The Case for Scenarios in London Planning: the example of migration policies

1. The Case for Scenarios in London Planning: the example of migration policies • Ian Gordon • LSE London and Spatial Economics Research Centres, • HEIF4 Development Workshop on • ‘London’s Future: a Scenario Approach’ • LSE, 29th October 2010

2. ‘Making a Drama out of a Strategy’ – or ‘keeping to the script’ ? • A decade of Mayoral planning in London → recurring pleas for consideration of alternative futures • first as reaction against Livingstone Plan’s: • deterministic high growth assumptions (‘vision’) • and lack of Plan B if infrastructure funding was unavailable • now – more vocally – at EiP on Johnson DRLP: • in relation to potential long term impacts of financial crisis • anticipated cuts in pub. exp. + ‘smaller state’ • limits on immigration from outside EU (less emphasised) • Arguments so far brushed aside, because: • current assumptions are the best available • previous experience with scenarios added nothing • ‘plan, monitor, manage’ (PPM) will provide all necessary flexibility • Plan needs to provide certainties • to investors / funders / neighbours / CG

3. Why Scenarios are Needed for Strategic Planning • Case for thinking (hard) about alternative scenarios is not just: • that there is an inbuilt expansionist bias in LP’s reading of trends; • or that recent economic/political shifts may have big LT implications • But that a strategic approach going beyond simple accommodation of immediately observable trends (now or later via PPM) involves: • A wider perspective, on fundamental processes, situations that may have to be faced and how planned actions could impinge on these • Clarifying relation between goals, fundamental values/ priorities and (uncertain) reality judgements about change and impacts of actions • Analysing how separate interventions / policies are liable to interact – via the ways that private individuals / firms respond to these • To do this requires a set of coherent ‘stories’ about how different paths of development (not just trends) might emerge, via both: • serious exercises of imagination (distinct from default internal view) + • An evidence-based understanding of how key cause-effect relations work • Even more these would be pre-requisites for any more democratic approach to long-term planning in London

4. Some Issues Needing Attention • Baseline scenario: • As best guess still prob. too ‘optimistic’ about scale of London growth (in jobs at least – cf. productivity) but key to recognise: • Likely repetition of strong boom-bust cycles (despite mild present one) • Continuing wide margins of uncertainty about trend (± 100%) • Some ‘canonical variations’ • A set of threats to underlying conditions particularly boosting London’s competitive position over past 20 years (LPUK 2009): • Financial re-regulation; a more sustainable UK macro/trade -strategy; northern revanchism in reaction to cuts vs City bailout • Two Coalition policy emphases with potential LT implications; • From big state / welfare to big society (in relation to regeneration and social geography of London housing (cf. Blair CabOff report) • Major curtailment of immigration into UK – will take as example since (think) connects with some of problems underlying neglect of scenarios

5. Thinking Strategically about London Impacts of Tighter Migration Controls • Coalition policies involve an annual limit on non-EU econ migrants • Conservatives at least expect reduction of UK net flow below 100,000 p.a. as in (most) 1990s rather than c. 200,000 as in 2000s • Potentially major impacts on London housing and labour markets • But components of population change in London are complex: • Births have become largest (positive) element • Substantial continuing (net) outward migration to rest of UK /GSE • Very uneven effects by age & all components causally linked: • Out-moving families reduce impact of London births • Out-moving older people die somewhere else • International migrants effectively displace 50% as many domestic migrants • Plan attributes upsurge in population growth since 1988 to impact of in-movement of people of child-bearing age on births • May be politic • But key element in acceleration has been international migration in young working age groups • And this is key to housing, labour market and planning implications

7. What Might a Reversal of this Change Imply? • Non-EU flow already cut back by drop in refugee admissions: • Effectively reversing rest of growth cannot be taken for granted • But simple arithmetic implies gross reduction of 50k p.a. • If 50% displacement rate continued for new arrivals (?) would imply a net change over Plan period of c. 650 k • So potentially very large effect – but how it actually plays out depends on (scarcely examined) set of housing market processes • Also true of repercussions for child population numbers • And of developments at bottom end of London labour market • Where induced fall in wages seems to have induced job growth • But also (probably) contributed to level of voluntary worklessness in London • One candidate then for serious examination in scenario terms • But lack of attention so far exemplifies two rather general points: • Issues may be neglected because it is impolitic to address them directly; • Needs much more effort to uncovering cause-effect connections and their strengths to get anywhere useful

8. Conclusion • Many different reasons to give more attention now to serious scenario work for London planning • Even if, as I tend to think: • short-medium term impacts of cuts on economy likely to be much worse elsewhere; and • long term prospects for city remain pretty good • Given the political functions of the Plan: • may be bit naïve to expect any version of to give great attention to potential down-sides or many alternative views • But PPM is not an adequate/strategic response to real / continuing uncertainties: • this needs serious wotk on some ‘canonical’ alternatives • especially if anything is to be done about the major ‘democratic deficit’ for this - primarily strategic - authority