The Statesman , (291C to end, pp. 335-358) . Philosophy 190: Plato Fall, 2014

Plato’s Academy, a mosaic in the Museo Nazionale, Naples, (Photo: Giraudon) The Statesman, (291C to end, pp. 335-358) . Philosophy 190: Plato Fall, 2014 Prof. Peter Hadreas Course website: http://www.sjsu.edu/people/peter.hadreas/courses/Plato

Results of Recent Election 11/4/2014 on U. S. Senate1 On November 4, 2014, thirty-three seats in the 100-member United States Senate were up for election as well as a few seats that were vacated early. The Republicans regained the majority of the Senate for the first time since 2006. Republicans needed a net gain of at least six seats to obtain a majority. Republicans successfully defended all of their seats, and picked up seven Democratic seats (Arkansas, Colorado, Iowa, Montana, North Carolina, South Dakota and West Virginia) by the end of the night, with the possibility of two more pick-ups. The race in Alaska wasn't called until a week later (an eighth Republican gain), while Louisiana will vote in a run-off election on December 6, because none of the candidates reached the required 50% threshold for victory during the primary. 1. paraphrased from en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Senate_elections,_2014

Results of Recent Election 11/4/2014 on U. S. House of Representatives1 The elections for all 435 seats of the House of Representatives, Nov. 4, 2014, representing the 50 U.S. states resulted in the Republicans winning 15 seats from Democrats, while 3 Republican-held seats turned Democratic. Six remaining districts that are still too close to call (AZ-2, CA-7, CA-16, CA-26, LA-5, and LA-6), 4 have the possibility of changing hands from Democratic to Republican. If the Republicans can gain at least 1 of these 4 seats, then they will achieve their largest majority in the House since 1928. 1. paraphrased from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_House_of_Representatives_elections,_2014

Topic of the Statesman: What is the art of statesmanship and how might it be applied well

The Paradigm of Weaving in the Statesman (279B, p. 321) “VISITOR: So what model, involving the same activities [pragmateia] as statesmanship, on a very small scale, could one compare with it, and so discover in a satisfactory way what we are looking for? By Zeus what do you think? If there isn’t anything else at and, well, what about weaving? Do you want us to choose that? Not all of it, if you agree, since perhaps the weaving of cloth from wool will suffice; maybe it is part of it, if we choose it, which would provide testimony if we want. YOUNG SOCRATES: I’ve certainly no objection.

The Paradigm of Weaving in the Statesman The Visitor does say (285E, p. 329): “I certainly don’t suppose that anyone with any sense would want to hunt down the definition of weaving for the sake of weaving itself.”

How is Weaving like Statesmanship (279B, p. 321) The Visitor says they are both activities or ‘pragmateia’. This word should be distinguished from knowledge: epistēmē or gnōstikē. It means diligence in business or in a practice. Pragmateia as ‘applied study’ is halfway between knowledge and practice.1 Weaving like good politics provides protection against nature. Clothes in general are to the body as the polis is to the citizen. Statesmanship like weaving depends on other arts. An analogy is drawn between the warp or hard threads and the spirited or hard-souled citizens and between the woof and soft threads and then gentle citizens. Various weaves are various blends of the two types of character. 1. Thanks again to Rosen for this characterization of pragmateia. Rosen, Stanley, Plato’s Statesman: The Web of Politics, (South Bend, IN: St, Augustine’s Press, 2009), p. 101.

Raw wool that has been carded and made into ‘rolags’’

Engraving of Scotswomen singing a waulking song while waulking or fulling cloth, c. 1770.’

The Art of Fulling as Conducted in RomanTimes “In Roman times, fulling was conducted by slaves working the cloth while ankle deep in tubs of human urine. Urine was so important to the fulling business that it was taxed. Stale urine, known as wash, was a source of ammonium salts and assisted in cleansing and whitening the cloth.”1 1. Downloaded 11/8/2014 from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fulling

Woman spinning. Detail from an Ancient Greek attic white-ground oinochoe, ca. 490 BC, from Locri, Italy. British Museum, London..

‘Weft’ and ‘woof’ are Old English words for ‘woven.’

Correction of First Diaeresis about Weaving (280B, p. 322) VISITOR: As for what comes next, let’s reflect that someone might perhaps supposed that weaving had been adequately described wen put like this, being unable o grasp that it had not been divided off from those cooperative arts that border on it when it had been parcelled off from many related ones. YOUNG SOCRATES: Tell me – which related ones? VISITOR: You didn’t follow what had been said, it seems, so it looks as if we must go back again starting from the end. If you grasp just now, separating off the putting together of blankets by means of the distinction between putting around and putting under.

First Diaeresis Leading to Weaving (279C-280E, 321-322) 1. An applied study or ‘pragmateia’ is distinguished from a theoretical study. 2. An applied study a ‘pragmateia’ is divided into those that are active, that is, those that are for doing something, and those that are defensive, those that are for a defense against suffering something. 3. Defensive applied studies are divided into divine or human antidotes and protections.1 4. Defensive weapons are distinguished from protective screens. 5. Defensive screens are divided into hangings or curtains and protections against the cold and heat. 6. Protections against the cold and heat are divided into those that are attached to houses and those that make contact with the human body. 1. This would rule out the ‘divine shepherd of the Age of Cronus.

First Diaeresis Leading to Weaving (279C-280E, 321-322) 7. Protection of the human body are divided into what is spread beneath such as carpets and what is wrapped around such as clothing and blankets. 8. ‘Wrap-arounds’ are divided into those which are cut out in one piece and those which are compounded from several pieces. 9. Those which are compounded from several pieces are divided into those which have perforations and those which do not. 10. Unperforated wrap-arounds are divided into those that are made from plant fibers and those from animal hair. 11. Lastly, wrap-arounds made from animal hair are either glued together with liquids or pastes or fastened together by themselves, hence woven.

Expanding the Previous Diaeresis with ‘Other than” groups Coverings other than clothes: built shelters, protections from inflowing water, protections from thefts and violent acts, lid-making, doors Protections other than those for defense: arming for war Protections other than human ones: art of magic, protective charms Materials other than wool from which clothes might be made: flax, esparto, skins Weaving

Expanding ‘weaving’ into its stages of production and related ‘cares’ carding Weaving: “if we proceeded to set it down as the as the finest and greatest of all those sorts of care that exist in relation to woolen clothing, p. 323, 281D Matting and felting Manufact-uring of warp and woof: spinning Clothes-mending, ‘fulling’

Consideration of contributing as opposed to primary causes of weaving carding Spindles and shuttles 281E, p. 324 Weaving Manufact-uring of warp and woof: spinning Washing and mending 282A, p. 324 Clothes-mending, ‘fulling’

Focusing on the primary causes of weaving Warping-spinning: “. . . the yarn that has been twisted by the spindle and been made firm you’ll call the ‘warp. . .’ 282E, p. 325 Weaving Manufact-uring of warp and woof: spinning Woof-spinning: “But those threads that in their turn get a loose twisting, and have a softness appropriate to the softness of the warp . . .

The Art of Measurement Its Two Types and the Assessment of Moral/Aesthetic/Political value 283B-287A, pp. 327-330 The Eleatic Visitor, considering whether he’s been going on too long, takes up a discussion of two kinds of measurement. (metrētikē). The first accords with the ordinary concept of measurement. We measure “number, lengths, depths, breadths and things in relation to what is opposed to them.” (284E, p. 328). “what is opposed to them’ implies some standard which is not being measure, but which is a criterion for the measuring, as a, inch foot or a mile – millimeter, kilometer -- might be for length, depth and breadth.

The Art of Measurement: Its Two Types and the Assessment of Moral/Aesthetic/Political value 283B-287A, pp. 327-330 [continued from previous slide] But the second type of measurement is the distinction, with very significant revision, that will become Aristotle’s notion of virtue as a mean between an excess and a deficiency. The Visitor introduces the notion by saying (283E, p. 326): “What about this: shan’t we also say that there really is such a thing as what exceeds in due measure [πρὸς τὸ μέτριον, pros to metrion]1, and everything of that sort, in what we say or what we do? Isn’t it just in respect that those of us who are bad and those of us who are good most differ? YOUNG SOCRATES: It seems so. 1. πρὸς τὸ μέτριον, pros to metrion which Rowe translates as ‘due measure’ is literally translated as ‘toward the mean.’

The Art of Measurement 283B-287A, pp. 327-330 [continued from previous slide] VISITOR: In that case we must lay it down that the great and the small exist and are objects of judgment in these twin ways. It is not as we said just before, that we must suppose them to exist only in relation to each other. But rather as we have just now said, we should speak of their existing in one way in relation to each other, and in another in relation to what is in due measure. Do we want to know why? YOUNG SOCRATES: Of course. VISITOR: If someone will admit will admit the existence of the greater and everything of the sort in relation to nothing other than the less,1 it will never be in relation to what is in due measure – you agree? YOUNG SOCRATES: Of course. 1. NOTE: The visitor apparently doesn’t have the vocabulary to speak of parameters of measurement, such, meters, pounds, degrees of Centigrade, miles per hour, etc. , but his meaning is clear enough: we measure something by a lesser part of it, a degree Centigrade is an increment – lesser part – of heat, etc. But ‘due measure’ as in the sweater or shoe is the right size is something quite different. And Plato’s goal is clearly not to apply due measure to crafts but to find the due measure between an excess and and a deficiency in the actions of a statesman.

The Art of Measurement 283B-287A, pp. 327-330 [continued from previous slide] VISITOR: Well, with this account of things we shall destroy – shan’t we? – both the various sorts of expertise themselves and their products, and in particular we shall make the one we are looking for now, statesmanship, disappear, and the one we said was weaving. For I imagine all sorts of expertise guard against what is more and less than what is in due measure, not as something which is not, but as something which is and is troublesome in relation to what they do. It is by preserving measure in this way that they produce all the good and fine things they produce. YOUNG SOCRATES: Of course. VISITOR: If, then, we make the art of statesmanship disappear, our search after that for the knowledge of kingship will lack any way forward? YOUNG SOCRATES: Very much so. 1. NOTE: Unlike Aristotle, Plato applies the mean, as the ‘due measure,’ not only to the moral virtues but to acts of human production, to studied skills, to technai in general.

The Art of Measurement 283B-287A, pp. 325-330 [continued from previous slide] VISITOR: Is it the case then just as with the sophist we compelled what is not into being as well as what is, when our argument escaped us down the route, so now we must compel the more and less, in their turn, to become measurable not only in relation to each other, but also in relation to the coming into being of what is due measure? For if this has not been agreed, it is certainly not possible for either the statesman or anyone else who possesses knowledge of practical subjects to acquire an undisputed existence. YOUNG SOCRATES: Then now too we much do as much as we can. VISITOR: This task, Socrates, is even greater than the former one – and we remember what the length of that was. Still, it’s very definitely fair to propose the following hypothesis about the subject in question. YOUNG SOCRATES: What’s that?

The Art of Measurement 283B-287A, pp. 325-330 [continued from previous slide] VISITOR: That at some time we shall need what I referred to just now for the sort of demonstration what would be commensurate with the precise truth itself. But so far as concerns what is presently being shown, quite adequately for our immediate purpose, the argument we are using seems to me to come to our aid in a magnificent fashion. Namely, we should surely suppose that it is similarly the case that all the various sorts of expertise exist, and at the same time that greater and less are measured not only in relation to each other but also in relation to the coming into being of what is in due measure. For if the latter is the case, then so is the former, and also if it is the case that the sorts of expertise exist, the other is the case too. But if one or the other is not the case, then neither of them will ever be. YOUNG SOCRATES: This much is right, but what’s the next move after this?

The Art of Measurement 283B-287A, pp. 325-330 [continued from previous slide] VISITOR: It’s clear that we should divide the art of measurement, cutting it in two in just the way we said, positing as one part of it, all those sorts of expertise that measure number, lengths, depths, breadths and speeds of things in relation what is opposed to them, and as the other, all those that measure in relation to what is due measure, what is fitting, the right moment, what is as it ought to be – everything that removes itself from the extremes to the middle. YOUNG SOCRATES: Each of the two sections you refer to is indeed a large one, and very different from the other.

Shift From Diaeresis (Method of Successive Twofold Division) to Division into Natural Articulations (287B-D, p. 330) VISITOR: Well then, the king has been separated off from the many sorts of expertise that share his field – or rather from all of them concerned with herds; there remain, we are saying, those sorts of expertise in the city itself that are contributory causes and those that are causes, we must first divide from each other. YOUNG SOCRATES: Correct. VISITOR: So do you recognize that it is difficult to cut then into two? The cause, I think, will become evident if we proceed. YOUNG SOCRATES: Well, then what should we do. VISITOR: Then let’s divide them limb by limb, like a sacrificial animal, since can’t do it into two. For we must always cut into the nearest number so far as we can. (Method described in Phaedrus 265Eff.)

Narrowing in on Statesmanship by Separating it from ‘contributory’ – non-essential causes of the genesis of a city (287D-289C, pp. 330-332) List of Possessions tools (revised at 289B to make “currency, seals, and engravings” first on the list. (allusion to artifact closest to Forms?) receptacles vehicles defensive bulwarks playthings, toys raw materials: gold, silver, cut trees, basket weavings, skins, cork, papyrus – “the class of things not put together” 288E, p. 332. Removed in the list summary: 289B, p. 332) (source of Aristotle’s material cause?) bodily care-taking: farming, hunting, gymnastic training, doctoring and cooking.

Narrowing in on Statesmanship by Separating it from those groups of people most removed from Statesmanship (289D-291C, pp. 333-5) purchased slaves. free men who undergo voluntary servitude. wage-earners who serve anyone who’ll pay them. heralds, clerks and other such officials. Those who possess a servile knowledge of prophecy. Priests – places mentioned where this is a condition of kingship, for example in Egypt. Sophists – “Although removing him from among those who really are in possession of of the art of statesmanship and kingship is a very difficult thing to do, remove him we must if we are to plainly see what we are looking for.” (291C, p. 335)

Narrowing in on Statesmanship by Distinguishing Between Kinds of Rule in Cities • (291C-292C, pp. 337-8) • Monarchy: rule by one in accordance with law • Aristocracy: rule by few in accordance with law • Tyranny: lawless rule by one. • Oligarchy: lawless rule by few. • Democracy #1: rule by many in accordance with law. • Democracy #2: lawless rule by many. • (293E-294A, pp. 337-8) Ideal rule even without law: the kingly man who possesses practical wisdom, [φρονήσις, phrōnēsis] (See 302D, p. 347)

The Problem of the Statesmanship and Its Relation to Laws: A good statesman can make decisions taking into account human diversity and historical changes. The laws are general and relatively fixed. (294B, p. 338) • VISITOR: That law could never accurately embrace what is best and most just for all at the same time, and so prescribe what is best. For the dissimilarities between human beings and their actions, and the fact the practically nothing in human affairs ever remains stable, prevent any expertise whatsoever from making any simply decision in any sphere that covers all cases and will last for all time. I suppose that’s something we agree about. • YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly

The Problem of the Statesmanship and Its Relation to Laws: Φρονήσις, phrōnēsisor practical wisdom is a character trait. It cannot be exercised by a group of people or by laws. (295B-d, p. 339) • VISITOR: . . . For how could anyone ever be capable, Socrates, of sitting beside each individual perpetually throughout his life and accurately prescribing what is appropriate to him? Since in my view, if he were capable of this, anyone who had really acquired the expert knowledge of kingship would hardly put obstacles in his own way by writing down these laws we talked about. • YOUNG SOCRATES: It certainly follows from what we have now said visitor.

The Problem of the Statesmanship and Its Relation to Laws: Φρονήσις, phrōnēsisor practical wisdom is a character trait. It cannot be exercised by a group of people or by laws. (295B-d, p. 339) • VISITOR: Yes, but more, my good friend, from the things that are going to be said. • YOUNG SOCRATES: And what are they? • VISITOR: Things like the following. Are we to – that is, between us – that if a doctor, or else some gymnastic trainer, were going to be out of the country and away from his charges for what he thought would be a long time, and thought the people being trained, or his patients,, would not remember the instructions he had given them, he would want to write down reminders for them – or what are we to say? • YOUNG SOCRATES: As you suggested.

The Problem of the Statesmanship and Its Relation to Laws: Φρονήσις, phrōnēsisor practical wisdom is a character trait. It cannot be exercised by a group of people or by laws. (295B-d, p. 339) • VISITOR: But what if he came back unexpectedly, having been away for less time than he thought he would be? Do you think he wouldn’t propose other prescriptions, contrary to the ones he had written down, when things turned out to be different, and better, for his patients because of the winds or else some other of the things to come from Zeus which had come about contrary to expectation, in some different from the usual pattern? Would he obstinately think that neither he nor his patient should step outside those ancient laws that had once been laid down – he himself by giving other instructions, the patient by daring to do different tings than hade been written down –

The Problem of the Statesmanship and Its Relation to Laws: Φρονήσις, phrōnēsisor practical wisdom is a character trait. It cannot be exercised by a group of people or by laws. (295B-d, p. 339) VISITOR: [continued] on the grounds that these were the rules of the art of medicine and health and that, and that the things that happened differently were unhealthy and not part of his expertise? Or would all such things, if they happened in the context of truly expert knowledge, cause altogether the greatest ridicule, in all spheres, for legislation of this sort? YOUNG SOCRATES: Absolutely right.

Because Φρονήσις, phrōnēsisor practical wisdom cannot be enacted by a group “a second best method” (300C, p. 344) must be adopted: an imitation of who really possesses the art of statesmanship as encoded in a constitution. Whether it is a monarchy, aristocracy or democracy depends on its ability to imitate the genuine art of statesmanship VISITOR: For these reasons, then, the second best method of proceeding for those who establish laws and written rules about anything whatsoever, is to allow neither individual nor mass ever to do anything contrary to these – anything whatsoever. YOUNG SOCRATES: Correct VISITOR: Well, imitations of the truth of each and everything would be these, wouldn’t they – the things issuing from those who know which have been written down so far as they can be?

“a second best method” (300C, p. 344) must be adopted [continued] YOUNG SOCRATES: Of course. VISITOR: Now we said – if we remember – that the knowledgeable person – the one who really possesses the art of statesmanship, would do many things in relation to his own activity by using his own expertise, without taking any notice of the written laws, when things appear to him to be better, contrary to those that have been written down by him and given as order to people who are not currently with him. YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. That’s what we said. VISITOR: Well, any individual whatever or any large collection of people whatever for whom there are actually written laws established, who understand to do anything at all different, contrary to these, on the grounds that it is better, will be doing, won’t they the same thing as the true expert, so far as they can.

“a second best method” (300C, p. 344) must be adopted [continued] YOUNG SOCRATES: Absolutely VISITOR: Well then, if they were do such a thing without having expert knowledge, they would be undertaking to imitate what is true, but would imitate it altogether badly; but if they did it on the basis of expertise, this is no longer imitation but that very thing that is most truly what it sets out to be. YOUNG SOCRATES: I agree completely – I think. VISITOR: But it is established as agreed upon between us – we agreed to it before at any rate – that no large group of people is capable of acquiring any sort of expertise whatever. YOLUNG SOCRATES: Yes, it remains agreed. VISITOR: Then if same sort of kingly expertise exists, neither the collection of people that consist of the rich. Nor all the people together, could ever acquire this expert knowledge of statesmanship.

“a second best method” [continued] 301E302A, p. 346) . . . VISITOR: But as thing are, when – as we say – a king does not come to be in cities as a king-bee is born in a hive, one individual immediately superior in body and mind, it is necessary – so it seems – for people for people to come together and write things down, chasing after the traces of the truest constitution. YOUNG SOCRATES: Possibly.

Visitor’s Solution to Impossibility of Collective Phrōnēsis (304A, p. 248-9) “VISITOR: Well, is seems that in the same way we have now separated off those things that are different from the expert knowledge of statesmanship, and those that are alien and hostile to it, and there remain those that are precious and related to it. Among those, I think, are generalship, the art of the judge and that part of rhetoric which in partnership with kingship persuades people of what is just and so helps in steering through the business of cities. . . .” [continued]

Visitor’s Solution to Impossibility of Collective Phrōnēsis continued from previous slide] (305A, p. 351) “VISITOR: If then one looks at all the sorts of expert knowledge that have been discussed, it must be observed that none of them has been declared to be statesmanship. For which is really kingship must not itself perform practical tasks, but control them with the capacity to perform them, because it knows when it is the right time to begin and set in motion the most important things in cities, and when it is the wrong time, and the others must do what has been prescribed for them.”

Conclusion: The art of statesmanship, to the extent that it is a studied skill, that is a technē, cannot carry out the best form of measurement which is embedded in phrōnēsis. Furthermore the method of division or diaeresis cannot extract the art of statesmanship. Thecorrect weaving together of the technai, laws and care of the city is statesmanship.

Final Definition of the Art of Politics (305E, p. 351) . . . VISITOR: For this reason, then, the sorts of expertise we have just examined control neither each other nor themselves, but each is concerned with some individual practical activity of its own, and in accordance with its individual nature of the activities in question has appropriately acquired a name that is individual to it. YOUNG SOCRATES: That seems so, at any rate.. . . VISITOR: Whereas the one that controls all of these, and the laws, and cares for every aspect of things in the city, weaving everything together in the most correct way – this, embracing its capacity with the appellation belonging to the whole, we would, it seems, most appropriately call statesmanship. YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. Absolutely

Results of Recent Election 11/4/2014 on U. S. Senate1 On November 4, 2014, thirty-three seats in the 100-member United States Senate were up for election as well as a few seats that were vacated early. The Republicans regained the majority of the Senate for the first time since 2006. Republicans needed a net gain of at least six seats to obtain a majority. Republicans successfully defended all of their seats, and picked up seven Democratic seats (Arkansas, Colorado, Iowa, Montana, North Carolina, South Dakota and West Virginia) by the end of the night, with the possibility of two more pick-ups. The race in Alaska wasn't called until a week later (an eighth Republican gain), while Louisiana will vote in a run-off election on December 6, because none of the candidates reached the required 50% threshold for victory during the primary. 1. paraphrased from en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Senate_elections,_2014

Results of Recent Election 11/4/2014 on U. S. House of Representatives1 The elections for all 435 seats of the House of Representatives, Nov. 4, 2014, representing the 50 U.S. states resulted in the Republicans winning 15 seats from Democrats, while 3 Republican-held seats turned Democratic. Six remaining districts that are still too close to call (AZ-2, CA-7, CA-16, CA-26, LA-5, and LA-6), 4 have the possibility of changing hands from Democratic to Republican. If the Republicans can gain at least 1 of these 4 seats, then they will achieve their largest majority in the House since 1928. 1. paraphrased from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_House_of_Representatives_elections,_2014

Final Application of the Paradigm of the Weaver: Application to the Unity of the Virtues

The Weaving of Different Types of People with Opposing Virtues In the early and middle Platonic dialogues, the unity – or at least the harmony -- of the virtues is maintained as an acknowledgement advanced by their investigation. In the Statesman, the Eleatic Stranger argues that opposite virtues must be woven together by the statesman. It’s proposed that this position taken by the Eleatic Visitor is not inconsistent with Plato’s earlier view. The Statesmantreats the ideal polis as a model or paradigm which guides the Statesman’s decision-making, but practically speaking there is no statesman’s art, so the statesman must rely on similacra. One of these lies is finding correct leadership through the weaving together military, oratorical and juridical arts. Another consists in the weaving together of courageous types of people with gentler but self-controlled and well ordered types of people.

The Weaving of Different Types of People with Opposing Virtues – Text (306A-311C, p. 351-358) VISITOR: Then it seems that we should discuss the intertwining that belong to kingship – of what kind it is, and in what way it intertwines to rend us what sort of fabric. YOUNG SOCRATES: Clearly. VISITOR: What it seems we have to deal with, in that case, is certainly a difficult thing to show. YOUNG SOCRATES: But in any case we have to discuss it. VISITOR: To say that part of virtue is in a certain sense different in kind from virtue provides an all too easy target for those expert in disputing statements, if we view things in relation to what the majority of people think. YOUNG SOCRATES: I don’t understand.

The Weaving of Different Types of People with Opposing Virtues – Text (306A-311C, p. 351-358) VISITOR: I’ll put it again, like this. I imagine you think that courage, for us, constitutes one part of virtue. YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. VISITOR: And also that moderation is something distinct from courage, but at the same time that this too is one part of what the other is part of. YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. VISITOR: Well, we must take our courage in our hands and declare something astonishing in relation to these two. YOUNG SOCRATES: What?

The Statesman , (291C to end, pp. 335-358) . Philosophy 190: Plato Fall, 2014