Authentication and key agreement schemes for network applications
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Authentication and Key Agreement Schemes for Network Applications 在電腦網路應用環境中的身份認證與金鑰協議技術之研究 PowerPoint PPT Presentation


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Authentication and Key Agreement Schemes for Network Applications 在電腦網路應用環境中的身份認證與金鑰協議技術之研究. Advisor: Dr. Chin-Chen Chang Student: Hao-Chuan Tsai Date: 12.30.2010 Department of Computer Science and Information Engineering, National Chung Cheng University. Outline.

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Authentication and Key Agreement Schemes for Network Applications 在電腦網路應用環境中的身份認證與金鑰協議技術之研究

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Authentication and key agreement schemes for network applications

Authentication and Key Agreement Schemes for Network Applications在電腦網路應用環境中的身份認證與金鑰協議技術之研究

Advisor: Dr. Chin-Chen Chang

Student: Hao-Chuan Tsai

Date: 12.30.2010

Department of Computer Science and Information Engineering, National Chung Cheng University


Outline

Outline

  • Part I: Authentication Scheme with Key Agreement

    • three party authenticated key agreement

  • Part II: Anonymous Authentication Scheme for Wireless Networks


Part i authentication scheme with key agreement

Part I: Authentication Scheme with Key Agreement


User authentication

User Authentication

  • Goal:

    • Convince system of your identity before it can act on your behalf

  • Methods

    • Who you are

    • What you know

    • What you have


User authentication cont

1.025cm

1.923cm

5.39cm

8.56cm

User Authentication (cont.)

  • What you have

    • Verify identity based on possession of some object

    • Magnetic Card

    • Smart Card (IC Card)


User authentication cont1

User Authentication (cont.)

  • Who you are

    • verify identity based on your physical characteristics or involuntary response patterns known as biometrics

    • characteristics used include:

    • signature (usually dynamic)

    • fingerprint

    • hand geometry

    • face or body profile

    • speech

    • retina pattern

    • always have tradeoff between false rejection and false acceptance


User authentication cont2

User Authentication (cont.)

  • What you know

    • Birthday, School name, Blood type, or Salary ?

    • Meaningful Secrets ?

    • Meaningless Secrets (Passwords) !

  • Traditional Password Mechanism

    • Procedure:

      • 1. Prompt user for a login name and password

      • 2. Verify identity by checking that password is correct

    • Passwords in the System:

      • May be stored in clear mode

      • May be stored in cipher mode: Encrypted or One-Way Hashed

    • Passwords should be selected with care to reduce risk of exhaustive search

    • One problem with traditional passwords is caused by eavesdropping their transfer over an insecure network


User authentication cont3

User Authentication (cont.)

  • Password Practice

    • Password Complexity Criteria

      • At least 7 characters long.

      • Does not contain your User Name, Real Name, or Company Name.

      • Does not contain a complete dictionary word.

      • Is significantly different from previous passwords.

      • Contains characters from each of the following groups:

        • uppercase letters

        • lowercase letters

        • numerals

        • symbols found on the keyboard.


Key establishment

Key Establishment

  • Create Session Keys

    • Key transport

      • A session key is selected by one communication party and is distributed to others in some way

    • Key agreement

      • A session key is established by the cooperating of all communication parties


Three party authenticated key agreement 3paka

Three-Party Authenticated Key Agreement (3PAKA)

Drawbacks of 2PAKA

  • Given N parties

    • there are N(N-1)/2 (=nC2) secret keys that should be established

    • each party should securely store N-1 secret keys

  • Awkward for larger-scale networks

  • Inflexible (difficult to add, update, or delete a party)

  • Example

    • If N = 6, then there are 6(6-1)/2 = 15 secret keys should be established in advance.


Three party authenticated key agreement 3paka cont

Three-Party Authenticated Key Agreement (3PAKA) (cont.)

  • An authenticated key agreement protocol is an interactive method for two or more parties to determine session keys based on their secret keys or public/private keys.

Trusted server

Authentication

Authentication

Key agreement / key exchange

SK

Secure communication


Typical 3paka

Typical 3PAKA


Weaknesses of typical 3paka

Weaknesses of Typical 3PAKA

  • Impersonation attacks

    • Impersonate clients or the server

  • Man-in-the-middle attacks

  • On-line password guessing attacks

  • Off-line password guessing attacks

    • The most powerful attack


The proposed 3paka 1 4

The Proposed 3PAKA (1/4)

  • The server needs to authenticate the communication clients explicitly

  • The established session key would not revealed to either the server or others

  • Round efficiency


The proposed 3paka 2 4

The Proposed 3PAKA (2/4)

  • Initial phase

    • The server computes

    • And then the server computes

    • Server also finds a value rc to satisfy the equation

      and computes


The proposed 3paka 3 4

The Proposed 3PAKA (3/4)

2.

S

1.

A

B


The proposed 3paka 4 4

compute

compute

The Proposed 3PAKA (4/4)

S

3

retrieve

derive

4

A

B


Part i i anonymous authentication scheme for wireless networks

Part I I : Anonymous Authentication Scheme for Wireless Networks


Scenario

Roaming path

Scenario


Architecture

Architecture

  • Multiple regional domain

    • Each domain is operated under a different administration

  • HLR (Home Location Register)

    • HLR is used to denote the home domain, the home domain server, and the home location register, concurrently.

    • A subscriber has only one home as his administrative domain

      • One who desiring to contact MS must consult his HLR.

  • VLR (Visiting Location Register)

    • VLR is used to denote the visiting domain, the visiting domain server, and the visiting location register, concurrently.

    • When a subscriber roams into a visited domain, he should initially establish a residence within that domain.


Authentication and key agreement schemes for network applications

VLR needs to ensure that MS is currently in good status.

VLR

HLR

MS

IMSI

IMSI, VLR

Computes:

SRES1 = A3(Ki, RAND1), Kc1 = A8(Ki, RAND1)

SRES2 = A3(Ki, RAND2), Kc2 = A8(Ki, RAND2)

SRESn = A3(Ki, RANDn), Kcn = A8(Ki, RANDn)

IMSI, (RAND1, SRES1, Kc1),

(RAND2, SRES2, Kc2),

…,

(RANDn , SRESn, Kcn).

RAND1

(Unspecified Secure Channel)

Multiple on-the-fly triplets should be on-line generated and transferred in batch to the VLR. Then, VLR can use them in successive authentication flows with the roaming MS.

Computes: (inside SIM)

SRES1 = A3(Ki, RAND1)

Kc1 = A8(Ki, RAND1)

SRES1

Computes:

enc_with_ A5(Kc1, TMSI)

enc_with_ A5(Kc1, TMSI)

Decrypts:

enc_with_ A5(Kc1, TMSI)

MS establishes a temporary residence in the visited domain.


Authentication and key agreement schemes for network applications

VLR

MS

TMSI

RANDm

Computes: (inside SIM)

SRESm = A3(Ki, RANDm)

Kcm = A8(Ki, RANDm)

SRESm

enc_with_A5(Kcm, messages)

VLR

MS

TMSI, RANDm

Computes: (inside SIM)

SRESm= A3(Ki, RANDm)

Kcm = A8(Ki, RANDm)

SRESm

enc_with_A5(Kcm, messages)

When MS makes a call, the origination protocol is then invoked to authenticate himself to VLR and establish a session key.


Authentication in wireless mobile networks cont

Authentication in Wireless Mobile Networks (cont.)


Authentication in wireless mobile networks

Authentication in Wireless Mobile Networks


Authentication in wireless mobile networks cont1

Authentication in Wireless Mobile Networks (cont.)


Authentication in wireless mobile networks cont2

Authentication in Wireless Mobile Networks (cont.)

  • The main problems we suffer

    • Impersonation Attack

      • Attackers can impersonate either MS or FA to obtain secret information

    • Personal Privacy Problem

      • The identity of MS can be revealed to others


Authentication in wireless mobile networks cont3

Authentication in Wireless Mobile Networks (cont.)

  • The proposed scheme has the following characteristics

    • Provide mutual authentication

      • A mobile client and the communicating entities can be authentic

    • An established session key would not revealed to either the uninvolved servers or others

    • Diverting the most complicated operations to either the HLR or VLR

    • The risk of compromising the secret information stored on HLR is reduced

    • Ensure anonymity


Authentication in wireless mobile networks cont4

Authentication in Wireless Mobile Networks (cont.)

  • Initial phase

    • Sh chooses a long-term private key xsh. ( YSh=xshG)

    • Sh generates a unique master secret for an MS,

      where

    • Sh also generates the self-verified items

    • Eventually, Sh computes as the master delegation key


Authentication in wireless mobile networks cont5

Authentication in Wireless Mobile Networks (cont.)

  • It is worth noting that, if the secrets are generated by the home network for which the public key is YSh, an MS can verify the secrets successfully since


Authentication in wireless mobile networks cont6

Authentication in Wireless Mobile Networks (cont.)


Security requirements

Security Requirements


Performance comparisons

Performance Comparisons


Future works

Future works

  • Cloud Computing


Thanks for your attention

Thanks for your attention


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