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Part IV: Regional Applications

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Part IV: Regional Applications

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    1. Part IV: Regional Applications Chap. 11: Russia and the Near Abroad Chap. 12: Europe Chap. 13: Asia and the Pacific Chap. 14: The [Global] South [the Americas] Chap. 14: The US and . . .

    2. Part IV: Regional Applications Russia and the Near Abroad

    3. Part IV: Regional Applications As I noted earlier in the semester, each one of us is influenced by where we are born and raised, the societal myths were collectively taught growing up, our environments ideology, etc. We are taught to fit into our—accepts the myths, cultural, and ideology—societal slot. Those who fail to are ostracized by society. Since states are collections of individuals more or less socialized on the same myths and culture and as such reflect them, understanding international politics necessarily requires understanding state and/or regional perspectives. It helps us to understand why states do the things they do, respond to certain external stimuli the way they do, and interact with international actors and phenomena the way they do. An example I’ve previously used: why might the PRC’s government (indeed its people) be suspicious of a treaty (NAFTA) or international organization (WTO) even though it’s relatively certain that its commitment thereto will generally be beneficial for China? (Colonial past; Century of Humiliation, . . .) What we often call patriotism (even nationalism) is partially a reflection of how well a govt has insinuated its myths across society.An example I’ve previously used: why might the PRC’s government (indeed its people) be suspicious of a treaty (NAFTA) or international organization (WTO) even though it’s relatively certain that its commitment thereto will generally be beneficial for China? (Colonial past; Century of Humiliation, . . .) What we often call patriotism (even nationalism) is partially a reflection of how well a govt has insinuated its myths across society.

    4. Part IV: Regional Applications More accurately, it is important to understand that states do not actually do anything. Rather, they are somewhat inanimate, arbitrarily drawn objects on maps. States, or the governments that represent them in international politics, are reflections of that state’s societal worldviews. For our purposes, we call it ethos. In pluralistic societies they presumably represent the views from the bottom up—the cultural views and mythologies that have evolved over time. In dictatorship, they presumably enforce the views from the top down. In either case, societal views are reflected in governmental (state) behavior. A state’s decisionmaking elite engender societal views of the state itself, how it views other states and so forth.

    5. Part IV: Regional Applications To be sure, countless international interactions originate quite apart from a particular government: without its knowledge or permission. Nonetheless, many of these interactions create stimuli to which governments may eventually have to respond. We have seen how policymakers and analysts use theories and analogies to understand. But few of us are policymakers or analysts. Therefore, national ethos (think of as worldview) can be particularly revealing in understanding international politics.

    6. Part IV: Regional Applications Overview In this section the authors consider five regional perspectives: 1) Russia and the Near Abroad; 2) Europe; 3) Asia-Pacific; 3) the South [Global South or Less Developed Countries (LCDs)]; and 5) the US and Latin America. One could argue with their groupings; but any grouping of states—and one must group states or alternatively consider some 193 different worldviews—is somewhat capricious.

    7. Part IV: Regional Applications Overview [A few caveats are in order here. While I support considering national ethos as a factor in understanding international politics, it is not without hazards. First, to say there is “a US worldview” is simplistic; to say there is a US and Latin America worldview is that much more simplistic. We shall try to develop some general themes that shape ethos. Second, and implied above, considering national and/or regional ethos reinforces the tendency—prevalent among Realism—to think that states are the only actors in international politics; in point of fact, many actors exist including states, groups, MNCs, etc. Clearly, since 9/11 we’ve all come to realize that non-state actors can be very powerful forces in international politics. Third, there is a risk in developing a national ethos to unwittingly become apologists for state behavior. With those warnings in mind, let us turn to ethos as an explanatory variable in understanding international politics.]

    8. Part IV: Regional Applications Geopolitical Overview Flash Points Nuclear Economic Growth Human Rights Building Democracy Regional Perspective: Russian

    9. Part IV: Regional Applications Regional Perspective: Russian [I’m going to depart from the book a bit here. So that “a,””b” and “c” will be different with some different emphases than out authors. I shall then pick back up with “d.” When considering Russia’s ethos, one needs to consider two core themes: historical Russia nationalism; and Marxism Leninism The Contemporary Foreign-Policy Debate

    10. Part IV: Regional Applications Regional Perspective: Russian Economic determinism. Dialectic materialism. Role of the State in history. Social controls. The subjugated peoples eventually, with the assistance of enlightened vanguard party, revolt (also, capitalists states may go to way with each other); Lenin and Imperialism—the highest stage of capitalism. The state withers away. It yields a new economic system in which no contradictions exist.

    11. Part IV: Regional Applications Regional Perspective: Russian The Near Abroad The Contemporary Foreign-Policy Debate Regional Architecture Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) NATO and the OSCE Case Study: Chechnya

    12. Part IV: Regional Applications Regional Perspective: Russian The Near Abroad The Contemporary Foreign-Policy Debate Regional Architecture Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) NATO and the OSCE Case Study: Chechnya

    13. Part IV: Regional Applications Geopolitical Overview

    14. Part IV: Regional Applications Geopolitical Overview (continued) They importantly note that the entire geography that we consider here once lay inside the formal boundaries of the former Soviet Union USSR). With the demise of the USSR, fifteen “new” states came into the international system, eventually joining the UN. Russia’s relations with all its former republics predate the USSR.

    15. Part IV: Regional Applications Geopolitical Overview (continued) During Tsarist times, Russia frequently sought to extend its geographical borders—for defensive purposes, in search for warm-water ports, etc. Under the Bolsheviks, the USSR maintained and attempted to extend them just as had the Tsars. Russia continues to struggle today with its borders—the case study at the end of the chapter will illustrate

    16. Part IV: Regional Applications Geopolitical Overview (continued) The point is that Russia and Russians view the Near Abroad (NA) as an area of special providence with Russia being the benefactor for said states. Put simply, Russian ethos and that of its former republics are integrally linked and have been for generations. The authors pose two questions concerning Russia’s geopolitical overview that are important in international terms: 1) will Russia’s ethos cause Russia to seek to return to its former grandeur of superpower or will it be satisfied to remain a regional power? 2) how will Russia define and manage its relations with the states of the NA?

    17. Part IV: Regional Applications Flashpoints Nuclear Economic Growth Human Rights Building Democracy Regional Perspective: Russian

    18. Part IV: Regional Applications [I’m going to depart from the book a bit here. So that “a,””b” and “c” will be different with some different emphases than out authors. I shall then pick back up with “d.” When considering Russia’s ethos, one needs to consider two core themes: historical Russia nationalism; and Marxism Leninism. Though the authors address both later in the chapter, I want to make them a particular focus of Russia’s ethos.

    19. Part IV: Regional Applications The Contemporary Foreign-Policy Debate The Near Abroad. From the Baltic States to the Ukraine to Kazakhstan, these states occupy the “gray area” between Russia’s domestic and foreign policy Regional Architecture. The authors note there is no regional architecture per se. We have discussed the rather unique relationship Russia has with its Near Abroad and how said relationship is something between a domestic and foreign-policy issue for Russians

    20. Part IV: Regional Applications

    21. Part IV: Regional Applications

    22. Part IV: Regional Applications Case Study: Chechnya November, 1991: leaders in Chechnya—geographically inside Russia—and Ingushetia declared independence from Russia; Russia moved in to overturn any such separatist thinking or actions—some brutal fighting occurred on both sides and the separatist movement was temporarily turned back, resulting in negotiations; In 1994 conflict erupted again even while negotiations were underway; Russia had earlier seized control of Chechnya’s capital, Groznyy, and the insurgents headed for the hills;

    23. Part IV: Regional Applications Case Study: Chechnya August 1999, a new round of particularly fierce fighting erupted as guerillas launched attacks in Dagestan, declaring it an Islamic state; Continued low-level insurgency (with eruptions from time to time) that both Yeltsin and Putin have promised to resolve; accusations and evidence of gross violations of human rights on both sides; often other adjacent regions with peoples of similar aspirations have been pulled into the conflict; outsiders such as al Qaeda have become involved and sent jihadists to region. [Though partners with US in war on terror, the 2003 State Department HR report, released February, 26 2004, still lambastes Russia and China]

    24. Part IV: Regional Applications Chapter 12: Europe. Introduction

    25. Part IV: Regional Applications

    26. Part IV: Regional Applications Flash Points Deadly Quarrels and Contagious Wars Refugees Communist Transformation Integration Growing Pains Regional Perspective Britain As Historical balancer France Germany

    27. Part IV: Regional Applications Regional Architecture. We’ve have already discussed the three institutions-regimes that form Europe’s regional architecture: the ever-growing EU; NATO and its future; and the OCSE. Thus this brief summary will be somewhat redundant. Case Study: Crisis Management, the Balkans

    28. Part IV: Regional Applications

    29. Part IV: Regional Applications Yugoslavia was created out of the ashes of WW I, from Slavic parts of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire (Bosnia, Croatia, Slovenia joined Serbia and Montenegro); After WW II it was held together by the reign of Marshal Tito, a somewhat independent (of Moscow) Communist; In 1991 a series of separatists (irredentists) movements resulted quickly in the Serbia-Slovenia, the Serbia-Croatia, Serbia-Bosnia and more recently the Serbia-Kosovo wars; Ultimately, NATO, EU, and the UN intervened; Peacekeepers remain in parts today

    30. Part IV: Regional Applications Conclusion. The authors seem to predict the emergence of the EU as an effective counterweight to US influence. And over the long term they may well be correct. [Has 9/11 changed said prediction? How?]

    31. Regional Applications Chap. 13: Asia and the Pacific Introduction Regional Perspective Flash Points Regional Architecture Case Study: Int’l Trade & Finance Conclusion

    32. Regional Applications Chap. 13: Asia and the Pacific Introduction. Let us consider the authors’ own admission that defining Asia-Pacific as they do raises some issues. The authors note that the Asia-Pacific region is an ill-defined region. Should one include the Pacific Rim, for instance? If so, one must examine the US, Mexico, Chile, etc. They note that both the US and APEC members. However one defines the region, it is “a region of great diversity along a number of dimensions” (p. 384). They discuss the region’s colonial past reflecting very different colonial legacies

    33. Chap. 13: Asia and the Pacific The authors note that the Asia-Pacific region is an ill-defined region. Should one include the Pacific Rim, for instance? If so, one must examine the US, Mexico, Chile, etc. They note that both the US and APEC members. However one defines the region, it is “a region of great diversity along a number of dimensions” (p. 384; my emphasis). They discuss the region’s colonial past reflecting (historically) very different colonial legacies. The British in India-Pakistan, the French in French Indochina, the Portuguese in Macao, and Thailand having never been ruled as a colonial possession—something of which many Thais are proud. Economically, they illustrate diversity by discussing “at least” six different economic identities. The first group is developed states (Australia, Japan, New Zealand). The second is Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) such as South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore. A third group is resource rich, developing nations such as Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia. A fourth group is command economies—as we discussed while discussing Soviet Russia—the authors citing North Korea. Fifth is a group that has mixed economies, China and Viet Nam. Finally, are those states that are undeveloped states, the authors citing Papua New Guinea. There is diversity in power as well (politically). Depending how one defines the region, it either has a single dominant power (China), three [or four] powers (China, Russia, the US [Japan]). Beyond these indicators of diversity, the authors note that one must account from Pakistan and India on the fringes of the region (the subcontinent). Finally, (regionally or systemically) they mention three “notable post-Cold War trends” (p. 386). They are: 1) the decline of Russia’s and America’s naval presence [the US is arguable since 9/11]; 2) the general decline of superpower military bases [again arguable since 9/11]; and 3) the steady modernization of East Asia militaries, though this trend has been somewhat retarded since the currency crises in the late 1990s.The authors note that the Asia-Pacific region is an ill-defined region. Should one include the Pacific Rim, for instance? If so, one must examine the US, Mexico, Chile, etc. They note that both the US and APEC members. However one defines the region, it is “a region of great diversity along a number of dimensions” (p. 384; my emphasis). They discuss the region’s colonial past reflecting (historically) very different colonial legacies. The British in India-Pakistan, the French in French Indochina, the Portuguese in Macao, and Thailand having never been ruled as a colonial possession—something of which many Thais are proud. Economically, they illustrate diversity by discussing “at least” six different economic identities. The first group is developed states (Australia, Japan, New Zealand). The second is Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) such as South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore. A third group is resource rich, developing nations such as Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia. A fourth group is command economies—as we discussed while discussing Soviet Russia—the authors citing North Korea. Fifth is a group that has mixed economies, China and Viet Nam. Finally, are those states that are undeveloped states, the authors citing Papua New Guinea. There is diversity in power as well (politically). Depending how one defines the region, it either has a single dominant power (China), three [or four] powers (China, Russia, the US [Japan]). Beyond these indicators of diversity, the authors note that one must account from Pakistan and India on the fringes of the region (the subcontinent). Finally, (regionally or systemically) they mention three “notable post-Cold War trends” (p. 386). They are: 1) the decline of Russia’s and America’s naval presence [the US is arguable since 9/11]; 2) the general decline of superpower military bases [again arguable since 9/11]; and 3) the steady modernization of East Asia militaries, though this trend has been somewhat retarded since the currency crises in the late 1990s.

    34. Regional Applications Chap. 13: Asia and the Pacific Continued. The British in India-Pakistan, the French in French Indochina, the Portuguese in Macao, and Thailand having never been ruled as a colonial possession—something of which many Thais are proud. Economically, they illustrate diversity by discussing “at least” six different economic identities. The first group is developed states (Australia, Japan, New Zealand). The second is newly Industrialized countries (NICs) such as South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore. A third group is resource rich, developing nations such as Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia. A fourth group is command economies—as we discussed while discussing Soviet Russia—the authors citing North Korea. Fifth is a group that has mixed economies, China and Viet Nam. Finally, are those states that are undeveloped states, the authors citing Papua New Guinea. There is diversity in power as well. Depending how one defines the region, it either has a single dominant power (China), three [or four] powers (China, Russia, the US [Japan]). Beyond these indicators of diversity, the authors note that one must account from Pakistan and India on the fringes of the region (the subcontinent). The authors note that the Asia-Pacific region is an ill-defined region. Should one include the Pacific Rim, for instance? If so, one must examine the US, Mexico, Chile, etc. They note that both the US and APEC members. However one defines the region, it is “a region of great diversity along a number of dimensions” (p. 384; my emphasis). They discuss the region’s colonial past reflecting (historically) very different colonial legacies. The British in India-Pakistan, the French in French Indochina, the Portuguese in Macao, and Thailand having never been ruled as a colonial possession—something of which many Thais are proud. Economically, they illustrate diversity by discussing “at least” six different economic identities. The first group is developed states (Australia, Japan, New Zealand). The second is Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) such as South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore. A third group is resource rich, developing nations such as Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia. A fourth group is command economies—as we discussed while discussing Soviet Russia—the authors citing North Korea. Fifth is a group that has mixed economies, China and Viet Nam. Finally, are those states that are undeveloped states, the authors citing Papua New Guinea. There is diversity in power as well (politically). Depending how one defines the region, it either has a single dominant power (China), three [or four] powers (China, Russia, the US [Japan]). Beyond these indicators of diversity, the authors note that one must account from Pakistan and India on the fringes of the region (the subcontinent). Finally, (regionally or systemically) they mention three “notable post-Cold War trends” (p. 386). They are: 1) the decline of Russia’s and America’s naval presence [the US is arguable since 9/11]; 2) the general decline of superpower military bases [again arguable since 9/11]; and 3) the steady modernization of East Asia militaries, though this trend has been somewhat retarded since the currency crises in the late 1990s.The authors note that the Asia-Pacific region is an ill-defined region. Should one include the Pacific Rim, for instance? If so, one must examine the US, Mexico, Chile, etc. They note that both the US and APEC members. However one defines the region, it is “a region of great diversity along a number of dimensions” (p. 384; my emphasis). They discuss the region’s colonial past reflecting (historically) very different colonial legacies. The British in India-Pakistan, the French in French Indochina, the Portuguese in Macao, and Thailand having never been ruled as a colonial possession—something of which many Thais are proud. Economically, they illustrate diversity by discussing “at least” six different economic identities. The first group is developed states (Australia, Japan, New Zealand). The second is Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) such as South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore. A third group is resource rich, developing nations such as Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia. A fourth group is command economies—as we discussed while discussing Soviet Russia—the authors citing North Korea. Fifth is a group that has mixed economies, China and Viet Nam. Finally, are those states that are undeveloped states, the authors citing Papua New Guinea. There is diversity in power as well (politically). Depending how one defines the region, it either has a single dominant power (China), three [or four] powers (China, Russia, the US [Japan]). Beyond these indicators of diversity, the authors note that one must account from Pakistan and India on the fringes of the region (the subcontinent). Finally, (regionally or systemically) they mention three “notable post-Cold War trends” (p. 386). They are: 1) the decline of Russia’s and America’s naval presence [the US is arguable since 9/11]; 2) the general decline of superpower military bases [again arguable since 9/11]; and 3) the steady modernization of East Asia militaries, though this trend has been somewhat retarded since the currency crises in the late 1990s.

    35. Regional Applications Chap. 13: Asia and the Pacific Continued. Finally, they mention three “notable post-Cold War trends” (p. 386). They are: 1) the decline of Russia’s and America’s naval presence [the US is arguable since 9/11]; 2) the general decline of superpower military bases [again arguable since 9/11]; and 3) the steady modernization of East Asia militaries, though this trend has been somewhat retarded since the currency crises in the late 1990s [in Southeast Asia; in East Asia (China, Japan) it is prominent.]

    36. Regional Applications Chap. 13: Asia and the Pacific

    37. Regional Applications Chap. 13: Asia and the Pacific Regional Perspectives. Japan too has a unique history with respect to the West. Feudal-shogun period (1603-1868); isolationism; Commodore Perry steams into Japanese harbor to inform Japan it is now open to Western trade; cannons on ships trumped shogun system; Japan operates under duress but quickly sees the wisdom of trade and naval power; during the Meiji Restoration (1868-1912) Japan follows the pattern set by the US; Further, once opened, industrial revolution affects Japan; Japan becomes a great industrial-military power: goes to war with China (1890s) and quickly proves its mettle; goes to war with Russia (c. 1904) and is quickly winning; in both cases West (and US in particular) steps in, precluding Japanese total victory;

    38. Regional Applications Chap. 13: Asia and the Pacific Regional Perspectives. Japan too has a unique history with respect to the West. Feudal-shogun period (1603-1868); isolationism; Commodore Perry steams into Japanese harbor to inform Japan it is now open to Western trade; cannons on ships trumped shogun system; Japan operates under duress but quickly sees the wisdom of trade and naval power; during the Meiji Restoration (1868-1912) Japan follows the pattern set by the US; Further, once opened, industrial revolution affects Japan; Japan becomes a great industrial-military power: goes to war with China (1890s) and quickly proves its mettle; goes to war with Russia (c. 1904) and is quickly winning; in both cases West (and US in particular) steps in, precluding Japanese total victory;

    39. Regional Applications Chap. 13: Asia and the Pacific Regional Perspectives. Japan, Continued. US eventually wins but not before demanding “unconditional surrender”; Japan asks only to keep its symbolic Emperor; US says no; August 1945 US uses to atomic bombs on Japan—the only time nukes have been used on a people; Japan surrenders “unconditionally”; US occupation with military ships and bases in Japan; US military officers write Japan’s constitution for it (limiting what percent of its GDP may be spent on military); Vietnam War, Nixon shocks, other indignities; 1980s, a time of Japan bashing in US.

    40. Regional Applications Chap. 13: Asia and the Pacific Regional Perspectives. B. The Korean Peninsula. Some basic historical context is necessary before discussing the “Flash Points.” End of WW II: the victors divided up various regions in both the European and Pacific theaters. In the latter, above the 38th parallel Korea would be temporarily administered by China (and Russia); below the 38th, the US would be the principal administrator; June 1950: socialist N. Korea poured over the 38th parallel in a blitzkrieg that caught S. Korea and the US by surprise, quickly pushing the latter two to the bottom of the peninsula;

    41. Regional Applications Chap. 13: Asia and the Pacific

    42. Regional Applications Chap. 13: Asia and the Pacific

    43. Regional Applications Chap. 13: Asia and the Pacific Regional Perspectives. B. The Korean Peninsula. June 1950: Truman’s Admin-istration was able to get a resolution passed in the UN security Council giving the US the cover it needed to intervene in a major military counter offensive; the allies (viz. the US) drove the invaders back northward quickly driving N. Korean troops all the way back up the peninsula, to the China border; November, 1950: Chinese troops crossed the Korea-China border driving the allies back southward again; 1950-1953: stalemate; Spring 1953: Eisenhower’s Administration—elected partly on a promise to resolve Korea—with its South Korean ally signs an “armistice,” that is a ceasefire with no end to the war; The Korean Peninsula. Some basic historical context is necessary before discussing the “Flash Points.” End of WW II: the victors divided up various regions in both the European and Pacific theaters. In the latter, above the 38th parallel Korea would be temporarily administered by China (and Russia); below the 38th, the US would be the principal administrator; June 1950: socialist N. Korea poured over the 38th parallel in a blitzkrieg that caught S. Korea and the US by surprise, quickly pushing the latter two to the bottom of the peninsula; June 1950: President Truman’s Administration was able to get a resolution passed in the UN security Council giving the US the cover it needed to intervene in a major military counter offensive; the allies (viz. the US) drove the invaders back northward quickly driving N. Korean troops all the way back up the peninsula, almost to the China border; November, 1950: Chinese troops (in huge numbers) crossed the Korea-China border driving the allies back southward again; 1950-1953: stalemate; Spring 1953: Eisenhower’s Administration—elected partly on a promise to resolve Korea—with its South Korean ally signs an “armistice,” that is a ceasefire with no end to the war; 1953-2004: technically still at war, simply operating under a ceasefire; 1960s to present: several instances of flair ups along the DMZ (countless N. Korean incursions, by cave, by submarine, etc.) and provocative moves (USS Pueblo, EC 121, Polar Tree, etc)The Korean Peninsula. Some basic historical context is necessary before discussing the “Flash Points.” End of WW II: the victors divided up various regions in both the European and Pacific theaters. In the latter, above the 38th parallel Korea would be temporarily administered by China (and Russia); below the 38th, the US would be the principal administrator; June 1950: socialist N. Korea poured over the 38th parallel in a blitzkrieg that caught S. Korea and the US by surprise, quickly pushing the latter two to the bottom of the peninsula; June 1950: President Truman’s Administration was able to get a resolution passed in the UN security Council giving the US the cover it needed to intervene in a major military counter offensive; the allies (viz. the US) drove the invaders back northward quickly driving N. Korean troops all the way back up the peninsula, almost to the China border; November, 1950: Chinese troops (in huge numbers) crossed the Korea-China border driving the allies back southward again; 1950-1953: stalemate; Spring 1953: Eisenhower’s Administration—elected partly on a promise to resolve Korea—with its South Korean ally signs an “armistice,” that is a ceasefire with no end to the war; 1953-2004: technically still at war, simply operating under a ceasefire; 1960s to present: several instances of flair ups along the DMZ (countless N. Korean incursions, by cave, by submarine, etc.) and provocative moves (USS Pueblo, EC 121, Polar Tree, etc)

    44. Regional Applications Chap. 13: Asia and the Pacific Regional Perspectives. The Korean Peninsula. 1953-2004: technically still at war, simply operating under a ceasefire; 1960s to present: several instances of flair ups along the DMZ (countless N. Korean incursions, by cave, by submarine, etc.) and provocative moves (USS Pueblo, EC 121, Polar Tree, etc) China-Taiwan. From around 200 B.C the Han Dynasty, China: jungwo wherein China was unified and a strong central government became equated with a prosperous China; many achievements including an accurate calendar, mathematics, gun powder; ministry of barbarian affairs (kowtow), etc.

    45. Regional Applications Chap. 13: Asia and the Pacific

    46. Regional Applications Chap. 13: Asia and the Pacific Regional Perspectives China-Taiwan. Jungwo

    47. Regional Applications Chap. 13: Asia and the Pacific Regional Perspectives. China-Taiwan. European explorers seeking overland (Marco Polo) sea routes to China for spices, and “exotic” goods; 1830s: after years of trying to open China to trade, Britain finally discovers it can use opium to create a captive customer base; Opium Wars where U.K subdues China with former’s gunships (ironically, U.K. uses gunpowder); China forced to sign a series of unfair treaties, ceding territories to Western powers;

    48. Regional Applications Chap. 13: Asia and the Pacific Regional Perspectives. China-Taiwan. 1830s-1940s: known as the Century of Humiliation; Chinese currency in English (one side) colonial areas for Westerners—parks with signs reading “No dogs or Chinese allowed”; as trade follows the flag, so too does religion as the West imposed its religious ideals on the Chinese; 1860s, Taiping Rebellion where Chinese Christians fought non Christians resulting in some 20 million deaths; early 20th Century, the Boxers (society of harmonious fists) encouraged by Empress Dowager; Boxers subdued by Westerners; now US, Germany, and others all exploiting China under “Open Door” policy;

    49. Regional Applications Chap. 13: Asia and the Pacific Regional Perspectives. China-Taiwan. In response to humiliation and the weakness of central government, a new political party, the Nationalist or Kuomintang part (KMT) under Dr. Sun Yetsen takes on extant warlords in an attempt to reunify China under strong central leadership; Early 1920s Mao Zedong and other form the Chinese Communist Party (CCP); KMT and CCP cooperate in some cases compete in others: there are two United Fronts against Japanese invasions; after the second, KMT turns on CCP and kills 10s of thousands; CCP forced to flee northward on the famous Long March; WWII ends with US supporting the KMT and Russia supporting (mostly) the CCP;

    50. Regional Applications Chap. 13: Asia and the Pacific Regional Perspectives. China-Taiwan. Civil war erupts from 1945-1949; CCP finally vanquishes KMT to Formosa (Taiwan)!! US—and some other Western states—refuses to recognize CCP-controlled China (known as the Peoples’ Republic of China until 1970s; Two Taiwan Straits crises in 1950s;Chinese ideology: Marxism-Leninism-Maoism [discuss]

    51. Chap. 13: Asia and the Pacific

    52. Regional Applications Chap. 13: Asia and the Pacific Flash Points. Korean Peninsula. We’ve already discussed above. South China Sea. Mostly, there exist multiple claims on islands in the South China Sea. We’ve already considered the sensitivity of the China-Taiwan issue. The other big deal is oil. The Spratly and Paracel Islands (see Map 13.3) have been claimed by Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, etc. In short, the disputes typically involve one of the aforementioned—or other Asian states—on the one hand and China on the other.

    53. Regional Applications Chap. 13: Asia and the Pacific Flash Points. C. Human Rights. Most if not all the leaders of the region push “cultural relativism” when the West accuses them of having less-than-stellar records on human rights. Many also believe this century is going to be the Asian Century, a new century where “Asian values” and their communal focus trumps the Western Liberal focus on the individual. Many Asians believe that the West’s obsession on the individual is self indulgent, even decadent.

    54. Regional Applications Chap. 13: Asia and the Pacific Geopolitical Architecture. Since the demise of the East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, there has been no regional architecture equal to the EU for economic prosperity issues, NATO for national-security issues, or OCSE for human rights issues. Instead, Asia-Pacific relies on a series of informal dialogues. Association of South East Asian States (ASEAN). Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Shared Values. Case Study: International Trade and Finance. Conclusion. [note: jump to slide 83]

    55. Regional Applications Chap. 14: The South [Global South] Introduction Geopolitical Overview. Africa Middle East South Asia Southeast Asia Flash Points. State Failure AIDS Crisis Radical Islam (Jihadism) Regional Perspective.

    56. Regional Applications Chap. 14: The South [Global South] Introduction. The authors begin with the old three-fold division common during the CW but no longer relevant. Namely, the First World was the Industrialized Western states (democracies). The Second World was the Industrialized East (the command economies of the Soviet Union and its allies. What was left over—an eclectic and diverse group of nation states—was the Third World. These states represented tremendous diversity as we shall see but shared a desire to develop.

    57. Regional Applications Chap. 14: The South [Global South] Continued. [I would prefer that Latin America be covered in this chapter since it shares this group’s general goals: how to develop economically and politically given the international system as it was and is.] Note: with the exclusion of Antarctica, the gray states.

    58. Regional Applications Chap. 14: The South [Global South]

    59. Regional Applications Chap. 14: The South [Global South] Continued. The GS is comprised of well over 100 states. Though they are extremely diverse (e.g. some resource rich such as Nigeria, others resource poor such as Sudan) they have a common denominator: since emancipation, they have had to struggle to develop given their past colonial heritages. Africa

    60. Regional Applications Chap. 14: The South [Global South] Africa. Africa. Depending upon how one counts—e.g., the inclusions of various islands—Africa consists of at least 53 states. Africa consists of at least two extremely different regions: Northern Africa (some of which the French called the Maghreb states) Islamic states as well as part of the Horn of Africa; Sub-Saharan Africa states.

    61. Regional Applications Chap. 14: The South [Global South] Africa. Archeological finds have dated the evolution of the human race to some 20 million years ago in Africa; similarly artifacts of human activity date back to the 2nd Century A.D., the Aksum empire indicating trade between Arab and Africa states.

    62. Regional Applications Chap. 14: The South [Global South] Africa. The empire of Ghana in the 10th-11th Centuries parallels the rise of Islam. However, because of geography—mountain ranges and waterways—Africa generally remained isolated until the 19th Century. Europe “discovered” Africa whereupon the continent was carved into a series of colonial possessions.

    63. Regional Applications Chap. 14: The South [Global South] Africa. Berlin Conference (1884-85) formally divided Africa among the European states: France in the western Sub Saharan and northern parts; Italy in the Horn; Belgium in south central; the British and Dutch here and there.

    64. Regional Applications Chap. 14: The South [Global South] Africa. Colonization, by its very nature, meant particular things for Africa. First, that natural boundaries of tribes and peoples would be changed to fit the needs of the colonists: the colonists drew new boundaries that facilitated the exploitation of resources to repatriate to the colonial state whereupon manufactured goods would be produced. The Industrial Revolution made this imperative. Second, the new boundaries would combine tribes of peoples who had histories of hostility—indeed colonial policy, in many instances, was precisely to divide and to conquer.

    65. Regional Applications Chap. 14: The South [Global South] Middle East. The Middle (perhaps more appropriately Near) East is the birthplace and the crossroads of civilizations. [Consider the Romans being supplanted by the Byzantium Empire which, in turn, was replaced by the Ottoman Empire (1453) which lasted until the end of WW I.] The text properly notes that Semitic peoples are comprised of both Arabs and indigenous Jews.

    66. Regional Applications Chap. 14: The South [Global South] Middle East. The region is comprised additionally of Turks, Persians (Nubian Empire of northern Africa, Kunde) and a few associated others. Historically the area we call the Middle East has been a strategic region—well before oil. Included: commerce from Africa, Asia, and Europe cross paths here. Early civilization emerged around 4,000 BCE, in the Euphrates and Tigris river valleys as well as the Nile river valley.

    67. Regional Applications Chap. 14: The South [Global South] Middle East. the region is the home to three of the world’s “great religions”: Islam, Christianity, and Judaism. Much as we saw with China, the region’s peoples are rightly proud of their early accomplishments: algebra, other mathematics—imported from the Far East—and advanced technologies, medicines, and optics. The Ottomans and emerging European cultures began competing for control from 1400s-1800s, with Europeans finally emerging as dominant.

    68. Regional Applications Chap. 14: The South [Global South] Middle East. Then the Industrial Revolution and its need for oil, coupled with discoveries of oil in the area, caused the region to be the object of competing Europeans states. Ever since then the region has been the focus of great power intrigues and politics.

    69. Regional Applications Chap. 14: The South [Global South] South Asia. The Subcontinent that defines this region is separate from the Eurasian continent by vast mountain ranges (Himalayas). The authors define South Asia as: India, East and West Pakistan (known now as Bangladesh and Pakistan respectively) Bhutan, Nepal, Sri Lanka (formerly known as Ceylon) and the Maldives. Many great civilizations from this region (Hindu from the Ganges River) succumbed to European suzerainty in 1850s (the British) [just before America’s civil war].

    70. Regional Applications Chap. 14: The South [Global South] South East Asia. The authors distinguish between the Indochina peninsula and the island nations. [We’ve already discussed ASEAN and APEC.] The French gained an Asia foothold in Indochina and the British in India and Burma, Singapore, and Hong Kong; the Portuguese in Macao—and actually earlier than the French in Indochina; the Dutch in Indonesia, and the Philippines (Spanish and US).

    71. Regional Applications Chap. 14: The South [Global South] Flash Points. State Failure. The authors cite Kaplan’s alarmist warning of the dangers of failed states in Africa. Whether one buys Kaplan’s entire argument, the authors note potential problems in Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, and Angola Sierra Leone, Liberia (2003). The additionally warn of Somalia as an example of how Africa is a security concern for everyone, not just Africans.

    72. Regional Applications Chap. 14: The South [Global South] Flash Points. State Failure. The question is: how to address failed states? 1) Unilateral intervention by neighboring states fearing spillover; 2) Intervention—unilateral and multilateral—with the blessing of regional organizations; 3) Annexation by a neighboring state; 4) Regional integration, which as we’ve seen, requires minimum prerequisites such as shared norms-values, etc. Finally they discuss Palestine as a failed state waiting to happen.

    73. Regional Applications Chap. 14: The South [Global South] Flash Points. AIDS Crisis. Infectious and parasitic diseases are major causes of deaths—killing some 17 million annually. In 1999, they note, AIDS surpassed all other causes of death in Sub Saharan Africa. Frequently due to cultural-religious norms, AIDS is a neglected by the very governments whose peoples are most vulnerable. One startling statistic they cite is the CIA projection that in the 2000s, AIDS is expected to kill one quarter of the populations in certain states.

    74. Regional Applications Chap. 14: The South [Global South] Flash Points. C. Radical Islam [Jihadism]. From my perspective the authors appear to be rather tepid in their concern—probably a function of when the ms. was written versus when actually published. For instance they use passive constructions such as “some people believe” and the old pejorative descriptions as ‘green peril’ and ‘green menace.’ [Lack of Economic Development.]

    75. Regional Applications Chap. 14: The South [Global South] Flash Points. Radical Islam [Jihadism]. The authors passively point out that “It has been argued that Islam is the only ideological alternative” to the West, which transcends national boundaries. As such it’s a transnational phenomenon. In a world of some 6 billion persons, 1 billion are Muslim (around 16-17%). They do note that Muslims comprise majorities in some 50 states and significant minorities in many others. They cite some evidence of the threat of Jihadism to int’l order and stability. TEST Question. According to our text, militant islamic groups are? Destabilizing to Islamic states which often adopt undemocratic measure to deal….TEST Question. According to our text, militant islamic groups are? Destabilizing to Islamic states which often adopt undemocratic measure to deal….

    76. Regional Applications Chap. 14: The South [Global South] Regional Perspective. The authors cite Puchala’s themes that “inform” “a radical non-Western perspective” (p. 433) The West is viewed as enjoying global hegemony via imperialists The power is reinforced by public and private institutions (TNCs, IOs, media) Western influence is aided and abetted by indigenous collaborators who sale out their own people for money Western influence is thought to be responsible for cultural annihilation and domination Regional Perspective. The authors cite Puchala’s themes that “inform” “a radical non-Western perspective” (Ibid.) The West is viewed as enjoying global hegemony via imperialism The power is reinforced by public and private institutions (TNCs, IOs, media) Western influence is aided and abetted by indigenous collaborators who sale out their own people for money Western influence is thought to be responsible for cultural annihilation and domination [Does this sound like conspiracy theories to you? It should as it is. Many Islamic or otherwise, believe that the US in particular and the West in general conspire to keep them from developing politically and economically. Regional Perspective. The authors cite Puchala’s themes that “inform” “a radical non-Western perspective” (Ibid.) The West is viewed as enjoying global hegemony via imperialism The power is reinforced by public and private institutions (TNCs, IOs, media) Western influence is aided and abetted by indigenous collaborators who sale out their own people for money Western influence is thought to be responsible for cultural annihilation and domination [Does this sound like conspiracy theories to you? It should as it is. Many Islamic or otherwise, believe that the US in particular and the West in general conspire to keep them from developing politically and economically.

    77. Regional Applications Chap. 14: The South [Global South] Regional Architecture. South-South Cooperation. The so-called non-aligned movement (NAM) began in Bandung Indonesia in 1955. Sukarno sponsored it. Six years later it was formalized with a membership of 25 states. Today its membership is around 113 states. During the CW its behavior reflected little of its name sake. Since the CW’s demise it has begun to function collectively to mobilize its power in the UN’s General Assembly. It has been successful, if not in effecting a NIEO, keeping it is the forefront of issues.

    78. Regional Applications Chap. 14: The South [Global South] Regional Architecture. South-South Cooperation. Its purpose is to close the 80:20 gap. Additionally they discuss the G77 in similar terms and mention a number of other organizations. Virtually every govt believes the gap in unsustainable in the long term. Some believe its is the inevitable and international consequences of the global-capitalist system; others are more optimistic about eventual development. See Table 14.1

    79. Regional Applications Chap. 14: The South [Global South] Regional Architecture. Regional Organizations. Never fully realized or as the authors note a “mixed record.” They cite Spain and W. Sahara . . . . In 2000, the OAU became the Africa Union (AU). 2) Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) with 9members. 3) Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), established in 1975 and has become increasingly involved and effective in post-CW era. The Arab League which was established in 1945, originally with Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Trans-Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. Now a very important regional actor with some 25+ members.

    80. Regional Applications Chap. 14: The South [Global South] Regional Architecture. [Supplemental: linear vs. dependency] Regional Organizations. While the G77 and NAM are trans-regional, other regional organizations exist and are discussed here. 1) Organization of Africa Unity (OAU) was formed in Addis Ababa in 1963. Its original mission was rather ambitious: the creation of the United States of Africa. Two other early purposes were boundary related, problems left from colonial times. Article XIX provides for dispute resolution via mediation, conciliation, and arbitration.

    81. Regional Applications Chap. 14: The South [Global South] Case Study: Human Rights and Community. Rwanda and Burundi. In early 1990s, communal violence between the Hutu and Tutsi broke out and in three months’ time it is estimated that between 800 k and a 1 million. Belgium’s colonial tenure used Tutsis over Hutu and exacerbated already troubled relations. Violence broke out and the world sat on its collective hands.

    82. Regional Applications Chap. 14: The South [Global South] Conclusion. Many hope the end of the CW would bode well for those in the GS. Clearly this has not been the case. The old problems—lack of development, poverty, urbanization—remain while new problems have emerged: AIDS, effects of drug trade, environmental degradation, terrorism, etc.

    83. Regional Applications Chap. 15: The United States and the Americas Introduction. Roots of America’s ethos Political freedom Anti-tyranny Application to International Politics America’s foreign policy pillars prior to 20th Century

    84. Chap. 16. Global Commons Introduction Flash Points Human Population Fossil Fuels and Minerals Species Loss Forests Water Air Pollution Global Architecture Case Study: War against Drugs

    85. Global Commons: I. Introduction Timeline of sorts representative of the rise of the environment as in issue in world politics. Interestingly, the first international attention was in the early 1970s with the creation of the UN Environmental Program (UNEP) in 1972. Not until the 1980s did much attention get focused, however. “By the 1980s concern for the environment was widespread” (482).

    86. Global Commons: I. Introduction The “commons” (Garrett Hardin’s) “tragedy of the commons” allegory. Namely, there exists a village of cattle herders whose net worth is a function of the number of cattle he has. Assume each villager is a utility maximizer: is rational. As such each villager wishes to maximize his net worth. However, the land on which each herder’s cattle graze is finite: a limited or scarce resource. Consequently, each villager who rationally maximizes his own net worth affects the overall village’s well being and eventually each of his fellow herders’ net worth.

    87. Global Commons: I. Introduction Thus, say our authors, is the problem of the global commons. “The global commons is composed of those resources that are held to be the common inheritance of all people and not the possession of individual countries” (483). It turns out that said commons are numerous: access to clean air and water; protective ozone layer; global warming; resource scarcity; species loss; and the spread of disease. These minimally are considered global-commons issues.

    88. Global Commons: I. Introduction Chapter premise: and most who study these phenomena is that the nation-state system has done a particularly poor job of dealing with such issues. Simply put, these issues transcend national boundaries and therefore require different approaches. As globalization or interdependency increases, these issues become more compelling as they increasingly affect us all.

    89. Global Commons: II. Flash Points. Human Population. Human population growth accounts for a portion, though not all, of environmental degradation. Thus as the population increases, so increase the negative effects on the environment. It took all of human history until 1800 to reach a global population of 1 billion. It took a little more than 100 years to double it. The human population doubled from 3 to 6 billion in a mere 40 years.

    90. Global Commons: II. Flash Points. Human Population. Human population growth accounts for a portion, though not all, of environmental degradation. Thus as the population increases, so increase the negative effects on the environment. It took all of human history until 1800 to reach a global population of 1 billion. It took a little more than 100 years to double it. The human population doubled from 3 to 6 billion in a mere 40 years.

    91. Global Commons: II. Flash Points.

    92. Global Commons: II. Flash Points.

    93. Global Commons: II. Flash Points Fossil Fuels. Here, obviously, the authors are speaking to the issue of non-renewable resources. The question then becomes the rate at which said resources are being consumed. Further, it’s the industrialized world that accounts for the alarming rates. Three-fourths of the world’s population—in the GS—consume only 17% of the fossil fuels. The US alone consumes about 80% of the world’s energy production annually. Imagine what will happen in coming years when countries such as China and India, both rapidly industrializing, become fully industrialized?

    94. Global Commons: II. Flash Points Fossil Fuels. Here, obviously, the authors are speaking to the issue of non-renewable resources. The question then becomes the rate at which said resources are being consumed. Further, it’s the industrialized world that accounts for the alarming rates. Three-fourths of the world’s population—in the GS—consume only 17% of the fossil fuels. The US alone consumes about 80% of the world’s energy production annually. Imagine what will happen in coming years when countries such as China and India, both rapidly industrializing, become fully industrialized?

    95. Global Commons: II. Flash Points Species Loss. Three million species of plants and 10 million of animals are estimated to be endangered: 10% of flowering plants and greater than 1,000 vertebrates. Thirty percent of the world’s ecosystems are estimated to be in decline. The mention invasive species as a problem of modern world travel. In many if not most instances they wreak havoc. [Note: does anyone remember the Chinese fish in the US that can leave water, crawl on land, and kill off other fisheries?][Note: does anyone remember the Chinese fish in the US that can leave water, crawl on land, and kill off other fisheries?]

    96. Global Commons: II. Flash Points Continued. When an invasive species is introduced into a non-indigenous habitat it typically has no natural predator to balance its population rate. The authors cite the recent discovery of a deep-sea sponge that apparently has cancer applications. Beyond the fact that plants supply our oxygen, the issue is we know not what we’re destroying. The Convention on Biodiversity (Rio, 1992) is an attempt to get a global perspective on solving some of these problems. Noticeably absent from the signatories is the US. [Note: does anyone remember the Chinese fish in the US that can leave water, crawl on land, and kill off other fisheries? See next slide.][Note: does anyone remember the Chinese fish in the US that can leave water, crawl on land, and kill off other fisheries? See next slide.]

    97. Invasive Species: Chinese Snakehead Fish Dollar bill for scale; there are much scarier pictures of this thing propelling itself on land. It has teeth!Dollar bill for scale; there are much scarier pictures of this thing propelling itself on land. It has teeth!

    98. Global Commons: II. Flash Points Forests. In theory these too are different than non-renewable. The tropical and subtropical forests cover only 7% of the world’s surface yet they’re home to more than half the world’s plant and animal species. They cite the alarming rate at which deforestation has been occurring, especially in the past few decades. Alas, much of it is done in the name of development; for instance, most of the deforestation results from the expansion of farming and animal husbandry (ranching) making Hardin’s tragedy of the commons an apt allegory

    99. Global Commons: II. Flash Points Water. Water scarcity is an increasingly serious problem. [To cite two recent examples of which I’m aware: water in Middle East shared by Arabs and Israelis; US-Mexico.] Twenty-six countries are considered water scarce. The authors cite Israel vis-ŕ-vis aquifers. Oceans. The authors note the GS’s position that the oceans represent a common heritage, a position memorialized in UNCLOS III. The resultant treaty has been signed by 133 nations;

    100. Global Commons: II. Flash Points Water. Continued Oceans, Continued. The authors note the GS’s position that the oceans represent a common heritage, a position memorialized in UNCLOS III. The resultant treaty has been signed by 133 nations; again notably absent is the US despite the fact that it took effect in 1996. The also note the problems of pollution and that it, perforce, transcends national boundaries: oil spills, run off, fertilizers, etc. Finally the discuss the problem of “flags of convenience” under which most oil tankers [as well as Cruise Ships and many other ships] are registered. Fish. Obviously fishes are a renewable resource but fishing stocks are being over-fished. Changes in spawning habits and over fishing threaten many species. Coral Reefs. Some 60% of the world’s coral reefs are at risk.

    101. Global Commons: II. Flash Points Air Pollution. “Air pollution” say are authors “is a significant problem in the industrialized countries” (p. 494). They note that Los Angeles alone produces some 400 tons of particulates annually. All of us who grew up in California or who have lived here long know what a problems pollution is in the Inland Empire and Los Angeles.

    102. Global Commons: II. Flash Points Air Pollution, Continued. Acid Rain. Normal rain has a pH of 5.6. In some parts of American rain with a pH of 4.6, i.e., ten-times more acidic. Climate Change and Ozone Depletion. The authors discuss the 25% increase in CO2 since the middle of the nineteenth century. Among other things, CO2 binds oxygen that the world’s population cannot breathe. Along with methane CH3 and Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), greenhouse gases have increased. Thus too has climate change increased correspondingly. They discuss the breadth of the problem in both the developed and GS. (See Fig. 16.6). They then turn to the world’s responses: 1992 Rio Conference and the 1997 Kyoto Protocols. While Clinton signed the latter, it has yet to be ratified by the Senate. The Bush team is against it but has yet to come up with badly needed alternatives. See Documentary History, p. 494. A related problem is the depletion of the protective ozone layer. Ozone in the lower atmosphere is a problem—a pollutant. In the upper atmosphere it protects the earth from harmful UV radiation. CFCs are a major contributor to both greenhouse gases—hence global warming—and to the depletion of ozone.

    103. Global Commons. III. Global Architecture Global Architecture. It’s why it’s called the problem of the global commons. There is no global approach. Sovereign states make their own policies and regard IOs approaches as infringing on their sovereignty. The authors suggest that a global approach is needed. They cite Rosenau’s definition of global governance, conceived to include systems of rule at all levels of human activity. These are informal rules where comity and reciprocity are the enforcement mechanisms—thus they have limited usefulness. The benefits: 1) treaties take a long time to negotiate; 2) environmental issues involve a broad mix of states, NGOs, IGOs, and MNCs; 3) environmental crises must be addressed quickly.

    104. Global Commons. Environment as Security; Conclusion Case Study: The Environment as A Security Issue. Conclusion. In the aftermath of the Rio Summit, an international consensus has emerged on the following: 1) for the first time in history, humans are the principal force behind global environmental change; 2) said human forces are a global rather than local concern; 3) the changes will require flexible, agile policymaking; 4) the time required to effect these changes is beyond the traditional timeframes. In other words, stop-gap expedients will not cut it.

    106. Global Commons: II. Flash Points Air Pollution. “Air pollution” say are authors “is a significant problem in the industrialized countries” (p. 494). They note that Los Angeles alone produces some 400 tons of particulates annually. All of us who grew up in California or who have lived here long know what a problems pollution is in the Inland Empire and Los Angeles.

    107. The End Global Commons Next

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