EMBARGOES AND EXPORT CONTROLS The Challenge for U.S. Universities A Focus for Faculty

1. EMBARGOES AND EXPORT CONTROLSThe Challenge for U.S. UniversitiesA Focus for Faculty Julie T. Norris Office of Sponsored Programs Massachusetts Institute of Technology

2. PURPOSES • Advance foreign policy goals • Restrict goods and technologies that could contribute to military potential/economic superiority of adversaries • Prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction • Prevent terrorism • Fulfill international obligations

3. BACKGROUND: EMBARGOES • U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)

4. EMBARGOES Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) • Regulates the transfer of items/services of value to embargoed nations • Imposes Trade Sanctions, and Trade and Travel Embargoes Aimed at Controlling Terrorism, Drug Trafficking and Other Illicit Activities • Prohibit Payments/Providing Value to Nationals of Sanctioned Countries and Some Specified Entities/Individuals • May Prohibit Travel and Other Activities with Embargoed Countries and Individuals Even When Exclusions to EAR/ITAR Apply

5. WHAT OFAC CONTROLS • OFAC prohibits: • Payments or providing anything of value to sanctioned countries, nationals of some countries and specified entities/individuals • Travel to and other activities with embargoed countries and individuals/entities • In general OFAC “trumps” export controls

6. OFAC EMBARGOES OFAC Embargoes Apply When: • Payments of compensation, honoraria, contracts/ services/value to or in embargoed countries or to foreign nationals and entities of some embargoed countries – depends on applicable sanctions • Attending or planning international conferences • Travel to Embargoes Countries • Travel to Cuba allowed if the university has an export license and the traveler is a full-time employee of the university • Students may travel under the university license if they are students enrolled at the university that has the license but with conditions • Payments/Services/Value to specifically listed individuals

7. OFAC EMBARGOES Editing, Reviewing, Authoring Publications • An OFAC letter dated April 2, 2004 allows peer review as well as copy and style editing of articles written by Libyan Nationals [http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/rulings/ia040504.pdf] • December 17, 2004 OFAC General License for Cuba, Sudan and Iran allows most editing/joint authorship with nationals of these countries (but not the governments or government employees) (31 C.F.R. 515, 538, 560)

8. EXPORT CONTROLS COVER • U.S. Export controls (ITAR, EAR) • Cover any item in U.S. trade (goods, technology, information) • U.S. origin items, wherever located • Exclude patents and patent applications, artistic or nontechnical publications • Exclude technology in the public domain • Exports of most high technology and military items, as well as associated technologies require U.S. export authorization (either license or applicable exemption) • Trade sanctions (OFAC) • focus on financing, commodities, and services in countries posing the greatest security or foreign policy threats

9. BACKGROUND AND LAW • Early 1980’s export control laws extended to the IHE’s • Intense reaction from the university community • Four universities wrote to describe the consequences • NSDD-189 issued

10. NSDD-189 • Provides definition: • “Fundamental research” means basic and applied research in science and engineering, the results of which ordinarily are published and shared broadly within the scientific community. Where national security requires control, the mechanism for control at universities is classification • No restrictions may be placed on conduct or reporting of federally-funded fundamental research that has not received national security classification except as provided in statutes

11. NSDD-189 (continued) • University research will not be deemed to qualify as fundamental research if … the university or research institution accepts any restrictions on publications resulting from the research, other than limited prepublication reviews by research sponsors to prevent inadvertent divulging of the sponsor’s proprietary information or for filing of patent applications.

12. CONDOLEEZA RICE LETTER • Reaffirmed NSDD-189 • “…encourage open and collaborative basic research. The linkage between the free exchange of ideas and scientific innovation, prosperity, and U.S. national security is undeniable.” • “…policy on the transfer of scientific, technical, and engineering information set forth in NSDD-189 shall remain in effect and we will ensure that this policy is followed.”

13. ITAR and EAR • ITAR: State Department • International Traffic in Arms Regulations (“munitions”) • Licensing done by Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) • In March 2002 DDTC revised ITAR regulations with regard only to satellite research and only with limited applicability • EAR: Commerce Department • Export Administration Regulations (“dual use”) • Licensing done by Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), formerly BXA • OFAC: Treasury Department • Office of Foreign Assets Control • Trade sanctions, embargoes, terrorism

14. EXPORT CONTROL REGULATIONS • Statutory – must accept in agreements; have an escape clause! • Cover virtually all fields of science and engineering • Prohibit the unlicensed export of only certain materials or information for reasons of national security or trade • Exclusion for fundamental research when there are no publication restrictions, no restrictions on foreign nationals, and no access or dissemination controls. Exclusions limited to information or data, not to shipment of physical items or the providing services

15. BASIC CONCEPTS TO UNDERSTAND • Even if an item is on one of the lists of controlled technologies, there is generally an exclusion for fundamental research (note the need for no restrictions on publications or foreign nationals) • Licenses needed not only for the shipment of tangible items but also to the research results themselves

16. BASIC CONCEPTS TO UNDERSTAND • “Export” does not necessarily mean out of the country; concept of “deemed export” critical and will be discussed in more detail later • The “T-7: countries where U.S. policy is normally to deny licenses – Afghanistan, Belarus, Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Syria, Vietnam and to countries where U.S. has an arms enbargo (Burma, China, Haiti, Liberia, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Zaire) and in certain circumstances also Armenia and Azerbaijan

17. BASIC CONCEPTS TO UNDERSTAND • If you need a license it takes (a lot of) time • Penalties for noncompliance

18. WHAT IS AN EXPORT? • Any oral, written, electronic, or visual disclosure, shipment, transfer or transmission • Outside the U.S. to anyone, including a U.S. citizen, of any commodity, technology (information, technical data, assistance) or software codes • To a non-U.S. entity or individual, wherever located • To a foreign embassy or affiliate • Export regulations cover only certain technologies and, therefore, the great majority of research is not in the covered technology lists of the State or Commerce departments

19. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ITAR AND EAR • ITAR [22 CFR 120-130] • Covers military items or defense articles • Regulates goods and technology designed to kill or defend against death in a military setting • Includes space related technology because of application to missile technology • Includes technical data related to defense articles and services

20. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ITAR AND EAR • EAR [15 CFR 730-774] • Covers dual use items • Regulates items designed for commercial purpose but which could have military applications (computers, civilian aircraft, pathogens) • Covers both the goods and the technology

21. 0-Nuclear Materials, Facilities and Equipment 1-Materials, Chemicals, “Microorganisms” and Toxins 2-Materials Processing 3-Electronics * 4-Computers * 5-Telecommunications and Information Security * 6-Lasers and Sensors 7-Navigation and Avionics 8-Marine 9-Propulsion Systems, Space Vehicles and Related Equipment Commerce Control List Categories

22. LIMITATIONS FOR RESEARCHERS • Both EAR and ITAR provide exemptions for “full time, regular” employees who maintain residency during term of employment • May preclude need for a license, but often unavailable to foreign researchers • Visa restrictions (students with F or J visas) • Postdocs and students are often not full time, regular employees

23. KEY ISSUES FOR UNIVERSITIES • Public domain • Fundamental research exemption • “Deemed” exports

24. FUNDAMENTAL RESEARCH • ITAR: Recognizes research exemption, but purposely limited • Covers information “which is published and generally accessible to the public” through • Unrestricted publications • Fundamental research in science and engineering at accredited institutions of higher learning in the U.S. where the resulting information is ordinarily published and shared broadly in the scientific community • Excludes proprietary information or that with government-imposed access or dissemination controls

25. FUNDAMENTAL RESEARCH • EAR • Allows prepublication review solely to insure no inadvertent release of sponsor’s proprietary information or to protect a patent position • Prepublication approval by sponsor or other publication restriction invalidates exemption except • If there are access and dissemination controls explicitly provided for national security in award • However, some technologies (advanced encryption) always ineligible for fundamental research exemption

26. ‘DEEMED EXPORT’ • Export controls also cover transfer of goods and technology within the U.S. (transfer outside the U.S. is deemed to apply when a non-qualified foreign national receives the information in the U.S.) • Applies to technology transfers under EAR • Applies to technical data and defense services under ITAR • Unless the fundamental research exemption applies, a university’s transfer of controlled technology to a non-permanent resident foreign national in the U.S. may be controlled or prohibited (your students!) • The issue of equipment use is becoming significant

27. EXAMPLES OF COVERED ITEMS • Export of research products • Underwater research vehicles, regardless of size, covered by ITAR • Temporary transfer of research equipment abroad may require license (GPS equipment to certain foreign destinations such as Iran, Syria, China, etc) • Software: • If provided free to public, no license • If proprietary or encryption technology, may require license or be prohibited

28. THE ISSUE OF FOREIGN NATIONALS • March 2002 State Department rule expanded fundamental research exemption for some space technology (but not all, e.g., China) • Recently, IPASS has complicated the issue because of prohibition from working on “uniquely available sensitive technology” • Government grants may limit access by foreign nationals • Does approval constitute “a specific access and dissemination control”?

29. THE ISSUE OF FOREIGN NATIONALS • Corporate grants • Especially SBIR/STTR – proprietary or publication restrictions generally invalidate exemption • Position of some government agencies becoming less flexible • Conferences • May restrict participants or co-sponsorship • May have an OFAC problem also • Transfer of defense services • Teaching foreign collaborators how to use certain items may be a defense service requiring a license • Remember the “full time regular employee of a university” requirement

30. FUNDAMENTAL RESEARCH EXCLUSION AVAILABLE? • U.S. Fundamental Research exclusion applies only for the creation of fundamental research information at an accredited institution of higher learning in the U.S.

31. HOW LONG DOES IT TAKE TO GET A LICENSE? • Fast approval in weeks • Normal approval in months • Hardest cases can take years

32. MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES • License application requires the signature of the “empowered official” • The certification includes the existence of an export control dissemination plan • Penalties for violation

33. PENALTIES FOR NONCOMPLIANCE • ITAR • Criminal: up to $1M per violation and up to 10 years in prison • Civil: seizure and forfeiture of articles, revocation of exporting privileges, fines of up to $500K per violation • EAR • Criminal: $50K-$1M or five times value of export, whichever is greater, per violation, up to 10 years in prison • Civil: loss of export privileges, fines $10K-$120K per violation • OFAC • Criminal: Up to $1M and 10 years in jail • Civil:$12,000-$55,000 per instance

34. COMPLIANCE RISKS FACED BY UNIVERSITIES • U.S. export controls create significant tensions with university policies of non-discrimination based on nationality and a free and open campus • State Department believes ITAR revisions largely placated universities; NSC and OSTP know that’s not true • Recent audits/reviews of export control policies and understandings at 12 universities; agency reports issued in March 2004 and an interagency report in April 2004. Problems focused now on the Commerce Department and the issue of equipment

35. WHAT DOES THE FUTURE HOLD? • It is clear that export control regulations will continue to dominate much of the academic research community. • Institutions are becoming more “savvy” about the issues • Oversight by the government is increasing • There is every indication that the government will increase regulations and audit compliance with those regulations in the academic community.

36. EQUIPMENT AND THE DEEMED EXPORT ISSUE • Commerce Department report indicated that access to controlled equipment in university laboratories may require a deemed export license even when the research conducted in that laboratory is fundamental. • Letters from some university research VPs, followed by letters from some university presidents crystallized the issues

37. WHAT ARE THE TICKING TIME BOMBS • Corporate sponsored research • Liability if know, or have reason to know, about corporate sponsor violations • Material transfer agreements • Increasing scrutiny of all exports, universities in particular • Commerce criticized by GAO for failure to enforce “deemed” exports appropriately • “National security vs. openness” • Biology, biotech, and bioengineering under increasing threat • “Troublesome clauses”

38. WHAT MAKES SOME CLAUSES TROUBLESOME? • Conflicts with institutional policies on openness in research and unfettered transmission of knowledge • Most institutions have clear policies on freedom to publish; fewer on use of foreign nationals and there is the problem of granting exceptions to the policies or procedures • May require sponsor approval for publications • May require sponsor approval of specific individuals assigned to selected research projects • Travel and presentations at conferences and programs can become difficult • Exceptions can trigger complicated (and expensive) export control requirements

39. MAJOR TRUTHS • Easier to make it public than keep it proprietary • Beware of equipment, encrypted software, listed/controlled chemicals, bio-agents, and toxins • Side deals are dangerous • Publish or perish! • Fear works!

40. BEST PRACTICES • Keep it simple! • Keep it open! • No side deals!!! • Centralize administration/oversight • Support responsible office with legal counsel • Educate the community • Provide threshold guidelines