On Losing the Information War

1. On Losing the Information War Greg Wilcox LTC USA (Ret.) July 2005

2. Sun Tsu • Four operational factors in war: • Moral • Mental • Physical • Circumstantial • The primary target is the mind of the enemy commander • Sun Tzu “the first Psychological Warrior” Source: Samuel B. Griffith, Sun Tzu: The Art of War, pp. 40-41.

3. T.E. Lawrence “We had to arrange (our soldiers) minds in order of battle just as carefully and as formally as other officers would arrange their bodies. And not only our own men’s minds, though naturally they came first. We must also arrange the minds of the enemy so far as we could reach them; then those other minds of the nation supporting us b behind the firing line, since more than half the battle passed there in the back; then the minds of the enemy nation waiting the verdict; and of the neutrals looking on; circle beyond circle.” “I am not in favor of giving battle, especially at the outset of a war. I am even convinced that an able general can wage war his whole life without being compelled to do so.” Source: T.E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom Source: B.H. Liddell Hart, Lawrence of Arabia

4. Col. John Boyd: Three Aspects of War 3:1 • Moral • Mental • Physical Focus of American forces Focus of Attrition Warfare • MORAL LEVERAGE • Find ways to overcome flaws/contradictions that • generate mistrust and discord • Emphasize traditions/experiences that build trust and harmony • Reveal harsh statements of adversaries about us • Reveal adversary shortcomings/deficiencies • Acquaint adversaries with our way of life • Respect the culture of others, provide aid • Demonstrate we do not tolerate ideas that undermine • our own culture and interests Sources: Col John Boyd, “Patterns of Conflict” Dec 86, and “The Strategic Game”, Jun 87

5. GEN Charles Krulak: The Strategic Corporal • Concept of the Strategic Corporal in the 21st Century • Maybe the strategic Private? • Al Qaeda reveres their strategic corporals • The U.S. fears their strategic corporals • Bottom-up initiative based on guidance • This is a company-level war Source: Gen. Charles C. Krulak, USMC, “The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War”Marines Magazine, January 1999

6. LTC John Poole, USMC (Ret.): on IW • “There is ample evidence that both Hezbollah and al-Qaeda are conducting a ‘4th Generation’ type of war. In this endeavor, their principal tool is the media. Through it, they readily point out any excess, whether by force or exaggeration.” • “A politically sensitive foe might come to see the media as his enemy and suppress any potentially embarrassing detail. Unfortunately, there is a price to be paid for this type of secrecy. An army that never admits to error has no reason to improve.” • To defeat a 4GW opponent, “…one must search for ‘ultimate truth,’ quickly admit any setback, and then readily adapt to any unforeseen circumstances. He must accomplish the latter without sacrificing his ideals.” Source: Poole: Tactics of the Crescent Moon, pp. 223-224

7. So Where Does Information Warfare Fit? • Only one piece of a Holistic effort but CRITICAL • (See Maj Isaiah Wilson, USA, “Thinking Beyond War”) • Depends on definition and context: • American military focus is on EW (C2W) • i.e., technology • Focus should be on influencing people • Less shooting, more talking • Protect the civilians • Get out of the bunkers • Beyond Definitions: • Our formal definitions, concepts, and even organizations have little to do with the 4GW enemy we now face from Iraq to the Philippines. • There is need and use for signals intelligence and computer security, but… • The information war is the most important aspect of this war: the transmission of effective messages to the undecided, to our friends, to the enemy, and most important, to our own people.

8. What About Al Qaeda/Hezbollah IO? • Past Masters (Culturally attuned to the use of language to influence outcomes). Examples: • Bombings in Spain • May have influenced national elections in Spain • Al Qaeda followed bombings by unilateral offers of truce to Europe • Threats followed by bombings in England • Free access to Moslem press • Manipulate American/European press • Creative Blog sites • Al Qaeda Training Manual instructions: • PRISONS AND DETENTION CENTERS section • “IF AN INDICTMENT IS ISSUED AND THE TRIAL BEGINS, THE BROTHER HAS TO PAY ATTENTION TO THE FOLLOWING:” • “At the beginning of the trial, once more the brothers mustinsist on proving that torture was inflicted on them by State Security [investigators] before the judge.” • “Complain [to the court] of mistreatment while in prison.”

9. Sophisticated Use of the Media Blog site showing video of captured American soldier. Use of Blog sites New! Mullah Omar condemning the United States and encouraging jihad by all Muslims against America via video-tape run by Al Jaazera and Al Arabia - A routine PSYWAR and Directive practice DVD of beheading murder of Nick Berg by Zarqawi Is the hottest selling DVD in Iraq

10. America’s 2d Television War • Vietnam • Ho Chi Minh determined US center of gravity the American Public • Objective was to get US to withdraw • War in press more important than bullets • Ho willing to accept attrition casualties • US media an unwitting supporter by broadcasting nightly grizzly imagery • Iraq/Afghanistan • Jihaadists (Osama Bin Laden) learned lessons of Vietnam • US center of gravity is American public • Objective is to get US to withdraw • War in media more important than bullets • This time, Muslim multi-media available and supportive of jihaadists • US media still providing nightly images of casualties and war Source: T.X. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone: War in the 21st Century

11. Other Means of IW RUMOR: The greatest source of misinformation in the Middle East Messages of the Imams and Madras

12. Other Means of IW (Cont.) • Polls • Questionable results if we don’t understand culture • Self-fulfilling prophesies? • Billboards, Signs, Graffiti • Unspoken Messages • Purple Fingers from voting (Positive Impact Lost) • Assassinations/Kidnappings • Disruption/Destruction (e.g., Long lines for gas stations) • Absence of Services

13. Who’s Responsible for U.S. Information Warfare? • The Commander-in-Chief sets the objectives of war • The NSC is the main counsel on the use of all aspects of the Government to prosecute the war • The SECDEF and the CJCS are the president’s principal military advisors • The State Dept is responsible for the message • No coherent organization • No USIS (Note that it is strange that Zinni, Armitage, and Powell let this one go) • VOA under USAID • No coordinated message from top to bottom. • (Source: DSB Summer Study: Strategic Communications, 2004) • Military does its own thing (PSYOPS, CA, Training Iraqi Forces, Training own forces • Evidently, no one is responsible for a coordinated US IW Program • NSC has done nothing about DSB Summer Study “Strategic Communications 2004. • (Source: White House Staffer at CAMEL Conf, Arlington, VA, Nov 04) Richard Pearle

14. Who Are the Target Audiences for US Policymakers? • Enemy • Leaders • Army • Population • Selves • Armed Forces • Population • Coalition Partners • Rest of World • Potential enemies • Neutrals • Friends and potential allies Difficult to address separate audiences in the information age

15. US Information to the American Public Administration Statements Media Free Press Correspondents In-Theater Press Events Embedded Reporters Pentagon Press Events Presidential Events Authors and Analysts

16. What About Military IO? • Communist Armies have a Political Officer down to company level responsible for IO • One consistent message from top to bottom • Focus on troop information and dealing with the population • American military efforts disjointed and uneven • PSYOP seen as incompetent/focused on equipment • HUMINT disregarded for decades • Soldiers in Vietnam called all Viets “Gooks” • Soldiers in Iraq/Afghanistan call natives “Ragheads” • Little or no cultural training • Little or no language training • Attitude: “Leave it to Beaver” (CA, PSYOPS, SF, MI) • Do we need a “Political Officer” in each company???

17. At 50 meters would you think this guy an enemy with an RPG or a photographer? US Military Relations with the Media • Trust is absent: No mutual respect • Some success with embedded reporters: • Soldiers tell the truth • Reporters get socialized • Jihaadists have threatened and killed journalists • US forces have accidentally killed journalists/photographers How about this guy? 2 seconds to decide

18. U.S. IW Not Done Well To Date • No policy guidance or direction • Absent cultural understanding • “Evil Eye” Leaflets in Falluja one day before killing of contractors • False Starts with al-Iraqya TV, Radio Sawa, & al-Sabah • Confession Video having some success in Iraq • PSYOP Focus on Equipment and Things rather than people • Command Information is inadequate • Spotty Integration of Information/Intel/PSYOP/PAO and Actions • Limited Understanding of IO Function commonplace • Makes it difficult to separate the fish from the sea with inadequate Information Program • Makes it impossible to protect the rear with no coordinated IW program Source: Wilcox Presentation to IO Quarterly Conf 5 May 05: “IO and Cultural Knowledge”

19. Integrated IW • Required: • Focus on people, not technology • Combined interagency/coalition effort • Long term establishment • Information driven • Independent Information • Leadership by talent, not bureaucracy • Regional Fusion Centers • Similar in concept to Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in Afghanistan • Multiply with security • Independent and networked Source: Wilson, Richards, Wilcox Briefing: 4GW & OODA Loop Implications of Iraqi Insurgency www.d-n-i.net

20. Continue Focus on HUMINT Get the Intel Specialists out with small units to provide actionable intelligence Build reliable infrastructure Regional Fusion Centers Tell the truth & tell it often Restructure Info/Intel Function Cultural Knowledge Training and Education FUNDAMENTAL How to “Get Well”

21. Prognosis • IW efforts so far have limited success • No clear direction from White House likely • Polls show decline in support both in Iraq and U.S. • Generals perceived as less than candid • Organizational change unlikely • Moral High Ground Lost in Abu Ghraib • Impossible to recover despite localization • Lasting images fired jihaad Thumbs Down What price for the destruction of Falluja?

22. BACKUP SLIDES

23. LTC John Poole, USMC (Ret.): on Training • “…the U.S. infantryman lives in a doctrinally driven, ‘top-down’ training environment. Such an environment cannot match the learning dynamics of its experimentally driven ‘bottom-up’ antithesis. Unfortunately, most Eastern armies, Hezbollah, and al-Qaeda follow the latter. One produces standardized procedures that are painfully dismissive, painfully predictable, and technologically dated. The other produces current guidelines that are circumstantially unique, surprise oriented, and threat compensating.” (Poole, Tactics of the Crescent Moon, p. 234) • Our soldiers ought to be trained by our own U.S. Special Forces instead of frittering away this precious resource in too many missions in too many places. (Poole, The Tiger’s Way) • We need to shoot less, not more. (Poole, Tactics of the Crescent Moon)

24. What price for the destruction of Falluja? Kinetics vice Sophistication

25. US Information to our Soldiers AFN http://Companycommand.net http://Platoonleader.net

26. The Pen Is Mightier than the Sword RUMOR is the Coin of the Realm Multi-media is Priceless