1 / 17

Chilean Crisis 1981

Monetary Policy. Chilean Crisis 1981. Jared Felice Ellen Robertson Shawn Roller Jason Sullivan. Chilean Crisis. Overview. GDP = $33 Billion Population = 11 Million Less than 1/10th the size of US Separated Powers Central Bank Currency = Peso. President: 1970 - 1973. Salvador Allende.

bambi
Download Presentation

Chilean Crisis 1981

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript


  1. Monetary Policy Chilean Crisis 1981 Jared Felice Ellen Robertson Shawn Roller Jason Sullivan

  2. Chilean Crisis Overview GDP = $33 Billion Population = 11 Million Less than 1/10th the size of US Separated Powers Central Bank Currency = Peso

  3. President: 1970 - 1973 Salvador Allende Elected in a multiparty system Poor economic condition Nationalized major industries Implemented a wage freeze Died during overthrow

  4. President: 1973 - 1990 Augusto Pinochet 1973 - Coup d’état created Junta (CIA) Chicago Boys Many free market principles Privatized many industries Crawling Peg Currency

  5. How did it start? • Two years prior to mid 1981, domestic private demand for consumption and fixed capital investments had increased rapidly. • Boom 1978-81, this led to changes in relative prices, in particular an increase in real wages. • Because of a new 1980 Constitution, the government was unwilling to abandon its newpolicy. • Bank’s loan portfolios reflected excessive risk taking. (Over leveraging)

  6. Stabilization of the Currency

  7. Over leveraging 1970-76 • 1970-1973-Corporation de Fomento (CORFO). • 1975 Re-privatization of CORFO own banks auctioned off. Bidders could borrow up to 90% of the price. • 1975 recovery from previous recession lead government to rely on private banks and lead to under regulation. • 1976 The Banco Osorno and several financial companies failed.

  8. 1976-1979 • The recession of 1976-1979 and the change in rules lead people in to a sense of euphoria about the future. Foreign loans in 1977 were 3.3% by 1982 they were 20.5%. • Rules regarding foreign borrowing changed and by 1980 foreign and domestic liabilities were subject to the same rules. • In 1981 global economy was in a recession.

  9. Over Leveraging Interest rate on bank loans. They were also buying nonperforming loans. Reform of banking policies.

  10. Resolution • Loan Portfolios • First: Restructuring debts denominated in US dollars and was precipitated by the devaluation of the peso in June 1982. • Second: One relief to several groups of debtors • Third: Allowed the banks to sell their substandard loans to the Central Bank. • Domestic Liabilities • Bank Runs and interest rates • Foreign Liabilities • Debt reduction programs

  11. Resolution • Recapitalizations of Banks • Sell substandard loans to the Central Bank • Generate surplus for banks • Bank/Company Takeovers • Includes liquidations and rehabilitations • Re- Privatization • Banco de Chile and Banco Santiago

  12. References • Hernández, Leonardo. Origins and Resolution of a Banking Crisis: Chile 1982-86. Working paper no. 057. Central Bank of Chile, Dec. 1999. Web. 31 Mar. 2014. • Hornbeck, J. F. The U.S. Financial Crisis: Lessons From Chile. Rep. no. RS22961. Congressional Research Service, 28 Sept. 2008. Web. 31 Mar. 2014. • "World DataBank." The World Bank DataBank. The World Bank Group, n.d. Web. 30 Mar. 2014.

More Related