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Single Event Upsets (SEUs) – Soft Errors

Single Event Upsets (SEUs) – Soft Errors. By: Rajesh Garg Sunil P. Khatri Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX. Background. pn junction behavior Electric field Depletion region Energy band diagram of Si

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Single Event Upsets (SEUs) – Soft Errors

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  1. Single Event Upsets (SEUs) – Soft Errors By: Rajesh Garg Sunil P. Khatri Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX

  2. Background • pn junction behavior • Electric field • Depletion region • Energy band diagram of Si • Energy transferred to Si may excite an electron from valence band to conduction band • e-h pairs can be generated

  3. Charge Deposition by a Radiation Particle – Drift and Diffusion • Radiation particles - protons, neutrons, alpha particles and heavy ions • Reverse biased p-n junctions are most sensitive to particle strikes • Charge is collected at the drain nodethrough drift and diffusion • Results in a voltage glitch at the drain node • System state may change if this voltage glitch is captured by at least one memory element • This is called SEU • May cause system failure Radiation Particle VDD G S D _ + n+ n+ Depletion Region + _ + _ E _ + _ E + VDD - Vjn _ + _ + _ + p-substrate B

  4. Charge Deposited by a Radiation Particle • Linear Energy Transfer (LET) is a common measure of the energy transferred by a radiation particle when it strikes a material • Relationship between Q,LET and t Charge of 1 electron Therefore the charge deposited by a unit LET (for a track length of 1µm) So the charge deposited by a radiation strike (in terms of LET and track length) is

  5. Other Charge Collection Mechanisms • Bipolar Effect • Parasitic bipolar transistor exists in MOSFETs • For example, n-p-n (S–B–D) in an NMOS transistor • Holes accumulation in an NMOS transistor may turn on this bipolar transistor • Alpha-particle Source-drain Penetration (ALPEN) • A radiation particle penetrates through both source and drain diffusions

  6. Modeling a Radiation Particle Strike • A radiation particle strike is modeled by a current pulse as where: tais the collection time constant tb is the ion track establishment constant • The radiation induced current always flows from n-diffusion to p-diffusion • For an accurate analysis, device level simulationshould be performed

  7. Single Event Upsets • Single Event Upsets (SEUs) or Soft Errors • Troublesome for both memories and combinational logic • Becoming increasingly problematic even for terrestrial designs • A particle strike at the output of a combinational gateresults in a Single Event Transient (SET) • If a memory latches wrongvalue -> SEU • A particle strike in a memory element may directly lead to an SEU event

  8. Radiation Hardening Approaches • Can be classified into three categories • Device level • Circuit level • System level • Device level – Fault avoidance • SOI devices are inherently less susceptible to radiation strikes • Low collection volumes • Still needs other hardening techniques to achieve SEU tolerance • Bipolar effect significantly increases the amount of charge collected at the drain node

  9. System Level Radiation Hardening Approaches • Fault detection and fault correction approaches • SEU events are detected using built in current sensors (BICS) (Gill et al.) • Error correction codes (Gambles et al.) • Triple modulo redundancy based approaches (Neumann et. al) • Classical way of radiation hardening • Area and power overheads are ~200% !!!!

  10. Circuit Level Hardening • Fault avoidance approach • Gate sizing is done to improve the radiation tolerance of a design (Zhou et al.) • Radiation tolerance improves • Higher drive capability • Higher node capacitance • Area, delay and power overheads can be large • Selectively harden critical gates

  11. Diode Clamping based Hardening Approach • Approach A - PN Junction Diode based SEU Clamping Circuits V (out) Radiation Strike 0.8 1V 0.6 0.4 in out 0.2 G 0 time 0V D2 D1 1.4V V (outP) 0.8 outP GP 0.6 0.4 Shadow Gate -0.4V 0.2 Higher VT device 0 time -0.4

  12. Our Radiation Hardening Approach • Approach B - Diode-connected Device based SEU Clamping Circuits V (out) Radiation Strike 0.8 1V 0.6 0.4 in out 0.2 G 0 time 0V D2 D1 Ids 1.4V V (outP) 0.8 outP GP 0.6 0.4 -0.4V 0.2 Higher VT device 0 • Performance of approach A is slightly better than B but with a higher area penalty than B. Therefore, we selected approach B time -0.4

  13. Protection Performance - Example • Circuit simulation is performed in SPICE • 65nm BPTM model card is used • VDD = 1V • VTN= | VTP| = 0.22V • Radiation strike at output of 2X INV • Q = 24 fC • ta= 145ps • tb= 45ps • Approach B is used

  14. Our Split-output Approach • Phase 1 • Gate level hardening • Phase 2 • Block level hardening • Selectively harden critical gates in a circuit • To keep area and delay overheads low • Reduce SER by 10X

  15. in Gate Level Hardening Approach • A radiation particle strike at a reverse biased p-n junction results in a current flow from n-type diffusion to p-type diffusion • A gate constructed using only PMOS (NMOS) transistors cannot experience 1 to 0 (0 to 1) upset Radiation Particle inp out1p inp & inn VDD - VTN out2 out2 out1 out1n out1p |VTP| INV1 INV2 out1n Radiation Particle inn out2 INV2 INV1 Static Leakage Paths

  16. inp & inn VDD - VTN out1n out1p |VTP| out2 Our Gate Level Hardening Approach Low VT transistors inp inp out1p out1p X out2 out2 out1n X inn out1n Leakage currents are lower by ~100X inn Radiation Tolerant Inverter Modified Inverter

  17. Radiation Tolerant Inverter Radiation Particle Strike inp X Radiation Particle Strike M8 M2 X out1p inp & inn X M4 X M6 out1n out2 out1p X M5 out2 M3 out1n The voltage at out2 is unaffected X M7 M1 A radiation particle strike at any node of the first inverter (radiation tolerant inverter) does not affect the voltage at out2 inn

  18. Radiation Tolerant Inverter • Radiation particle strike at the outputs of INV1 • Implemented using 65nm PTM with VDD=1V • Radiation strike: Q=150fC, ta=150ps & tb=38ps inp out1p out2 out1n inn INV1

  19. Block Level Radiation Hardening • 100% SEU tolerance can be achieved by hardening all gates in a circuit but this will be very costly • Protect only sensitive gates in a circuit to achieve good SEU tolerance or coverage • We obtain these sensitive gates using Logical Masking • PLM (G) is the probability that the voltage glitch due to a radiation particle strike gets logically masked • PSen(G) = 1 – PLM(G) • If we want to protect only 2 gates then we should to protect Gates 1 and 3 to maximize SEU tolerance • Gate 3 is the most sensitive P1 = 0.25 P0 = 0.75 0 0 For all inputs P1 = 0.5 P0 = 0.5 1 1 1 3 2 1 → 1 0 P1 = 0.5 P0 = 0.5 Radiation Particle

  20. Block Level Radiation Hardening • Obtained PSen for all gates in a circuit using a fault simulator • Sort these gates in decreasing order of their PSen • Harden gates until the required coverage is achieved • Coverage is a good estimate for SER reduction (Zhou et al.) • Gates at the primary output of a circuit need to be hardened since PSen = 1 for these gates • The dual outputs of the hardened gates at the primary outputs drive the dual inputs of an SEU tolerant flip-flip (such as the flip-flop proposed by Liu et al.)

  21. Critical Charge (Qcri) • Minimum amount of charge which can result in an SEU event • Our hardened gates can tolerate a large amount of charge dumped by a radiation particle • Operating frequency of circuit determines Qcri • Qcriis the amount of charge which results in a voltage glitch of pulse width T CLK in out1n out1p out2 t1 T + t1 2T + t1

  22. Experimental Results • We implemented a standard cell library L using a 65nm PTM model card with VDD = 1.0V • Implemented both regular and hardened versions of all cell types • Applied our approach to several ISCAS and MCNC benchmark circuits • We implemented • A tool in SIS to find the sensitive gates in a circuit • An STA tool to evaluate the delay of a hardened circuit obtained using our approach • Layouts were created for all gates in our library for both regular and hardened versions

  23. Experimental Results • Average results over several benchmark circuits mapped for area and delay optimality • Our SEU immune gates can tolerate high energy radiation particle strikes • Critical charge is extremely high (>520fC) for all benchmark circuits • Suitable for space and military application because of the presence of large number of high energy radiation particles

  24. Comparison Our Hardening Approach • Our approach is suitable for radiation environments with high energy particles

  25. SRAM Hardening • Decrease recovery time • Slow down feedback path • Insert resistors in the feedback paths • Resistor • Polysilicon • Gated • Increases write delay

  26. Conclusions • SEUs are troublesome for both memories and combinational logic • Becoming increasingly problematic even for terrestrial designs • Applications demand reliable systems • Need to efficiently design radiation hardening approaches for both combinational and sequential elements • Also need efficient analysis techniques to estimate SER of complex circuits • SEU susceptibility can be checked during design phase • Reduce the number of design iterations

  27. Thank You

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