Foreign and Military Policy

1. Foreign and Military Policy

2. Kinds of Foreign Policy • Majoritarian Politics- widespread benefits and costs (Pres has most power, public opinion supports but doesn’t guide) • Ex. Wars, military alliances, nuclear test ban, • Interest Group Politics-groups pitted against one another for benefits/costs (larger Congressional role) • Ex. Tariffs: Japan vs. the Steel industry • Client Politics- benefits to identifiable group w/o costs to any distinct group (Congress is central) • Ex. Israel policy (may be changing!)

3. Constitutional/Legal Context • Constitution creates “invitation to struggle” between President and Congress • Pres Commander-in-Chief, Congress appropriates $ • Pres appoints, Senate confirms • Pres negotiates treaties, Senate ratifies • Americans perceive President as being in charge, which history confirms

4. President’s Power • President is stronger in foreign policy than domestic • Pres can send troops w/o declaration of war • Probably stronger power than framers intended • But…president is weaker when compared to other heads of state • Wilson, FDR couldn’t get ally with Britain • Wilson couldn’t join League of Nations • HW Bush debated Congress on Iraq war • Supreme Court gives wide powers • Reluctant to intervene in Pres-Congress disputes Ex. FDR and Japanese internment camps, Nixon enlarging Vietnam war, Carter’s freezing of Iranian assets

5. Checks on President’s Power • Political rather than constitutional • Congress controls the $$$ • War Powers Act of 1973- restricts the president • If Pres commits troops he must report it to Congress within 48 hours • Only 60 day commitment w/o declaring war • Previously, Congress could use legislative veto to bring troops home • Has had very little influence, politically impossible (Congress will of course support successful military action)

6. Effects of War Powers Act • Congress rarely invokes it • Ford, Carter, Reagan, Bush, Clinton all sent troops w/o authorization • Politically impossible • Congress wouldn’t challenge successful military action (even Vietnam) • Constitutionality is questionable (so they don’t push it)

7. Machinery of Foreign Policy • Post-WWII major power status consequences: • President more involved in foreign affairs (top of agenda) • More agencies shape foreign policy • Too many and too big to really be coordinated (Sec. of State is only 1 person, agencies owe no loyalty to him) • National Security Council created to coordinate

8. National Security Council (NSC) • Created by law, chaired by the president • Includes VP and secretaries of state and defense • National Security Advisor heads the staff • Goal of staff is balanced view • Grown in influence since JFK but downgraded by Reagan • NSC rivals Secretary of State • Consequences of multi-centered decision-making: • “it’s never over”- rivalry between branches for foreign policy power • Agency positions influence their interests and policy

9. Foreign Policy and Public Opinion • Before WWII public opposed US involvement • Attack on Pearl Harbor shifted opinion • WWII • Universally popular war • Successful • US emerged as dominant power in the world • Public opinion varies, is highly general, and is dependent on: • polling questions • opinions expressed by leaders • impact of world events

10. Backing the President • Public tends to support the president during crisis (approval ratings go up!) • Support does not decrease with casualties • Body bag fallacy: soldiers come home in coffins • Support for escalation and victory • Most wars do have public opposition • Highest among Democrats, African Americans, and those with post-grad degrees *In sum: People are leery of wars until they start, then they support them and want to win.

11. Mass vs. Elite Opinion • Mass Opinion: • Generally poorly informed • Generally supportive of the president • Conservative, less internationalist • Elite Opinion: • Better informed • Opinions change more rapidly (Vietnam) • Protest on moral/philosophical grounds • More liberal and internationalist • Even more so in leaders active in politics, academia, media, or other organizations concerned with foreign affairs

12. Cleavages among Foreign Policy Elites • Events have no meaning until interpreted by people who must react to them • Who are the elites? • Administrative position in foreign policy field(State dept, NSC), key congressional committees, various private organizations, editors of relevant publications

13. How a Worldview Shapes Foreign Policy • Definition: comprehensive mental picture of world issues facing the US and ways of responding (sometimes called a paradigm) • Mr. X’s article on containment of USSR • Not unanimously accepted but consistent with public’s mood, events, and experience

14. 4 Worldviews • Isolationism: opposes involvement in world affairs • Adopted after WWI after little accomplished • Ended with Pearl Harbor • Containment: (anti-appeasement) US should resist the expansion of aggressive nations • Successful in that it didn’t harm US interests, proved welcome to allies, prevented military conquest

15. 4 Worldviews • Disengagement: (“Vietnam”) belief that US was harmed by its war with Vietnam(defeat and political disaster) so it should avoid similar events • Crisis interpreted 3 ways: • Correct worldview, but failed to try hard enough • Correct worldview but applied in the wrong place • Worldview itself was wrong • Critics believed world view wrong (#3) and new one should be based on isolationism

16. 4 Worldviews • Human Rights: we should try to improve the lives of people in other countries (Kosovo viewed as similar to Nazi genocide) • But what about Rwanda, China, USSR?? • New Question post 9/11: should the US “go it alone” or build a coalition?

17. Use of Military Force • Military power more important after collapse of USSR/end of Cold War • Used in Iraq, Bosnia, Afghanistan • Threats from rogues (Iran, N. Korea) and others (China, India, Pakistan, Israel, Russia) • 2 Views: • Majoritarian View: all benefit, all pay • Client View: military-industrial complex shapes what is spent • All pay, but some benefit more than others • Generals, big corporations, congressional districts that get big defense contracts

18. The Defense Budget • Total Spending • Very low spending in peacetime until 1950 • Driven up by Containment policy for USSR • Changes in spending tend to reflect changes in public opinion • Debate once USSR fell: • Liberals: cut defense, we aren’t world’s “police officer” • Conservatives: some cuts ok, but world is still dangerous and we must be ready • Saddam Hussein soon proved them right • Involvement in war in Bosnia proved military had been cut too much…Clinton increased spending

19. What do we get with our money? • People- most expensive • From draft to all volunteer since 1973 • More women, “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” recently overruled • “Readiness” –Training, supplies, food, fuel, etc • 1st to get cut due to client politics (no constituents to get mad) • Bases- at one time many opened and few closed due to client politics • Commission on Base Realignment and Closure created to take client politics out of the decision

20. What do we get with our money? • Hardware: big ticket items and small ticket items • Cost overruns: actual cost is more than estimated cost. Why?: • Unpredictability of cost of new item • Incentive for contractor to underestimate cost at 1st • Military chiefs want only the best • “Gold plating”- ask for everything at once • Sole-searching- new weapons are purchased from a single contractor…so no competition • When cutting defense budget Congress will not cut but stretch (start and stop production drives up the cost)

21. Structure of Defense Decision Making • National Security Act of 1947- created Dept of Defense • Headed by Sec. of Defense (must be civilian)- command authority over defense on behalf of pres • Sec. of Army, Air Force, Navy, (also civilians) • manage daily functions • Joint Chiefs of Staff (military) • Branches of military kept separate- Why? • Fear if unified they would become too powerful • Desire of services to preserve autonomy • Inter-service rivalries intended by Congress to increase info

22. Structure of Defense Decision Making • Joint Chiefs of Staff- committee of heads of 4 military branches, chairman, vice chair, and military officers appointed by the pres./confirmed by Senate • No command authority over troops • Key to national defense planning • Since 1986 reorganization, Chairman of JCS has been president’s principal military advisor • Chain of Command: Pres Sec. Defense various specified commands (these can go through JCS, but they have no command power) • Civilians head the military to protect from concentration of power

23. New Problem of Terrorism • Transition from Bipolar world to uni-polar • Doctrine of preemption- address threats before they are fully formed • Act alone if necessary – support of UN sometimes sought/received (Korea, Kuwait), sometimes not (Vietnam, Iraq) • Rebuilding Nations • Positive experience: Germany, Japan • Negative experience: Somalia, Haiti • Questionable: Iraq, Afghanistan • Lessons Learned: Don’t leave too quickly, organize agencies, learn from mistakes, carefully coordinate civilian and military operations