DUALISM OR MONISM?

1. DUALISM OR MONISM? The application of the D-N model to the social sciences has been widely criticized. Among its numerous critics, two main streams might be highlighted. On the one hand, there are people that firmly believe that, in order to achieve an objective knowledge of social phenomena, it is compulsory to give up any attempts at following the method of the natural sciences. On the other, there are those who not only deny the possibility of any causal explanations in the social sciences, but believe that the very notion of objectivity is to be given up as well. In either case, the critics of the causal model for explanation appeal to two kinds of arguments: the peculiar features of historical and social events (their being “unique” and “not reproducible”, that is) and the very nature of social phenomena, that are allegedly incompatible with any causal model of explanation.

2. a) “uniqueness” of social and historical events As opposed to natural phenomena, historical and social events are unique. As such, they are incompatible with any empirical regularity, and therefore with any kind of causal explanation. Whereas a physicist or a biologist can study the atom or the cell by making them part of a class of homogeneous elements (for both atoms and cells display recurrent characteristics), social scientists deal with events that cannot be seen as instances of given regularities. Rather, they study facts in their intrinsic individuality. The 1929 crash of Wall Street, the French Revolution or World War II are unique because they show features that cannot be found in any other event. Being unique events, we cannot appeal to laws (that is, regularities) to explain them, and therefore we cannot causally explain them.

3. REPLY What is unique in any historical event is the interweaving of typical aspects. The French Revolution is unique in the sense that is constitutes a unique interweaving of political economical, social, psychological, military, diplomatic… aspects. But this is no difference with physical events: what is unique in an earthquake is the interweaving of typical physical, chemical, as well as social economical, psychological… events. As we have seen, for an explanation to be scientific it must satisfy the condition that the explanandum is typical: when we study an event we do not study it in its entirety, but from a number of perspectives – that is, we study an event by highlighting (some of) its typical aspects.

4. b) “non-reproducibility” of social and historical events As opposed to natural phenomena, historical and social events are not only unique, but also non-reproducible. As opposed to a chemical reaction or an eclipse, we cannot reproduce the assassination of Julius Cesar or the battle of Trafalgar, not to mention things such as the Industrial Revolution. REPLY In order to counteract this thesis we have to agree on what we mean by “unrepeatability”. Of course, if we mean that two historical events are not repeatable in the sense that they are separated in time, then all events – natural as well historical and social – are not repeatable. If we mean that events such as the French Revolution cannot be reproduced, this is true also for events such as the Big-Bang or the evolution of species.

5. Historians – just like cosmologists, studying the origin of the universe, or biologists, studying the evolution of species – inquire past and non-reproducible events by following the traces these events left in time. It is the so-called “circumstantial paradigm”: we bump into a problem and, on the basis of our own knowledge of previous events, we recognize the traces left by an event, transforming it into a significant and decisive clue in order to get to an explanatory hypothesis. Charles S. Peirce’s theory of abduction provides the epistemological framework for this process: We observe the (surprising) fact F If C were true, F would be explained as totally normal. Therefore, there are good reasons to suspect that C is true. F C  F C

6. c) narration vs. causal explanation According to Leopold von Ranke (1795-1886), history should be neither French nor German, neither catholic nor protestant. As there is just one physics, so there should be only one historiography, which confines itself to the presentation of facts. Historians should limit themselves to the narration of the genesis and development of historical facts. REPLY As can be easily realized, historiographical theories cannot provide an exact picture of a past event, let alone a list of all particulars of a given historical fact. They are always extremely selective narrations, narrations that are selectively oriented towards the resolution of a given historiographical problem, which tells us some of the infinite possible facts that preceded and followed the event under scrutiny.

7. d) function vs. cause Just as a physiologist explains the function and not the cause of an organon, in connection with the functioning of the human body as a whole, in the same way social scientists have to look not for the causes but for the function of social phenomena, ascertaining the contributions of each of them to the functioning of the social order as a whole. According to Bronisław K.Malinowski (1884-1942), an anthropologist wishing to effectively understand the role of myth in society should not look for its causes, but should spot its function – that is, to strengthen tradition, which is indispensable for the survival of every culture.

8. REPLY Against this objection to models of causal explanation in the social sciences, we might argue that functional explanation – that has several merits – cannot be seen as a kind of explanation sui generis, for it is itself based on the principle of causality. When functionalists argue that of any event we should consider the function it plays with regards to, say, the functioning of society, they are saying that any social phenomenon is to be explained by referring it to the effects it produces. But this means that the phenomenon under scrutiny is the cause of those effects, which can be identified only by appealing to laws. Functional relations, that is, identify causal relations: saying that the function of myth is that of strengthening traditions equals to saying that the diffusion of myth is tone of the causes of the conservation of tradition.

9. e) teleological and empathetic explanations Some critics have argued that human actions – with their import of intentions, values, meanings, etc. – are by definition incompatible with causal explanation. To any nomological explanations, these critics have opposed two different approaches: that of teleological explanations and that of “empathetic” explanations. According to the supporters of teleological explanations, it is impossible to explain human actions without reconstructing a means/end relation: any action is nothing but a means to achieve a give end.

10. However, such a means/end relation cannot be but based upon a cause/effect relation. Indeed, deeming a given means as appropriate to achieving a given end means that we think it can bring about given effects, and this prediction can be done only by appealing to known regularities (laws). For only a law, or an empirical generalization, is able to allow an individual to select, out of an infinite number of possibilities, the means (that is, the action) that is deemed more appropriate in order to achieve a given end. On the other hand, some critics have argued that whereas Naturwissenschaften causally “explain” phenomena, Geistwissenschaften “understand” their meanings. They employ different methods because the objects they investigate have to radically different natures.

11. Natural sciences investigate abstract phenomena, which are “external” to researchers, and therefore do not involve anything like feelings, values or, more generally, social practices that historically obtain. As a consequence, they can be explained by linking them in a causal way. Historical and social sciences, by contrast, deal with unique phenomena, which are produced by humans and can be understood only “within” the cultural framework of the researchers – by relating them with the researchers’ values, interests, concerns, and more generally with their experiences (Erlebnisse). For these reasons, they can be investigated only by appealing to empathy: that is, by identifying (empathizing) with social actors, by living their own experiences, sentiments, projects…

12. Social scientists, in other words, must not confine themselves to considering the “external side” of the phenomenon under scrutiny, but they must penetrate the “internal side” of it, reproducing the very experiences of which that event is the outcome. REPLY Empathy is neither necessary nor sufficient to explain social and historical phenomena. It is not necessary, for a social scientist might not be able to identify himself with other individual, from either the psychological or the cultural point of view. Furthermore, even if this were the case, empathy would not be sufficient: the scientific character of a theory depends on its logical consistency and empirical testability, not on the process through which it was formulated.