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Prepoved kartelnih sporazumov,

Prepoved kartelnih sporazumov,. s klepov združenj in usklajenega delovanja (81 PES). Struktura 81. člena – 1. odst.:. Vsebuje prepoved sodelovanja (collusion) ki ima za posledico: …. navaja tipične primere. Struktura 81. člena. 2. Odst – sankcija- avtomatično ničnost (delna ničnost ECJ)

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Prepoved kartelnih sporazumov,

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  1. Prepoved kartelnih sporazumov, sklepov združenj in usklajenega delovanja (81 PES)

  2. Struktura 81. člena – 1. odst.: • Vsebuje prepoved sodelovanja (collusion) ki ima za posledico: • …. • navaja tipične primere

  3. Struktura 81. člena • 2. Odst – sankcija- • avtomatično ničnost (delna ničnost ECJ) • 3. odst - izjeme • 1. odst. se ne uporablja za sporazume, ki izpolnjujejo 4 pogoje (2+, 2-): • “pozitivnih učinkov več kot negativnih”

  4. 81 PES • 1. Kot nezdružljivi s skupnim trgom so prepovedani vsi sporazumi med podjetji, sklepi podjetniških združenj in usklajena ravnanja, ki bi lahko prizadeli trgovino med državami članicami in katerih cilj oziroma posledica je preprečevanje, omejevanje ali izkrivljanje konkurence na skupnem trgu, zlasti tisti, ki:

  5. a) neposredno ali posredno določajo nakupne ali prodajne cene ali druge pogoje poslovanja; • b) omejujejo ali nadzorujejo proizvodnjo, trge, tehnični razvoj ali naložbe; • c) določajo razdelitev trgov in virov nabave; • d) uvajajo neenake pogoje za primerljive posle z drugimi trgovinskimi partnerji in jih tako postavljajo v podrejen konkurenčni položaj; • e) pogojujejo sklepanje pogodb s tem, da sopogodbeniki sprejmejo dodatne obveznosti, ki po svoji naravi ali glede na trgovinske običaje nimajo nikakršne zveze s predmetom takšnih pogodb.

  6. Sankcija • 2. Vsi sporazumi ali sklepi, ki jih ta člen prepoveduje, so nični.

  7. Izjeme • 3. V naslednjih primerih se lahko določi, da se določbe odstavka 1 ne uporabljajo za: • - sporazume ali skupine sporazumov med podjetji, • - sklepe ali skupine sklepov podjetniških združenj, • - usklajeno ravnanje ali skupine usklajenih ravnanj, ki prispevajo k izboljšanju proizvodnje ali distribucije blaga oziroma k pospeševanju tehničnega ali gospodarskega napredka, pri čemer zagotavljajo potrošnikom pravičen delež doseženih koristi, in ki: • a) zadevnim podjetjem ne določajo omejitev, ki za doseganje teh ciljev niso nujne; • b) takšnim podjetjem glede znatnega dela zadevnih izdelkov ne dajejo možnosti izključitve konkurence.

  8. Consten & Grundig • Consten je bil ekskluzivni distributer Grundigovih izdelkov v Franciji. Prav takoje imel ekskluzivno pravico v Franciji uporabljati Grundigovo blagovno znamko GINT (Grundig International). V skladu s pogodbo Consten ni smel prodajati konkurenčnih izdelkov drugih proizvajalcev. Komisija je odločila, da pogodba med Constenom in Grundigom krši 81. člen PES. Consten je vložil pravno sredstvo pri SES.

  9. Consten & Grundig Grundig Consten G D2 D1 D1 ND1 D1 ND2 ND D3 ND3 D4

  10. Namen 81. člena PES Prepoved omejevalnih sporazumov, sklepov, usklajenih ravnanj Horizontalnih … Vertikalnih …

  11. Sporazumi, sklepi in usklajena delovanja • “The list in Article [81(1)] of the Treaty is intended to apply to all collusion between undertakings, whatever the form it takes. There is continuity between the cases listed. The only essential thing is the distinction between independent conduct, which is allowed, and collusion, which is not, regardless of any distinction between types of collusion.”

  12. Bistvo kartelne prepovedi Koordinacija (‘collusion’) Neodvisno ravnanje

  13. Elementi generalne klavzule • Dve ali več samostojnih podjetij • Podjetniško združenje • Koordinacija (collusion) v obliki sporazuma, sklepa ali usklajenega ravnanja • Namen ali učinek je preprečevanje omejevanje ali izkrivljanje konkurence • Znaten vpliv na konkurenco • Znaten vpliv na trgovino med DČ

  14. Sporazum • “…the concept of an agreement within the meaning of Article 81(1) of the Treaty centres around the existence of a concurrence of wills between at least two parties, the form in which it is manifested being unimportant so long as it constitutes the faithful expression of the parties' intention.” (Bayer AG v Commission)

  15. Sporazum • Pojem ni enak kot v civilnem pravu • Najmanj 2 subjekta • Skupna volja glede preprečevanja … • Formalni ali neformalni

  16. Sporazum • Lahko izjaja iz SPP • Pravila poslovnih/trgovskih združenj • Zadostuje tudi gentlemen's agreement (Quinine). • Ni treba, da je pravno zavezujoč, • Npr. žepotekel a se še spoštuje • Oblika ni važna, lahko se obstoj destilira iz okoliščin. • Lahko se na obstoj sklepa na podlagi daljšega poslovnega odnosa med strankama.

  17. Ni sporazum • Dogovor znotraj skupin podjetij (koncerni) • Pristna zastopniška pogodba • Kolektivna pogodba o zaposlitvi

  18. Complex arrangement • Polypropylene • “Single continuing agreement” • “[The undertakings] have expressed their joint intention to conduct themselves in the market in a specific way.”

  19. ECJ - Anic: • "When ... the infringement involves anticompetitive agreements and concerted practices, the Commission must in particular, show that the undertaking intended to contribute by its own conduct to the common objectives pursued by all the participants and that it was aware of the actual conduct planned or put into effect by other undertakings in pursuit of the same objectives or that it could reasonably have foreseen it and that it was prepared to take the risk."

  20. Samostojno ravnanje in sporazum • ECJ: “The only essential thing is the distinction between independent conduct, which is allowed, and collusion, which is not...” • Prilagajanje drugim • Sledenje vodilnemu na trgu • Sandoz »export prohibited« • Dozdevno samostojno ravnanje se lahko šteje za del pogodbenega razmerja (AEG) • Explicitna ali implicitna privolitev (Bayer)

  21. AEG • “A refusal by a manufacturer to approve distributors who satisfy the qualitative criteria of his system of selective distribution does not constitute, on the part of the undertaking, unilateral conduct … On the contrary, such an attitude forms part of the contractual relations between the undertaking and resellers, since the admission of a distributor is based on the acceptance, tacit or express, by the contracting parties of the policy pursued by the undertaking, which requires inter alia the exclusion from the network of distributors who are qualified for admission but are not prepared to adhere to that policy.”

  22. Association of undertakings • Not limited to particular type (e,g, trade associations) • Legal personality not important • Only important that it has influence on the market behaviour of its members • BNIC, v Guy Clair Case 123/83

  23. Sklepi združenj podjetij • Ni omejitve na določene tipe • Trgovska združenja • Poklicna združenja (odvetniška zbornica) • Ni potrebna pravna osebnost • Ni potreben formalni statut

  24. BNIC v. Guy Clair: • “[Article 81] of the Treaty applies to agreements between undertakings and decisions by associations of undertakings. The legal framework within which such agreements are made and such decisions are taken and the classification given to that framework by the various national legal systems are irrelevant as far as the applicability of the community rules on competition are concerned. An inter-trade agreement made by two groups of traders must therefore be regarded as an agreement between undertakings or associations of undertakings within the meaning of [Article 81] even if they meet within an organization which the national courts have held to be governed by public law.”

  25. Sklep združenja podjetij • Sklep o določitvi rabata • Ni potrebna formalna veljavnost oz. obveza • Vpliv na ravnanje članov! • Neobvezijoča priporočila glede cen (Fenex) • Tudi če določitev cen naloži/odobri država • Certifikati (SCK & FNK) • Tudi statut je lahko sklep

  26. Kazen • Združenje • Posamezni člani

  27. Usklajeno ravnanje (UR) • Enako/podobno ravnanje na trgu • Lahko neformalno sodelovanje • Skrivanje, uničenje dokazov • Razlika med usklajenim ravnanjem in naravno reakcijo na tržne razmere • Različni proizvodni stroški

  28. Odnos med sporazumi, sklepi in UR - ECJ: • “The list in Article [81(1)] of the Treaty is intended to apply to all collusion between undertakings, whatever the form it takes. • There is continuity between the cases listed. • The only essential thing is the distinction between independent conduct, which is allowed, and collusion, which is not, regardless of any distinction between types of collusion.”

  29. Definicija - ECJ Dyestuffs (ICI): • »… a form of coordination between undertakings which, without having reached the stage where an agreement properly so-called has been concluded, knowingly substitutes practical cooperation between them for the risks of competition.«

  30. ECJ (Sugar Cartel) “The concept of a 'concerted practice' refers to:“ • a form of coordination between undertakings … • without having been taken to the stage where an agreement properly so-called has been concluded, • knowingly substitutes for the risks of competition, • practical cooperation between them • which leads to conditions of competition which do not correspond to the normal conditions of the market, • having regard to the nature of the products, the importance and number of the undertakings as well as the size and nature of the said market.”

  31. Cimenteries CBR v. Commission • Any direct or indirect contact between economic operators • of such a nature as to disclose to a competitor the course of conduct which they themselves have decided to adopt or contemplate adopting on the market constitutes a concerted practice … where the object or effect of such contact is to create conditions of competition which do not correspond to the normal conditions of the market in question.

  32. Dokaz UR • In order to prove that there has been a concerted practice, it is not therefore necessary to show that a trader has formally undertaken… to adopt a particular course of conduct or that the competitors have colluded over their future conduct on the market. • It is sufficient that, by its statement of intention, the trader eliminated or, at the very least, substantially reduced uncertainty as to the conduct to expect of it on the market.”

  33. Vertikalna razmerja (Pioneer) • “A company whose purpose is to import and organize the sale of products in several Member States and which to that end attempts to find a distributor in each of the Member States in question, offers it an exclusive distributorship agreement, divides the products imported amongst the national distributors • and seeks to coordinate their sales efforts, inter alia by holding regular meetings, is obliged, on account of its central position, to display particular vigilance in order to prevent concerted … practices contrary to the competition rules, even if those activities do not necessarily confer on it a decisive influence on the conduct of each of the distributors.”

  34. UR in dopustno “naravno” paralelno ravnanje • Pri UR ni bistvo v razlikovanju med sporazumom in UR ampak v razlikovanju med UR in dopustnim paralelnim obnašanjem na trgu, ki ne nasprotuje konkurenčnopravnim pravilom!!! • Lahko problem v situaciji oligopola

  35. Oligopol • Malo prodajalcev • Težko dostopen trg • Malo diferenciacije proizvodov • Transparentnost stroškov in cen • ‘Naravno’ nižanje cen • Problem je struktura trga in ne ravnanje udeležencev

  36. UR in paralelno ravnanje • “Conscious parallellism” • Sprejemljiva razlaga enakega/podobnega ravnanja • ICI (Dyrestuffs) • Sugar (Suiker Unie) • Züchner v. Bayerische Bankprovizije za transfer sredstev med DČ • Asturienne&Rheinzink • Woodpulp

  37. ICI v Commission, case 48-69 • “Although every producer is free to change his prices, taking into account the … conduct of his competitors, • it is contrary to the rules on competition for a producer to cooperate with his competitors, • … in order to determine a coordinated course of action relating to a price increase and • to ensure its success by prior elimination of all uncertainty as to each other' s conduct regarding the essential elements of that action, such as the amount, subject-matter, date and place of the increases.”

  38. Suiker Unie (Sugar Cartel) • " … each economic operator must determine independently the policy which he intends to adopt on the common market including the choice of the persons and undertakings to which he makes offers or sells. … • this requirement of independence does not deprive economic operators of the right to adapt themselves intelligently to the existing and anticipated conduct of their competitors,…”

  39. Suikerunie(Sugar Cartel) • “… it does, however, strictly preclude any direct or indirect contact between such operators, the object or effect whereof is either to influence the conduct on the market of an actual or potential competitor or • to disclose to such a competitor the course of conduct which they themselves have decided to adopt or contemplate adopting on the market.«.

  40. Züchner v. Bayerische Bank - • Ali so se stiki nanačali na provizije v preteklosti ali v prihodnosti? • Ali bi bile provizije v situaciji konkurence različne? • Število in pomen bank, ki so aktivne v transferjih denarja med DČ • Volumen transferjev kjer se je uporabila enotna tarifa v primerjavi s skupnim številom transferjev.

  41. Cement • Obljuba konkurentu, da ne bo konkuriral na določenem trgu • Izmenjava info med konkurentoma na podlagi prošnje enega od njih • “ …did not make itinconceivable that the Italian undertaking, despite everything, allowed the information … to influence its export prices".

  42. Sprejemljiva drugačna razlaga ravnanja • Asturienne&Rheinzink • Woodpulp

  43. Woodpulp • “Parallel conduct cannot be regarded as furnishing proof of concertation unless concertation constitutes the only plausible explanation for such conduct • [Article 81] does not deprive economic operators of the right to adapt themselves intelligently to the existing and anticipated conduct of their competitors. • necessary to ascertain whether the parallel conduct cannot, taking account of the nature of the products, the size and the number of the undertakings and the volume of the market in question, be explained otherwise than by concertation.”

  44. “… it must be stated that, in this case, concertation is not the only plausible explanation for the parallel conduct. • the system of price announcements may be regarded as constituting a rational response to the fact that the pulp market constituted a long-term market and to the need felt by both buyers and sellers to limit commercial risks. • The similarity in the dates of price announcements may be regarded as a direct result of the high degree of market transparency. • Finally, the parallelism of prices and the price trends may be satisfactorily explained by the oligopolistic tendencies of the market and by the specific circumstances prevailing in certain periods. • Accordingly, the parallel conduct established by the Commission does not constitute evidence of concertation.”

  45. Karteli • Dogovarjanje cen • Quinine, Dystuffs (ICI), Cement Cartel, Sugar Cartel • Omejitve proizvodnje/prodaje (kvote) • Qinine, Belasco • Delitev trgov (načelo domačega trga) • Cement Cartel, Peroxygen, SAS/Maersk • Dogovarjanje glede ponudb na javnih razpisih (bid rigging) • Heating pipes • Omejevanje reklamiranja ipd. • Milchforderungfonds • Leniency

  46. Zastopanje, distribucija, franchising, licenca • Lastna distribucija ali vertikalna integracija, • zastopanje, • Pristno in nepristno zastopanje (alokacija rizikov) • Distribuciske pogodbe • Ekskluzivna distribucija (STM) • Selektivni distribucijski sistemi (Metro, BMW)

  47. Ekskluzivna distribucija (STM) • “…it is appropriate to take into account in particular • the nature and quantity, limited or otherwise, of the products covered by the agreement, • the position and importance of the grantor and the concessionnaire on the market for the products concerned, • the isolated nature of the disputed agreement or, alternatively, its position in a series of agreements, • the severity of the clauses intended to protect the exclusive dealership or, alternatively, • the opportunities allowed for other commercial competitors in the same products by way of parallel re-exportation and importation.”

  48. Selektivna distribucija Metro: • “… selective distribution system accords with [Article 81(1)], provided that: • resellers are chosen on the basis of objective criteria of a qualitative nature relating to • technical qualifications of the reseller and his staff and • the suitability of his trading premises and • that such conditions are laid down uniformly for all potential resellers and are not applied in a discriminatory fashion.”

  49. Franchising • Pronuptia, Yves Rocher • Specifična skupinska izjema4087/88 • Sedaj splošna glede vertikalnih razmerij 2790/99

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