Risk methodology for uocava voting systems
This presentation is the property of its rightful owner.
Sponsored Links
1 / 19

Risk Methodology for UOCAVA Voting Systems PowerPoint PPT Presentation


  • 95 Views
  • Uploaded on
  • Presentation posted in: General

Risk Methodology for UOCAVA Voting Systems. TGDC Presentation Matt Scholl NIST, Information Technology Laboratory, Computer Security Division http://vote.nist.gov. Purpose Tutorial on Risk Methodology Definition of Terms Categorization Process Risk Decisions

Download Presentation

Risk Methodology for UOCAVA Voting Systems

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation

Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author.While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server.


- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - E N D - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Presentation Transcript


Risk methodology for uocava voting systems

Risk Methodology for UOCAVA Voting Systems

TGDC Presentation

Matt Scholl

NIST, Information Technology Laboratory,

Computer Security Division

http://vote.nist.gov


Agenda

Purpose

Tutorial on Risk Methodology

Definition of Terms

Categorization Process

Risk Decisions

Applying Risk Methodology to Voting

Agenda


Purpose

Purpose

  • Present a methodology to solicit decisions and drive requirements for voting systems.

  • The methodology is based on the NIST Risk Management Framework.

    • A foundational approach for information system security used throughout U.S., state and local Governments, private industry, and other governments world-wide.

    • Use terms and definitions found in NIST information system security publications, standards and Federal laws.


Risk methodology for uocava voting systems

Goal

  • The process will result in a set of security, auditability, human factors (usability, accessibility) mitigations molded to fit various voting architectures with varying levels of assurance and capabilities.

  • NIST will assist the TGDC in identifying and applying a risk methodology to UOCAVA voting systems.

  • The Risk Management Framework is used to make specific risk based decisions.

Security

Auditability

Accessibility/

Usability


Risk methodology tutorial

Risk Methodology Tutorial

  • Brief the TGDC on NIST risk methodology for developing security controls.

  • Ensure the TGDC understands the information needed by NIST to develop the controls.

  • Define key terms.


Security objectives

Security Objectives

  • Confidentiality

    • Preserving authorized restrictions on information access and disclosure, including means for protection of personal privacy and proprietary information.

  • Integrity

    • Guarding against improper information modification or destruction, and include ensuring information non-repudiation and authenticity.

  • Availability

    • Ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of information.

      Source: 44 U.S.C Sec. 3542


Risk approach

Risk Approach

  • Risk is a function of the following:

    • Likelihood

    • Threat

    • Vulnerability

    • Impact

  • The NIST Risk Management Framework begins with assessing the potential impact on an organization should events occur to jeopardize the information and information system.


Examples of voting information types

Examples of Voting Information Types

  • Example types of voting information:

    • Voted Ballot

    • Blank Ballot

    • Tabulation Reports

  • Example threats:

    • Loss of ballot secrecy

    • Incorrect ballot received by voter

    • Tabulation Reports cannot be accessed by voting officials


Example voting categorization step 1

Example- Voting Categorization – Step 1


Impact levels

Impact Levels

  • High Impact – severe or catastrophic adverse effect

  • Moderate Impact – serious adverse effect

  • Low Impact – limited adverse effect

  • Why is this important?

    • Common framework for expressing security needs.

    • Aids in selection of appropriate security controls.

    • TGDC identifies possible criteria for determining voting-specific impact.

      Source: FIPS 199


Example voting categorization step 2

Example- Voting Categorization – Step 2


Example voting categorization step 21

Example- Voting Categorization – Step 2


Voting categorization step 3

Confidentiality

Voted Ballot

Loss of Ballot Secrecy

Low Impact

Moderate Impact

High Impact

Voting Categorization – Step 3


Voting categorization step 31

Confidentiality

Voted Ballot

Loss of Ballot Secrecy

Low Impact

Moderate Impact

High Impact

Voting Categorization – Step 3


Security control identification

Moderate Impact

Level

Examples of Architecture Types

Electronic Delivery/Mail Return

Kiosk

PC-based

Security Controls

Security Controls

Security Controls

Security Control Identification


Security control identification1

Security Control Identification

  • Use the NIST SP 800-53 “NIST Recommended Security Controls for Federal Information Systems”.


Overall structure

Overall Structure


Overall structure1

Overall Structure


Next steps for security

Next Steps for Security

  • TGDC identifies possible:

    • Information types

    • Voting threats

    • Voting-specific impact criteria

  • NIST assists the TGDC in identifying and tailoring security controls for all impact levels and all architectures.

  • Refine security controls as architectures mature.

  • An impact level can be selected for each information type.

  • Using risk assessment – refine security controls as threats and vulnerabilities become known.


  • Login