MN50324: MSc Corporate Finance 2008: Part 2. Payout Decisions: Dividends and Repurchases Venture Capitalism International Differences in Corporate Finance Practices. Behavioural Finance. II PAYOUT DECISION: Dividends. Share Repurchases. Section 6: Dividend Policy.
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A. Dividend Irrelevance.
Assume All equity firm.
Value of Firm = Value of Equity = discounted value of future cashflows available to equity holders = discounted value of dividends (if all available cashflow is paid out).
If everything not reinvested is paid out as dividends, then
MM used a source and application of funds argument to show that
Dividend Policy is irrelevant:
Source of Funds = Application of Funds
-If the firm pays out too much dividend, it issues new equity to be able to reinvest. If it pays out too little dividend, it can use the balance to repurchase shares.
-Hence, dividend policy irrelevant.
-Key is the availability of finance in the capital market.
Firm invests in project giving it NCF = 100 every year, and it needs to re-invest, I =50 every year.
Cashflow available to shareholders = NCF – I = 50.
Now, NCF – I = Div – NS = 50.
If firm pays dividend of 50, NS = 0 (ie it pays out exactly the cashflow available – no new shares bought or sold).
If firm pays dividend of 80, NS = -30 (ie it sells new shares of 30 to cover dividend).
If firm pays dividend of 20, NS = 30 (ie it uses cashflow not paid out as dividend to buy new shares).
In each case, Div – NS = 50.
B. Gordon Growth Model. of Funds.
Where does growth come from?- retaining cashflow to re-invest.
Constant fraction, K, of earnings retained for reinvestment.
Rest paid out as dividend.
Average rate of return on equity = r.
Growth rate in cashflows (and dividends) is g = Kr.
Example of Gordon Growth Model. of Funds.
How do we use this past data for valuation?
If T = 0, V = Value of assets in place (re-investment at zero NPV).
Same if r =
Examples of Finite Supernormal Growth. of Funds.
T = 10 years. K = 0.1.
B. Rate of return, r = 5% for 10 years,then 10% thereafter.
Are Dividends Irrelevant? of Funds.
- Evidence: higher dividends => higher value.
- Dividend irrelevance : freely available capital for reinvestment. - If too much dividend, firm issued new shares.
- If capital not freely available, dividend policy may matter.
C. Dividend Signalling - Miller and Rock (1985).
NCF + NS = I + DIV: Source = Uses.
DIV - NS = NCF - I.
Right hand side = retained earnings. Left hand side - higher dividends can be covered by new shares.
= NCF - E ( NCF).
Unexpected dividend increase - favourable signal of NCF.
E(Div - NS) = E(NCF - I) = 300.
Date 1 Realisation: Firm B: Div - NS - E (Div - NS) = 500 = NCF - E ( NCF).
Firm A : Div - NS - E (Div - NS) = -500 = NCF - E ( NCF).
D. Lintner Model. of Funds.
Managers do not like big changes in dividend (signalling).
They smooth them - slow adjustment towards target payout rate.
K is the adjustment rate. T is the target payout rate.
In Excel, run the following regression;
The parameters give us the following information,
a = 0, K = 1 – b, T = c/ (1 – b).
When r is constant over time, K* is constant. Net Income, Dividends, and firm value evolve deterministically.
=> VC’s value-adding.
Payoffs of Funds.
If VC is fair, by definition,
Optimal Effort Levels:
Fair VC’s equity proposal (equity norm):
as r => 1
Risk-averse in gains
Eg: Disposition Effect:
Sell winners too quickly.
Hold losers too long.
Risk-seeking in losses
Behavioral model of overconfidence. moral hazard on Capital Structure Decisions.
Both Managers issue debt:
Good mgr issues Debt, bad mgr issues equity. moral hazard on Capital Structure Decisions.
Both mgrs issue equity.
Overconfidence leads to more debt issuance.
Manager issues Equity.
Manager issues Debt.