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Energy Huntsville Meeting Huntsville, AL

Critical Mission Support Through Energy Security Susan Van Scoyoc Concurrent Technologies Corporation 16 August 2012. Energy Huntsville Meeting Huntsville, AL. BLUF on Energy Security. DoD Installations are moving towards microgrids as an energy security solution… the Triple Bottom Line.

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Energy Huntsville Meeting Huntsville, AL

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  1. Critical Mission Support Through Energy SecuritySusan Van ScoyocConcurrent Technologies Corporation16 August 2012 Energy Huntsville Meeting Huntsville, AL

  2. BLUF on Energy Security DoD Installations are moving towards microgrids as an energy security solution… the Triple Bottom Line

  3. What is the State of your Energy Security? • Are the critical missions and corresponding critical facilities identified? • Are all the mission critical equipment connected to the auxiliary generators? • Are your auxiliary generators capable of long-term continuous operation? • Can the generation be grid connected and operate in parallel? • Do you have large prime power generators on site? Are they connected to the distribution system? • Can the installation distribution system be operated independently from the commercial electric utility supply?

  4. ESA Methodology for the Army – Three Phases Phase I Phase II Phase III

  5. Summarized Results from Phase IPrioritized Critical Energy Needs • The decomposition of critical missions at each facility resulted in identifying SPFs, making site personnel aware of their energy dependencies to accomplish missions.

  6. Summarized Results from Phase IIRisk and Vulnerability Analysis • Phase II mathematically analyzes and uncovers plausible threats and their consequential risks to the mission. The qualitative/quantitative prioritization can be used as mitigation justification.

  7. Summarized Results from Phase IIIPotential Mitigation Solutions • Through prioritization and mission owner input, the ESA identified weaknesses in the existing energy security posture and provided actionable solutions for leadership to implement. • Determined multiple solutions with varying complexity and ROI • Provided solutions in a format that can be easily migrated to a form or template for recommended funding channels • Provided a decision point for installation leadership

  8. Mission Critical Utility Infrastructure Methodology Planning as a Mitigation Solution • High Reliability Generation and Distribution System • Intelligent Distribution System (Smart Grid) • Self Sustaining Electric Infrastructure • Onsite Electric Generation • Demand Response Control Define Critical Facilities Determine Energy Requirements Identify Generation Resource and Location Establish Distribution Configuration Determine Monitoring/ Control Strategy Develop Standard Operating Procedure

  9. Conceptual Design Results • Identify the Critical Facilities that Everything Relies On • Helps to prioritize and look at emergency with a “utility restoration priority perspective • Missions are constantly changing • Island concept can enable real-time changes to critical facilities supported based on mission cycles • Allows flexibility to provide service for Non-Critical Facilities • Critical Missions not always dependant on energy • Some facilities could be supported before critical operations depending on event 1 UFC mandates two backup generators (N+2) for prime power generating plants 2 Does not include existing 5 MW gas turbine 3 Does not include existing distributed generation

  10. Lessons Learned • Open source interoperability between components and systems for optimal operation and redundancy • Specifications for systems must be developed and integrated for Resilient Energy System operation • Periodic review of the system needed due to changing installation and mission priorities • Auxiliary generators and/or circuit connectivity may be lacking for key mission critical support equipment • Generation equipment largest contributor to project cost; decrease demand in critical facilities can lower generation requirements • Automated control strategies decrease downtime and increase operational stability

  11. Technology Gaps • Standard communication structure for both monitoring and command/control of distributed resources being implemented outside of a utility infrastructure • User-accessible, documented power interface design approach - how to choose components such as inductors/capacitors for solid application • Multimode inverters that can operate grid connected and switch to grid independent • Bi-directional DC to DC • Bi-directional AC to DC and DC to AC • Cyber security standards/protocols to mitigate threats • Small scale nuclear plants for military installations

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