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Game Authority for Robust and Scalable Distributed Selfish-Computer Systems

Game Authority for Robust and Scalable Distributed Selfish-Computer Systems. Shlomi Dolev, BGU (Israel) Elad M. Schiller, Chalmers (Sweden) Paul G. Spirakis, CTI (Greece) Philippas Tsigas, Chalmers (Sweden). Distributed computing assumes identical programs.

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Game Authority for Robust and Scalable Distributed Selfish-Computer Systems

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  1. Game Authorityfor Robust and Scalable Distributed Selfish-Computer Systems Shlomi Dolev, BGU (Israel) Elad M. Schiller, Chalmers (Sweden) Paul G. Spirakis, CTI (Greece) Philippas Tsigas, Chalmers (Sweden)

  2. Distributed computing assumes identical programs. Let’s play the prisoner dilemma game. How to design distributed algorithms for the wild internet? Use game theory for selfish-computer systems. The system designer

  3. John Nash Game theory predicts: selfish-computer choose betray! Yes, I trust game theory. OK... Let’s play in a real system. (–1,+3) (+1,+1) ( 0, 0) (+3,–1) The system designer

  4. O.K., we should explicitly enforce the implicit rules of the game. In a real system, where I am the only authority… they would be free to escape! We need a distributed game authority. The system designer

  5. The Society Moral Code Complete anarchy exists without moral codes Game authority founded over the moral majority choose and enforces the rules of the game promote freedom of choice for the society’s benefit • We promote honestly selfish behavior for the sake of: • end-point creativity • motivation for success

  6. The Society Moral Code Complete anarchy exists without moral codes Game authority founded over the moral majority choose and enforces the rules of the game promote freedom of choice for the society’s benefit • Benefits • End-point success • that yields global success • Provable scalability • from the days of Greece • Provable robustness, still

  7. Technical Contributions Cost Reduction: • We replace the higherprice of anarchy with the lowerprice of stability!

  8. Technical Contributions Bad Good Cost Reduction: • We replace the higherprice of anarchy with the lowerprice of stability! • Price of anarchy (PoA) • Worst case ratio between: • NE’s social cost, and • the social optimum • Koutsoupias & Papadimitriou STACS’99 Social optimum Worst NE PoA

  9. Technical Contributions Bad Good Cost Reduction: • We replace the higherprice of anarchy with the lowerprice of stability! • Price of stability (PoS) • Bestcase ratio between: • NE’s social cost, and • the social optimum • Anshelevich et al.FOCS'04 Social optimum Best NE Worst NE PoS PoA

  10. Game Authority Implementation Application-layer: Honestly selfish agents (majority) ∞ Explicit Middleware: Game Authority Moral Code Bad Good • Can we assume that all components are selfish? • impossible: Phy. layer game & Mac layer game &, … , & possible failures &impreciseutility • how to bound the PoA? • Honest and moral based middleware tolerating • Byzantine faults • transient faults • Facilitates interaction among honestly selfish agents Social optimum Best NE Worst NE PoS PoA

  11. Implementation (cont.) • How to decide on the preferable game? • How does the honest majority audit the game? • How to preserve privacy in simultaneous plays? • Byzantine agreement • Cryptographic primitives • Game theory analysis

  12. Your attention is appreciated More details: Technical report number TR-2006:9 Computer Science and Engineering Chalmers University of technology, 2006 Also, technical report, DELIS, 2006. Accessible viahttp://delis.upb.de/docs/

  13. Rabbi Akiva said: All is foreseen, but freedom of choice is given. The world is judged in goodness, yet all is proportioned to one's work. (Mishnah Pirkei Avot, Chapter 3, 19) הכול צפוי, והרשות נתונה; ובטוב העולם נידון.  והכול לפי רוב המעשה, אבל לא על פי המעשה. (פרקי אבות, ג` ט"ו)

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