For Love of the Frivolous Lifeboat Earth and the Myth of Anthropocentrism

1. For Love of the FrivolousLifeboat Earth and the Myth of Anthropocentrism Kyle Burchett University of Kentucky

2. Like impact craters Is humanity’s devastating ecological impact truly the result of overly anthropocentric ideologies?

3. Is ‘modernized’ humanity’s corporate-driven, frivolous mass consumption the result of an excess of human self-valuation?

4. What is the appeal of this narrative? How could it be true?

5. The vilification of anthropocentrism The anthropocentrism of classical ideologies in the West ascribes intrinsic value to humanity alone.

6. The vilification of anthropocentrism According to traditional ideologies, all nonhuman aspects of the environment, biotic or abiotic, are of merely instrumental value. As such, they are justifiably exploited and utilized in the pursuit of human ends—regardless of how frivolous those ends may be.

7. This presumably accounts for the widespread adoption of policies that collectively permit the mass extinction of Earth’s biota as well as the overuse of toxic and/or limited resources—ultimately leading to radical ecosystem transformations on a mounting, global scale.

8. Reason for suspicion What such a narrative fails to account for, however, is the widespread presence of racism, sexism, xenophobia, drastic socioeconomic inequalities, and other institutionalized forms of human devaluation among the various cultures within the societies that, presumably, have adopted exploitative relationships with the environment—all because of their ascription of intrinsic value to humanity.

9. In other words If such societies are truly anthropocentric—truly value humanity intrinsically—why does their anthropocentrism account for their members’ negative interactions with the environment but not for their negative interactions with one another or for their lack of concern for other humans separated from them by space and time?

10. How can vast numbers of people, under the sway of an anthropocentrism that values humans intrinsically but nonhumans instrumentally, so readily purchase food and luxury items for their ‘pets’ while they disregard fellow humans who are undernourished, abandoned, impoverished, etc.?

11. A case of mistaken identity Anthropocentrism is thus not the problem. What has been criticized under the term ‘anthropocentrism’ is actually something more akin to ethical egoism—the attitude that one’s moral concerns need not extend beyond oneself or one’s interests, narrowly limited spatiotemporally.

12. Anthropocentrism(s) Bryan G. Norton (1984) argues that the issue of intrinsic vs. instrumental value should be considered irrelevant to policy concerns and distinguishes two forms of anthropocentrism. • Strong anthropocentrism – based on the satisfaction of felt preferences. Individualistic and potentially irrational. • Weak anthropocentrism – based on the satisfaction of considered preferences. Non-individualistic and rational.

13. Rational (or genuine) anthropocentrism In a vein similar to that of Norton, I conclude that any rationally defensible worldview meant to inform policy regarding human-environment interactions must be genuinely anthropocentric—i.e., any respectable environmental ethic must favor the long-term ‘good’ of not merely individual humans but of the species as well. Whether or not one labels valuations of self and environment as ‘intrinsic’ could indeed be beside the point.

14. Rational (or genuine) anthropocentrism The human species is necessarily valued on a geologic scale of space and time, not one confined to a single human’s life or limited concerns. Thus, a rational form of anthropocentrism cannot condone the widespread adoption of frivolous, selfish interactions with ‘nature’ that are detrimental to the longevity of Homo sapiens.

15. Rational (or genuine) anthropocentrism Furthermore, if there is any hope for such a rational form of anthropocentrism to be adopted, it must also be fair, impartial, and just in its concerns for individual humans—those currently living as well as those who will possibly, probably, and/or actually live in the future.

16. Parfit’s Paradox The concern that arises for those who worry over Derek Parfit’s paradox (1984), or the person-affecting principle, is that we who currently live can only directly affect other particular (identifiable) humans—i.e., either those currently living or immediately foreseeable through impending births. Thus, taking a morally responsible attitude toward the species seems highly problematic. In order to care for and affect the species itself, one must take into consideration fundamentally unknowable humans separated from oneself on a geologic scale of space and time. Such impartiality may not be a problem, however, for those who eschew the ethical egoism which is surely to blame for much of what has been critiqued as ‘anthropocentrism.’