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EXPERT INFORMATION, PUBLIC DELIBERATION AND ELECTORAL SUPPORT FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FROM BENIN

. . . Broad public policies promote growth and development especially in developing countries. But, as electoral platforms, they are ineffective. Targeted Redistribution or clientelism is bad for development and governance. But clientelist platforms are effective in generating electoral support. (

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EXPERT INFORMATION, PUBLIC DELIBERATION AND ELECTORAL SUPPORT FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FROM BENIN

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    5. Theoretical Framework Expert information generates “specific” platforms. This enables parties to make promises on public goods and transfers that are credible When voters interact at town meetings, they learn about each other’s preferences and beliefs. This facilitate voter coordination.

    6. CONTEXT Benin is a vibrant democracy . Clientelism dominates electoral politics, except under Soglo (1991-1996). Thus, may be not “structural”, but driven by electoral circumstances. The 2006 election was about change (!). The main candidates were Thomas Yayi Boni, a technocrat, and Adrien Houngbedji, a veteran, but never a serious challenger.

    7. EXPERIMENT

    8. The 2001 Experiment in Benin Goal:test effectiveness of clientelistic/targeted redistribution vs. programmatic/broad public policy campaigns on voting Experiment: randomized trial – 24 villages in total – politicians used either clientelistic or programmatic or neutral election campaign. First ever electoral experiment involving real candidates competing in real elections. The candidates: Kerekou, Soglo, Lafia. Amoussou.

    9. Programmatic Treatment Example of « broad policy» message: «We are the representatives of candidate Saka Lafia, who is running for president in the March 3, 2001 election...If elected, he will engage in a nationwide reform of the education and health care system with emphasis on building new schools, new hospitals, and vaccination campaigns. In conjunction with other opposition leaders, he will fight corruption and promote peace between all ethnic groups and all the regions of Benin. »

    10. Clientelist Treatment Example of « clientelist» message: « We are the representatives of candidate Saka Lafia, who is running for president in the March 3, 2001 election. As you know, Saka is the only Bariba candidate....,. Saka is running because the northeast region, Borgou-Alibori,is very underdeveloped: low literacy rates, poor rural infrastructure and health care, etc. If elected, he will help promote the interests of the Borgou-Alibori region, by building new schools, hospitals, and roads and more importantly, hiring more Bariba people in the public administration. »

    11. Result: the clientelistic election campaign is more effective the programmatic election campaign costs votes by relatively effective among women, co-ethnics and more informed voters. Does this mean that clientelism is the only effective election campaign strategy? Programmatic campaign was too vague, and opaque! How about using a specific, informed programmatic/broad public policy electoral messages? What if those messages were generated through public deliberation?

    12. Refining the 2001 Programmatic Treatment The treatment Step 1: Public deliberation: a policy conference involving academics, political parties and civil society organizations, development agencies. Step 2: 6 major parties integrate the results of the policy conference into their campaign in randomly selected villages. Step 3:Town meetings in treatment villages to discuss “specific” and “informed” campaign promises, led by activists and research assistants. The control Campaign Rallies followed (mostly) by targeted and clientelist promises.

    13. Pictures of the Policy Conference: December 22, 2005

    18. Training Campaign Activists February 2006

    20. TREATMENT: Town Meetings in Oueme and Borgou February 2006

    23. Vague Programme "Our party stands for democracy and national solidarity. If elected, our candidate will engage in a nationwide reform of the education and the health care system."

    24. Specific Programme "if elected I will provide full medical insurance for all HIV patients and provide free primary education in all rural schools. I will pay for these programmes by cutting subsidies to cotton growers by 50%"

    25. CONTROL: Rallies in Abomey and Calavi

    31. RESULTS Outcome measures: voter information, turnout, voting results. Sample: a representative sample of voters in the treated villages and non-treated villages. Results: The treatment has a positive and highly significant effect on turnout, voting and trust in the candidate.

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    40. Concluding Remarks External validity Institutional Reforms Future projects

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