EFCOG Board of Directors Meeting Board Recommendation 2004-1 Oversight of Complex, High-Hazard Nuclear Operations August 4, 2004 Ted Sherry Deputy Manager, Y-12 Site Office. Background for Board Recommendation 2004-1. NASA Columbia Accident NRC/Davis-Besse Pressure Vessel Degradation
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Board Recommendation 2004-1
Oversight of Complex,
High-Hazard Nuclear Operations
August 4, 2004
Deputy Manager, Y-12 Site Office
1. DOE Delegations of Authority for safety responsibilities need to be in accordance with defined criteria and processes, such that:
a. Oversight is provided at all levels
b. Oversight is conducted by technically competent individuals.
1c. Corrective Action Plans from NASA Columbia and Davis Besse events need to be issued.
2a. Establish a Central, Technical Safety Authority responsible for safety goals, requirements, and waivers.
2b. Support and integrate safety research, analysis, and testing.
2c. Sustain Integrated Safety Management (ISM) as foundation of safety management implementation.
3. Direct and unbroken line of safety roles and responsibilities need to be reflected in Functions, Responsibilities, and Authorities (FRA) documents, and in Quality Assurance Plans (QAPs).
4. Validation reports need to be provided to the Secretary before DOE approves delegations of authority.
Ted Sherry (Lead/YSO), Mark Whitaker (DR-1), Ines Triay (EM-3)