Portfolio Committee on International Relations and Cooperation Briefing on Mali

1. Portfolio Committee on International Relations and CooperationBriefing on Mali Ambassador JM Matjila 27th February 2013

2. Contents • Objective: • To provide the Portfolio Committee with insight into the situation in Mali and the existing regional dynamics • Introduction: • Regional situation and security pressures • Evolution of the coup d‘ état • International processes • French intervention • Concerns arising from the situation • Questions and discussion

3. Regional situation and stability pressures • Complex region • Fragile states • Weak institutions • Existing conflicts • Libya • The Sudans • CAR • Niger Delta, north Nigeria • Cassamance • Guinea-Bissau • Western Sahara • Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea

4. Regional situation and stability pressures • Complex region • Fragile states • Weak institutions • Existing conflicts • Arms trafficking • Drugs trade • Movement of radicalised elements • El Shabaab • AQIM • Mujao • BokoHaram Somalia Cocaine Heroin

5. Genesis of the coup d’état • Historical Tuareg uprisings • Government failure to implement peace agreements • Drought and economic dislocation • Economic migrancy • Libya, Algeria hosted young Tuareg • Many drifted into Libyan military • Libyan civil war • Tuareg fled Libya, returning with weapons • Weak and corrupt administration in Mali • Globally viewed as weak on terrorism, if not actively colluding with hostage takers • Many senior civilians and military involved in arms and drug trade

6. Genesis of the coup d’ état • MNLA uprising • Defeated badly led, trained and armed military forces • Many defections • Poor military morale and capacity led to protests in military • Kati Barracks • Protests eventuated in coup d’état as hollow regime suddenly collapsed • MNLA advanced defeating Malian military and create “Azawad” • Northern part of Mali • AQIM, Ansar Ed-Dine and MUJAO joined rebellion • “Independence” declared on 6 April 2012 • MNLA militarily defeated by AQIM, Ansar Ed-Dine and MUJAO • MNLA agreed to negotiations and peaceful solution

7. International processes • ECOWAS • Seriously disturbed by situation and immediately reacted • Sanctions against junta • Placed Stand-by Force on alert • Junta agreed to transitional arrangement proposed by ECOWAS on 1 April 2012 • AU PSC • Immediately informed and supported ECOWAS actions • Requested UNSC action • Chap VII authorisation • Costs to be borne by UNSC • ECOWAS/AU military intervention plan developed

8. International processes • SA role in UNSC • South Africa supported all ECOWAS and AU actions • Active in negotiations of resolutions 2071 and 2085 • UNSC decisions • Rejected initial deployment plan • Revised plan accepted with proviso that it must be improved • Provided Chap VII authority for AFISMA • SA pledged $10 million for AFISMA to capacitate the police force • Rejected finance, but agreed to logistical support package • Required two-track approach to situation • National negotiations with non-terrorist elements • Armed action if negotiations fail • Agreed to force level of 3300 comprising ECOWAS and international force • UNSC to be briefed prior to any offensive military action by AFISMA or partners

9. French intervention • Offensive by AQIM, Ansar Ed-Dine & MUJAO • Defeats Malian military • Mali requests French military support • France initiates Operation Serval • Formally intended to prevent rebel advance • France indicates it will continue operation to liberate north Mali • ECOWAS troops now arriving in Bamako Map from www.bbc.com

10. Concerns arising from the situation • SA has several concerns: • Encourage the international community to support and empower the African initiative to bring peace and security in Mali under the auspices of the African Union and ECOWAS • The Malian Government must be seen to be a credible and joint leading partner in the intervention • Must demonstrate effective governance, respect for rule of law, command and control of the military and military effectiveness • SA seriously concerned about reports of Malian military reprisals and murders of those suspected of supporting MNLA or other movements • French airstrikes causing civilian casualties • Malian Government and French military preventing access to areas by journalists, humanitarian workers and doctors • Hiding human rights violations

11. Concerns arising from the situation • SA concerns continued: • Implications for the national negotiations process • Danger that no sustainable political solution will be developed or seen as necessary by Malian Government (and France) • Only a credible negotiated solution can address legitimate grievances of populations, especially Tuareg • Driving rebels, particularly non-jihadist groups, out of their captured areas without creating a durable political solution could lead to prolonged insurgency and unrest • Danger to Timbuktu Project • Damage to building • SA’s aid to rebuild Library

12. Concerns arising from the situation • SA concerns continued: • Humanitarian situation will be aggravated • Offensive will create additional refugees and IDPs • Offensive will complicate delivery of aid within northern Mali • First South African humanitarian shipment arrived in Bamako on 11 February 2013 • Total aid of R70 million from ARF • Maize: a total of 3486 t = 166 containers • Sugar: a total of 2352 t = 112 containers • Milk Powder: a total of 105 t = 5 containers • R15 million for cooking oil (to be sourced from within the ECOWAS region).

13. THANK YOU