Strengths and weaknesses of the existing mechanisms the bwc and its evolving role
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BWC IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT UNIT. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS. Strengths and weaknesses of the existing mechanisms: the BWC and its evolving role. Richard Lennane Head, BWC Implementation Support Unit United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (Geneva Branch).

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Strengths and weaknesses of the existing mechanisms: the BWC and its evolving role

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Strengths and weaknesses of the existing mechanisms the bwc and its evolving role

BWC

IMPLEMENTATION

SUPPORT UNIT

UNITED NATIONS

OFFICE FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS

Strengths and weaknesses of theexisting mechanisms:the BWC and its evolving role

Richard Lennane

Head, BWC Implementation Support Unit

United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs(Geneva Branch)

Beijing, China,4-6 November 2010


Bwc strengths and weaknesses

BWC strengths and weaknesses

  • Strengths:

    • Clear, comprehensive ban: no exceptions, few loopholes

    • Strong international norm, never publicly challenged

    • Futureproof (so far...)

  • Weaknesses:

    • No organisation or implementing body

    • No systematic monitoring of implementation or compliance

    • No systematic assessment of needs or provision of assistance

    • Uneven national implementation

    • No mechanism for investigating alleged violations

    • Conceived to deal with state-based BW programs: covers bioterrorism only indirectly

Beijing, China,4-6 November 2010


Weapons of mass destruction

Chemical

Weapons

Biological

Weapons

Nuclear

Weapons

Chemical

Weapons

Convention

Biological

Weapons

Convention

Nuclear

Non-proliferation

Treaty

Organization for

the Prohibition of

Chemical Weapons

?

International

Atomic Energy

Agency

Weapons of Mass Destruction

Beijing, China,4-6 November 2010


Biothreats the 21st century view

Biothreats: the 21st Century view

  • Government biological weapons programs

  • Non-state actors: bioterrorism

  • Naturally-occurring, emerging and re-emerging disease

  • Rapidly growing biotech capabilities, shrinking costs, and widely expanding interest, participation, availability and access

    • Unintended consequences, experiments gone wrong

    • Accidents, leaks, mistakes – or deliberate misuse or sabotage (bio-terror vs. bio-error)

    • Awareness and management of risks lagging far behind

Beijing, China,4-6 November 2010


The spectrum of biological risk

Natural disease outbreak

WHO

BWC

Unintended consequences

Vandalism, sabotage

Deliberate use of BW

Accidents

Negligence

The Spectrum of Biological Risk

“We must look at [the BWC] as part of an interlinked array of tools, designed to deal with an interlinked array of problems” – Kofi Annan, 2006

Beijing, China,4-6 November 2010


Strengthening the bwc the new way

Strengthening the BWC: the new way

  • Focus on improving and coordinating national implementation of BWC

  • Annual work programme deals with specific topics; exchange of technical expertise

  • Range of different actors and organisations involved

  • Implementation Support Unit coordinates activity

  • Renewed focus on CBMs, universalization

Beijing, China,4-6 November 2010


New bwc approach a network model

OIE

WHO

FAO

New BWC approach: a network model

BWC

INTERPOL

SCR 1540

Work

Program

ISU

State

State

Professional

associations

Industry

Scientific

organisations

Beijing, China,4-6 November 2010


Security vs development

Security vs. Development?

Art I / III

Art X

Beijing, China,4-6 November 2010


Security vs development1

Security vs. Development?

Art X

Art I / III

Beijing, China,4-6 November 2010


Security vs development2

Security vs. Development?

Art I / III

Art X

Beijing, China,4-6 November 2010


A new vision of the bwc

A new vision of the BWC

Art. I / III

Art. X

Mutual reinforcement: cooperation reduces risks; reducing risks encourages cooperation.

Beijing, China,4-6 November 2010


The new vision examples

The new vision: examples

  • Kofi Annan (2006): “Building public health capacities can strengthen safeguards against bioterrorism. And being better prepared to deal with terrorism can mean better public health systems overall. Similarly, the availability of training and technology is crucial to improving laboratory safety and security, and making labs safe and secure encourages cooperation and creates opportunities for development.”

  • USA (2009): “In order to implement our Article X commitments, it is critical that we work together to achieve, sustain and improve international capacity to detect, report and respond to outbreaks of disease, whether deliberate, accidental or natural ... Greater cooperation and technical assistance are key to achieving and sustaining the capabilities we need to prevent biological weapons use and to combat infectious diseases.”

Beijing, China,4-6 November 2010


Strengthening the regime

Strengthening the regime

BWC

National implementation

Non-state partners

International/collective

Legislation/regulations

Professional bodies

Organization?

Biosafety/biosecurity

Science & academia

Monitoring/assessment?

Enforcement capacity

Industry?

Investigations?

Export controls

Beijing, China,4-6 November 2010


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