are uninominal districts, but it is not relevant if the total number of seats of the political parties depends on their total number of votes. Properties for a proportional electoral system

  4. Introduction to electoral systems (cont.) • Representation of political parties • Sometimes it is calculated by applying a proportional method in each constituency and, when doing so, discordant allotments frequently emerge. • In other cases the representation of political parties depends on the total number of votes of each party. We can cite several examples, such as Germany, Mexico, Greece and Italy (but with different criteria for each country). Properties for a proportional electoral system

  5. Introduction to electoral systems (cont.) • Thresholds • Continuous thresholds are not oftenly used. I consider it is better not setting thresholds or change. • Classical thresholds imply obtaining a minimal number of votes or a minimum percentage of votes. Hence: • If the minimal is small, then the threshold provide non-practical consequences. • If the minimal is large, unfair results can be obtained. For example, a change of one vote can lead to a change in a big number of seats. • E.g. In Italy, a difference of one vote between two parties leads to a change of more than 60 seats from one party to another party. • Therefore, classical thresholds are not logical. • Moreover, a threshold is continuous if a change of one vote leads to a new allotment which does not differ more than one seat from the previous allotment, for any of the political parties. Properties for a proportional electoral system

  6. Hamilton Electoral Method: I Alabama paradox (Firstly, to each political party the integer part of their exact proportion (quota) is assigned. Next, the distribution is completed by assigning an additional seat to the political parties with greater remainder) Properties for a proportional electoral system

  7. Hamilton Electoral Method: I Inconsistency Properties for a proportional electoral system

  8. Electoral methods obtained via optimization We can find a method that minimizes the difference between the vectors of quotas and allocations. We must use a norm for measuring the difference between two vectors. With the norm: With the norm: With the norm: With other norm from an inner product We can use other objetive functions. Such as: Properties for a proportional electoral system

  9. Huntington Methods The exact proportionality is: Exactness is not possible. We can choose one of the equalities and find a method that minimizes the difference between any two political parties Properties for a proportional electoral system

  10. Divisor Methods If we Multiply the votes by a factor k appear fractions. How are the fractions rounded to integers? Example if V = ( 90, 130, 360 ) and k = 0.01 we have the fractions: k V = ( 0.90, 1.30, 3.60 ) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Threshold for rounding: 0.8, 1.4, 2.4, 3.1, 4.8, 5.2, …. Rounding: 1, 1, 4. To assign 6 seats this is the solution, but whether to allocate only 5 seats then we have to decrease k. Properties for a proportional electoral system

  11. Some Divisor Methods Jefferson (d’Hondt).Rounding down. The thresholds are:1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, … Webster (Sainte-Laguë). Rounding to the nearest whole number The thresholds are:0.5, 1.5, 2.5, 3.5, 4.5, 5.5, 6.5, … Adams. Rounding up The thresholds are:0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, … Properties for a proportional electoral system

  12. Jefferson method (or d’Hondt method) Example: To allot 24 seats Lower quota. Penalizes the fragmentation of the political parties. Benefit the large political parties. Properties for a proportional electoral system

  13. Webster method (Sainte-Laguë method) Example: To allot 24 seats It is impartial Properties for a proportional electoral system

  14. Adams method Example: To allot 24 seats Benefits small parties. In fact, It is not used to allocate seats to parties. It can be used to allocate seats in the constituencies Cambridge Compromise: 5+Adams Properties for a proportional electoral system

  15. Criteria for choosing an electoral method Desirable properties: Exactness, lower quota, impartial, monotonous, consistency, punish schisms. Hamilton Adams Webster Hondt Exacness SiSi Si Si Lower Quota SiNoNoSi Impartial Si No Si No Monotonous NoSi Si Si Consistency NoSi Si Si Punish Schisms NoNoNoSi d’Hondtis one of the most recommended methods for allocating seats to parties.Webstershould be used when impartiality is very important. Properties for a proportional electoral system

  16. Properties for an electoral system: I • Applying acceptable methods of apportionment (consistency, no paradoxes, exactness, etc.) • Divisor methods (in general). • Jefferson for allocating seats to the different political parties. • Webster when impartiality is required. Properties for a proportional electoral system

  17. Properties for an electoral system: II • Representativity (global and local) • Large proportionality. For example, more than 95% with the usual indexes to measure it. • Equity. Two political parties with a similar number of votes must be allocated an equal or almost equal number of seats. • Important regional or local parties must obtain representation. Properties for a proportional electoral system

  18. Properties for an electoral system: III • Governability • Bonus in the representation of the winner party. • Continuity • Application of continuous methods to transform votes into seats. • Application of continuous thresholds. Properties for a proportional electoral system

  19. Why Governability? • Are both representativity and governability mutually self-excluding? • No, it is possible to obtain large representativity and governability. • A country must: • Be well represented. • Enjoy governance. Properties for a proportional electoral system

  20. Governance in the current electoral systems • The vast majority of electoral systems. • Proportional electoral systems with plenty of small or median constituencies (many countries). • Electoral laws (e.g. Italy, Mexico, Greece). • Large thresholds. • Exceptions: Israel, Netherlands, Estonia (only one constituency and small or null threshold). Properties for a proportional electoral system

  21. U.K. 2010-Election Properties for a proportional electoral system

  22. Some current bonus for the winner • Italy, 2008: • Il PDL 37.64% votes 44.08% seats • Germany, 2005: • SPD 34.25% votes 40.67% seats • Spain, 2008: • PSOE 43.20% votes 48.28% seats • Greece, 2009: • PASOK 43.90% votes 53.33% seats • Netherlands, 2010 • VVD 20.49% votes 20.67% seats Fragmentation: 31 – 30 – 24 – 21 – 15 – 10 – 10 – 5 – 2 - 2 Properties for a proportional electoral system

  23. Threshold: Proportionality Properties for a proportional electoral system

  24. Usual threshold (non-continuous) Properties for a proportional electoral system

  25. Continuous threshold Properties for a proportional electoral system

  26. Comparison Usual (non-continuous) vs Continuous thresholds Properties for a proportional electoral system

  27. Representativity • A good representativity involves that an electoral system must meet the following properties: • Local representativity (i.e. representation of the most voted parties). • Global representativity (i.e. high proportionality). • Equity. Two political parties with a similar number of votes must be allocated an equal or almost equal number of seats. • Usually several (sometimes even all) of these requirements are not verified. WHY DOES THIS HAPPEN? Properties for a proportional electoral system

  28. Many constituencies and thresholds: Discordant apportionments When an electoral system is designed in a country, the State is usually districted into a high number of constituencies. The size of such constituencies is a function of the number of inhabitants in the country: Sometimes proportional to its population. Sometimes, small constituencies are overrepresented (e.g. Spain). In the election, the seats of each constituency are normally allocated in proportion to the votes that political parties (or coalitions) receive. Properties for a proportional electoral system

  29. Many constituencies and thresholds: Discordant apportionments (cont.) So, political parties receive seats in proportion to their votes in each constituency. But the total number of seats received by the political parties is not guaranteed to be proportional to the respective total votes. There are electoral systems, with higher degrees of complexity and fairness, yielding proportionality between total votes and total seats, like in Germany. In other cases discordant apportionments frequently arise. Properties for a proportional electoral system

  30. Many constituencies in several countries Examples: CountryConstituencies Italy 27 and Estero Chile 60 Argentina 24 Colombia 32 Brazil 27 Spain 52 Etc. Properties for a proportional electoral system

  31. Discordant apportionments Italy, 2008-Election PartyVotesSeats La Sinist. 1.093.415 0 La Destra 862.043 0 MPAS 410.487 8 Partito S. 347.923 0 Partito C. 202.382 0 Svp 147.666 2 Properties for a proportional electoral system

  32. Discordant apportionment Chile, 1997-Election PartyVotesSeats P. Comunista de Chile 393,523 0 P. Radical Social-D. 179,701 4 Properties for a proportional electoral system

  33. Discordant apportionment Argentina, 2005-Election PartyVotesSeats Afirm. para una Rep. Igualitaria   1,215,111 8   Alianza Propuesta Republicana    1,095,494 9   Partido Unidad Federalista    394,398 2 Alianza Frente Nuevo    349,112 3   Alianza Frente Justicialista    146,220 4   Others    2,916,851 0 Properties for a proportional electoral system

  34. Discordant apportionment Colombia, 2002-Election PartyVotesSeats Radical Change 316,5160 7 Coalition Coal 235,3390 11 http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Elecdata/Col/dip02.html Properties for a proportional electoral system

  35. Discordant apportionment Brazil, 1994-Election PartyVotesSeats Brazilian Social-Democracy Party (PSDB) 6,350,941 62 Liberal Front Party (PFL) 5,873,370 89 Workers' Party (PT) 5,859,347 49 Republican Progressive Party (PRP) 4,307,878 52 http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Elecdata/Brazil/legis1994.html Properties for a proportional electoral system

  36. Discordant apportionment Spain, 2008-Election PartyVotesSeats IU 969.946 2 CiU 779.425 10 UPyD 306.079 1 PNV 306.128 6 ERC 298.139 3 CC 212.543 2 Properties for a proportional electoral system

  37. The usual apportionment problem Party 1 Party 2 Party 3Size Constit. 1 v11 v12 v13 n1 O.K. Constit. 2 v21 v22 v23 n2 O.K. Constit. 3 v31 v32 v33 n3 O.K. Constit. 4 v41 v42 v43 n4 O.K. Total number of seats for all the political parties = Lottery? Properties for a proportional electoral system

  38. Is it possible to meet all the properties mentioned before? Yes, it is possible to design electoral systems verifying: • High proportionality and representativity. • Bonus for the winner (governability). • Continuity. • Etc. Properties for a proportional electoral system

  39. How? By allocating the seats to the political parties in several stages and several levels. First, we will show how it can be done for the case of Spain. The procedure can be applied to any country whose constituencies are not very small-sized. If the constituencies are uninominal-district type (e.g. U.K.) or very small (e.g. Chile) we can use a complementary regional list. Properties for a proportional electoral system

  40. Properties of the current electoral systemin Spain Acceptable methods. Hamilton’s method is used in order to allocate the 350 seats of the Parliament to the constituencies. Consequently, we must replace this method by Webster’s method. Governability.Yes Continuity.Yes Representativity Local.Yes Global.No Equity.No (NOTE: This is a common situation in many countries) Properties for a proportional electoral system

  41. Keeping governability and getting representativity in Spain • Representativity • Allocate part of the seats to the political parties according to their local results (in the constituencies). (Allotment R1) • Allocate another part of the seats to the political parties in proportion to their total votes. (Allotment R2) • Governability • Allocate the remaining seats rewarding to the winner party (Allotment R3) • Continuity • It is obtained by using a continuous function to transform votes into seats. Properties for a proportional electoral system

  42. First stage: R1 Allotment to the political parties • Similar to the current allotment: • Application of Jefferson’s method in each of the 52 constituencies, to allot 350 seats. Properties for a proportional electoral system

  43. Second stage: R2 Allotment to the political parties • We apply Jefferson’s method to allot 370 seats in proportion • to the total votes. • No party can receive less seats than those obtained in the • R1 allotment. Properties for a proportional electoral system

  44. Third stage: R3 Allotment to the political parties • We apply Jefferson’s method to allot 400 seats in proportion • to the square of the total votes. • No party can receive less seats than those obtained in the • R2 allotment. R3 is the final allotment to the political parties Properties for a proportional electoral system

  45. Bi-proportional allotment PSOE PP IU CiU PNV UPyD ERC BNG CC CA N-Bai 194 161 14 12 4 4 4 3 2 1 1 . Madrid481.401 1.737 164 0 0 132 0 0 0 0 0 Barcelona 42 1.309 470 155 547 0 5 184 0 0 0 0 Valencia 20599 770 46 0 0 10 3 0 0 0 0 Sevilla 15 626 339 58 0 0 13 0 0 0 0 0 Alicante 14 Málaga 12 Murcia 11 Cádiz 10 Vizcaya 10 Coruña 10 Asturias 9 326 289 50 0 0 9 0 0 0 0 0 Las Palmas 9 Islas Baleares 9 S. C. Tenerife 9 Pontevedra 8 Zaragoza 8 Granada 8 246 182 27 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 Properties for a proportional electoral system

  46. The representation in the regions • When the size of the constituencies is not uniform, as in the Spanish case, the seats corresponding the small political parties are allocated according to the biproportional method in the large constituencies. • For example, UPyD has obtained 131.242 votes in Madrid and 172.000 in the other 51 constituencies. The 4 seats corresponding to UPyD are allocated in Madrid. Then, the 40.261 votes obtained by UPyD at the 8 constituencies belonging to the region of Andalucia provide a UPyD-representative out of Andalucia. • Similarly, IU has obtained more than 50.000 in the Basque Country, but IU has not got any seats in the Basque Country. • Nowadays, the regions in Spain has high importance. If the constituencies would be the regions in Spain, UPyD would obtain one seat in Andalucia and IU would obtained one seat in the Basque Country. Properties for a proportional electoral system

  47. How to obtain a correct representation in the regions by using the current constituencies? Answer: By using biproportional allotment twice. In the first stage we apply biproportional allotment to know the number of representatives belonging to each political party in each region. For this allocation we use the total votes of the parties in the regions. In the second stage, we apply biproportional allotment into each region to determine the number of seats assigned to each political party in each constituency. A double biproportional allotment must be applied in all Federal States to obtain a good result. Properties for a proportional electoral system

  48. How many seats in R1, R2 and R3? • R2 allotment must obtain high proportionality (near to 100%). • Then, if we use near to 8% of the total seats for the governability and the winner party has 40% of votes (more or less) we can expect a proportionality of 95% (or more). Therefore a number of seats equivalent to the 8% (of the total seats) to get governability can represent a very realistic election in many cases (for example, in Spain). Then R1+R2=92%. • How many seats in R2? Different answer for different electoral systems. Each country must be analyzed. When there are many constituencies with large or median size, a percentage between 5% and 10% can be enough. • We can investigate other countries. Properties for a proportional electoral system

  49. Italy The Italian Constitution establishes the constituencies and their sizes. The Italian Electoral Law sets the total number of representatives for the political parties. Biproportional allotment is the only method able to yield an allotment compatible with the Italian Constitution and Electoral Law. The current Italian allotment for the Camera (as well as in the previous 2006 election) does not verify the Italian Law. In addition, the electoral system for the Italian camera is neither continuous, nor representative, etc. The same technique applied to Spain before gives the next result for Italy: An Equitable Electoral System for the Congress of Deputies

  50. Italy, 2008-Election with RG: 537+20+60Threshold: -50.000 votes Party Votes Quota R1 R2 R3 Current Il Popolo 13.628.865 232.26 234 234 277 272 Partito D. 12.092.998 206.08 201 201 218 211 Lega N. 3.024.522 51.54 46 46 46 60 Unione C. 2.050.319 34.94 25 25 25 36 Di Pietro 1.593.675 27.16 14 18 18 28 La Sinist. 1.093.415 18.63 8 12 12 0 La Destra 862.043 14.69 3 9 9 0 MPAS 410.487 7.00 3 4 4 8 Partito S. 347.923 5.93 0 3 3 0 Partito C. 202.382 3.45 0 1 1 0 Sinistra C. 162.974 2.78 0 1 1 0 SVP 147.666 2.52 3 3 3 2 Total 537 557 617 617 Properties for a proportional electoral system

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